N-11305

N-11305

FO No. 8

81ST INF DIV.

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AUTH: CG 81 Inf Div
INIT: [redacted] ACofS,G-3
DATE: 16 September 1945

UNCLASSIFIED

81 INF DIV (Reinf)
LEYTE, P. I.
1200, 16 September 1945

CHANGE NO. 1)
:
TO FO NO. 8)

S-1305

(2)

JUN 21 1965

1. Annex No. 2 is changed as follows:

MAP: Northern Japan 1/250,000, 4 sheets as distributed.

a. Divide Military District No. 2 into Subdistricts A and B along the GUN, SHI LINE (See Map Legend) (736.0-1996.0) - (743.5-2026.0) - (765.5-2025.0) - (776.5-2039.0). Subdistrict A lies to the north and west and Subdistrict B to the south and east of dividing line.

b. Redesignate Military District No. 3 as Subdistrict C and Military District No. 4 as Subdistrict D. Subdistricts C and D constitute Military District No. 3.

c. Delete Military District No. 4.

d. Corps south boundary is designated as O-4 line.

2. Annex No. 3 is changed as follows:

Par 2: Delete Det 558th Ordnance Tank Maintenance Company; substitute 887th Port Company for 266th Port Company.

3. Annex No. 5 is changed as follows:

Delete Par 1b.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL MUELLER:

ANDREW E. FORSYTH,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. J. LAPPAGE,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-3.

19 OCT 1945

[redacted]

81-3955
P.O. REG #81005

CHANGE NO. 1 to FO NO. 8 cont'd.

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AUTH: CG 81 Inf Div
INIT: [redacted] ACofS,G-3
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81 INF DIV (Reinf)
LEYTE, P. I.
1200, 16 September 1945

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FO NO. 8

MAPS: (1) Northern Japan, 1/250,000, 4 Sheets as distributed.
(2) Northern Honshu, 1/50,000, multiple sheets as distributed.
(3) Japan City Plans, 1/26,000, HIROSAKI
(4) Japan City Plans, 1/26,000, AOMORI

1. a. (1) JAPAN is rapidly being occupied by Allied troops under terms of the surrender.

(2) Annex No. 1, Intelligence.

b. (1) The EIGHTH ARMY consisting of the IX, XI, and XIV CORPS comprises the Occupation Forces for northern HONSHU and other areas.

(2) The IX CORPS consisting of the 77th and 81st INF DIVS, moves by naval transportation, in echelon with ADV HQ IX CORPS and 81 INF DIV in advance, occupies the AOMORI Prefecture, northern HONSHU, and will extend occupation to Island of HOKKAIDO.

(3) Naval and air forces will provide escort and support for amphibious landings as required. Naval forces are now securing the ocean areas contiguous to and within northern HONSHU and the enemy naval base at OMINATO.

2. a. 81 INF DIV (Reinf) will embark at LEYTE, P. I., beginning loading of cargo 10 September 1945, and move about 18 September 1945 under naval control to the vicinity of AOMORI, HONSHU, where it will land in amphibious assault formation, initially establish a beachhead, and occupy and secure the city and port of AOMORI and contiguous territory. It will be prepared for prompt extension of occupation of AOMORI Prefecture less such portions as may be allocated to Navy control.

[redacted]

81-3955

2. b. Missions of Division after securing AOMORI beaches:

(1) Take such steps as may be necessary to insure prompt compliance with terms of surrender.

(2) Insure that elements of the Japanese Army and its auxiliaries are disarmed and demobilized in accordance with terms of surrender.

(3) Institute military government for the purpose of maintaining law and order within zone of action, utilizing to the fullest the recognized Japanese officials. It will supervise the activities of the AOMORI Prefectural Government to the degree prescribed by HQ IX CORPS (Annex No. 4, Adm O No. 7).

c. Formation for landing on AOMORI Beaches: 2 RCTs in assault; RCT 322 on the right, RCT 323 on the left, RCT 321 in reserve.

d. Time of landing: O-Day and H-Hour to be announced.

e. (1) Troops: See Annex No. 3 for composition of RCTs and embarkation groups, and commanders.

(2) Military District Commanders:
Military District No. 1, under direct command of DHQ until transferred to CG ASCOM 8-2.
Military District No. 2, Brigadier General Rex W. Beasley.
Military District No. 3, Brigadier General Marcus B. Bell.

f. For objectives, boundaries, beaches, and occupation areas (Military Districts) see Annex No. 2, Operations Map.

g. For Tables of Embarkation, see Adm O No. 7.

3. a. RCT 322 will land on Beaches RED 1 and RED 2 on O-Day, H-Hour with two BLTs abreast, advance to O-1 line, securing the dock facilities in AOMORI, the AOMORI AIRFIELD, and Bridges over the TSUTSUMI-GAWA in AOMORI. Except for necessary security elements required in AOMORI, the town will be cleared promptly. Assembly area for regiment, less detachments, in the vicinity of SHINJO (785.5-2043.0). On order of DHQ it will advance to O-2 line occupying the towns of DAISHAKA and KANIDA (near O-2 line), prepared to continue advance to successive objective lines in its zone and on order to concentrate in Sub-District B of Military District No. 2.

3. b. RCT 323 will land on Beaches GREEN 1 and GREEN 2 on C-Day, H-Hour, with two BLTs abreast, advance to O-1 line, securing the portion of the city of AOMORI within its zone, and the oil storage facilities at NONAI. Except for necessary security elements required in AOMORI the town will be cleared promptly. Assembly area for regiment, less Detachments, in the vicinity of NONAI (800.0-2045.0). On order of DHQ it will advance to secure the town and port facilities of NOHEJI and the towns of ARITO and CHIBIKI (near O-2 line). It will be prepared to continue advance to successive objective lines in its zone and on order to concentrate in Sub-District D of Military District No. 3.

c. RCT 321 will land on Beaches GREEN 1 and 2 on orders from DHQ, move to an assembly area E of ASAMUSHI (803.5-2049.5) and be prepared to move on orders from DHQ to secure and occupy Sub-District C of Military District No. 3.

d. DIV ARTY, less 4 battalions, will land over Beach RED. Artillery battalions attached to RCTs, on order of DHQ, will revert to Div Arty control and assemble in a bivouac area 2000 yards west of SHINJO (785.5-2043.0). Div Arty will be prepared to move to and occupy Sub-District A.

e. 81 CAV RCN TR will land on Beach GREEN, prepared to conduct reconnaissances on any roads within the Division area and to assist Div Provost Marshal in accomplishment of his mission.

f. 306 ENGR (C) BN (less 3 Plats) will be prepared to land on orders of DHQ, move promptly to initial assembly area at KOTATE LUMBER MILL south of AOMORI, prepared to execute missions assigned (Adm O No. 7).

g. 306 MED BN (less 3 Coll Cos) with 41 Port Surg Hosp and 65 Port Surg Hosp attached will land on orders DHQ, move to assembly area in vicinity of SHINJO and establish a temporary Division Clearing Station and to provide further medical support of Division (Adm O No. 7). It will be prepared to establish Clearing Stations at HIROSAKI and HACHINOHE on orders of DHQ.

h. 543 ENGR B&S REGT (less Dets) with attached troops (See Annex No. 3) will be prepared to assist in ship-to-shore movement of troops and equipment as directed by Naval Commander and to land on Division order to establish, operate, and maintain Beaches RED and GREEN and port facilities as directed (Adm O No. 7).

[redacted]

FO NO. 8 cont'd.

3. i. SPECIAL TROOPS, less units specifically excepted and ADVANCE DHQ, will land on orders of DHQ; move promptly to assembly area near RJ at (786.2-2040.3). It will be prepared for further advance on orders of DHQ.

j. ADVANCE PARTY DHQ: Subject to instructions of Hq IX CORPS an advance party DHQ consisting of Command and Staff personnel of DHQ and reconnaissance parties of Embarkation Groups will land at AOMORI to complete detailed arrangements with appropriate Japanese military and civil authorities for the reconnaissance of beaches and other landing facilities.

k. First echelon IX CORPS troops scheduled to debark at AOMORI will land on order of DHQ. The Assistant Division Commander will exercise general supervision over these troops until they revert to IX CORPS control.

x. (1) Units crossing beaches will be alert to the possibilities of mines and booby traps.

(2) All troops will remain in a continual state of combat readiness until otherwise directed.

(3) See Annex No. 4.

4. See Adm O No. 7.

5. a. Index to SOI 1-9, Index to SSI 1-4.

b. CPs:

Adv IX Corps 81 Inf Div	LEYTE-USS APPALACHIAN Closes LEYTE 2100, 17 Sept, opens USS MAYFIELD same hour. After debarkation, Japanese Government Building in center of AOMORI.
RCT 321	USS CROCKETT - Vicinity of ASAMUSHI
RCT 322	USS KENSHAW - Vicinity of SHINJO
RCT 323	USS ROCKWELL - Vicinity of NONAI
81 Inf Div Base Echelon	RIZAL, LEYTE.

[redacted]

FO NO. 8 cont'd.

5. c. See Annex No. 5, Signal Communications.

PAUL J. MUELLER
Major General, U. S. A.
Commanding.

ANNEXES:
Annex No. 1 - Intelligence
Annex No. 2 - Operations Map
Annex No. 3 - Troops
Annex No. 4 - Conduct of Troops and Relations with Civilians.
Annex No. 5 - Signal Communications.

DISTRIBUTION:

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AUTH: CG 81st Inf Div
INIT: [redacted] CofS, G-2
DATE: 10 September 1945

81 INF DIV (Reinf)
LEYTE, P.I.,
1200, 10 September 1945

ANNEX NO. 1 TO ACCOMPANY
FO NO. 8, 81 INF DIV

I N T E L L I G E N C E

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Our heavy bombardment of TOKYO and other cities of Central and Northern HONSHU has caused the almost complete destruction of a large portion of the built-up area of those cities. Public utilities and transportation facilities have been hard hit. Millions of persons are homeless and are suffering from shortage of food and other necessities. It is also probable that normal governmental functions have been seriously disrupted by the death of key officials and destruction of government buildings, with the consequent loss of important records. The Japanese Navy, and to a lesser extent, the Air Force have been largely neutralized. The ground forces, however, still retain a formidable fighting potential. (See Appendix No. 1).

b. Air strikes in AOMORI have caused considerable damage. The majority of the schools and governmental buildings have been destroyed, and the dock area has suffered some damage. The railroads and marshalling yards are intact as are also the bridges over the TSUTSUMI-GAWA. The commercial and residential district between the TSUTSUMI-GAWA and the ferry marshalling yard suffered most heavily.

c. The extremely unpredictable nature of the Japanese character makes it difficult to judge accurately what the reaction of the populace will be to our occupation. In the past, there have been no instances of surrender of large organized groups of either civilians or military personnel. The only precedent at hand is the reaction of small groups and individuals to surrender. In the main they have proved docile and willing to cooperate. The Japanese armed forces and the populace on the whole will comply with surrender terms if such compliance is initially directed by or through the Emperor. Secret societies, however, with their fanatical beliefs may offer resistance in the form of espionage, sabotage, assassinations and organization of underground movements.

d. In addition to the peculiar national psychology of the Japanese, a considerable language barrier exists. Because of the limited Allied language personnel and the tremendous amount of language involved, maximum use must be made of local English-speaking Japanese. It is estimated that approximately 15% of the Japanese have a speaking knowledge of English.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. Will the enemy offer armed resistance in the initial phases of our landing and occupation?

b. Will any elements of the Japanese armed forces refuse to comply with surrender terms?

c. Will the Japanese civil population refuse to cooperate with our occupation forces? If so, what will be the nature and extent of their opposition?

d. Will the secret societies offer resistance to our occupation forces? If so, which societies will resist and what will be the nature of their effort?

3. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE TASKS.

a. Secure and safeguard intelligence information of value to the U.S.

b. Suppress activities of individuals and organizations which may be inimical to the operations of the occupational forces.

c. Investigate war criminals.

4. ESTIMATED ORDER OF PRIORITY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE TASKS.

a. Initiate investigation of intelligence objectives and establish intelligence control of specific individuals. (See Appendix No. 12).

b. Preservation and security of documents and archives.

c. Locate and investigate all Japanese organizations for espionage, sabotage and subversive activities.

5. SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE TASKS. Intelligence functions to be performed by Headquarters 81st Infantry Division and its subordinate units within assigned zone of action will be:

a. Carry out general intelligence tasks listed in paragraph 3 above, in conformity with established theater policies and specific directives to be issued by this headquarters.

b. Arrange for the safeguarding and control of documents, making them available on approval of DHQ to agencies requiring their use.

c. Early security and exploitation of intelligence targets according to priorities to be established.

d. Execution of counterintelligence measures.

e. Control and disposition of enemy headquarters below army group level as directed.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. General. - SOP.

b. Civil Censorship.

(1) Japanese communication facilities will be permitted to continue in operation for the use of officials of the Japanese Government acting under instructions of GHQ and Army Headquarters unless it becomes apparent that such facilities are being employed in a manner adverse to the best interests of Allied occupation forces.

(2) Unit commanders will report to DHQ all cases where it is thought that the operation of any communication facilities is contrary to Allied interests.

(3) Where practical employees and officials of telegraph, telephone, and radio agencies whether under civilian or state ownership will continue operating in their professional duties under such supervision as DHQ may prescribe. Unit commanders will submit their recommendations to DHQ covering supervision of facilities within their zones of occupation.

(4) Radio broadcast networks will operate under supervision of the IX Corps Commander.

(5) Active surveillance of wire and cable circuits will be maintained to prevent illicit transmissions by Japanese civilians or military personnel. In the absence of civil censorship personnel the CIC will assist in the required control.

(6) Details for operation of civil censorship detachments, if attached, will be published later.

c. Counterintelligence Corps.

(1) All CIC personnel attached to the Division will execute counterintelligence missions as directed by the Commanding Officer 48th Area Detachment.

(2) Personnel of the 48th Area Detachment and 81st CIC Detachment will be placed with infantry regiments to assist with search for and seizure of documents and records containing important intelligence and counterintelligence information; and to investigate espionage, sabotage and other subversive activity. They will operate under instructions from DHQ but will coordinate their efforts with unit commanders and assist unit intelligence officers in carrying out their counterintelligence missions.

(3) CIC Detachments will:

(a) Investigate and clear key Japanese officials for military government authorities.

(b) Advise and assist military government and military police authorities on the issuance and enforcement of regulations and proclamations governing the movement and travel of

civilians. Initially, all individuals will be restricted to their immediate communities and travel and communication prohibited. Such rigid control may be gradually relaxed.

(c) Investigate and seize, or impose suitable restrictions on, non-Japanese individuals who are determined to be inimical to the interests of the United States.

(d) Advise commanders concerning the physical security of our own installations and maintenance of security of information within United States Army units.

(e) Supervise and cooperate in the seizure of all public or private water plants, electric plants, or other public utilities.

(f) Cooperate in the establishment of a civilian identification and pass system.

(g) Insure the positive identification of all persons entering or departing from restricted areas.

d. Units taking over documents, public buildings, archives, prisoner of war camps, public works and other military objectives will place guards around them for security and will report immediately the location and nature of the installation to this headquarters. Operation of the installation will not be interfered with and no positive action will be taken except to preserve the installation and prevent destruction or sabotage of any part of it. A detailed list of intelligence objectives is shown in Appendix No. 12.

e. Linguists: Maximum use will be made of English-speaking Japanese nationals in work where their knowledge thereof does not involve a security risk. They will not be used in the interrogation of members of the HOKURYU-KAI (Black Dragon Society), TOKUMU KIKAN, KEMPEI TAI, NISSHO, or other terrorist organizations, or in the translation of documents pertaining to them. They may be used for normal interrogation and translation of such documents as a member of the Division Language Team may determine are not of a highly secretive nature.

7. HANDLING AND TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS, INTERROGATION AND INTERPRETATION.

a. General. - SOP.

(1) Documents will be secured and safeguarded as soon as located and report made to DHQ.

(2) No documents will be moved from their locations without the approval of the Division AC of S, G-2.

b. Diplomatic and Consular Documents.

(1) Such documents in the custody of the protecting power (neutral) will be respected.

ANNEX NO. 1 TO ACCOMPANY FO NO. 8, 81 INF DIV (cont'd).

(2) Documents not in the custody of the protecting power (neutral) will be guarded pending instructions from DHQ as to their disposal.

(3) If substantial reason exists for believing diplomatic or consular premises are used for war-like operations, the protecting power (neutral) may be asked for permission to search the premises. If permission is refused report will be made to DHQ.

c. Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Suspects: SOP.

8. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE. Captured materiel will be handled as provided by Division SOP except that it will not be removed from the objective area.

9. AUGMENTATION OF PERSONNEL.

a. 81st Reconnaissance Troop will be prepared to accomplish specific counter-intelligence missions under the supervision of CIC personnel.

b. It is anticipated that English-speaking Japanese nationals recruited through Military Government and checked by CIC will be available to assist units of the Division in handling their interrogation problems.

c. Technical Intelligence Teams may be attached to the Division. When attached they will operate under the special staff officer of their corresponding service in accordance with theater policies.

10. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS. SOP.

11. REPORTS.

a. General. - SOP.

b. Violations of surrender terms involving enemy activity will be transmitted immediately to G-2 by URGENT message.

c. Daily S-2 Periodic Reports required by Division SOP will be submitted as of 1800 to reach DHQ by 2000.

MUELLER
Maj Gen

OFFICIAL: Goddard
GODDARD
G-2

12 APPENDICES:

APPENDIX NO. 1 - Order of Battle and Military Installations (w/1 Incl.).

APPENDIX NO. 2 — Japanese Intelligence, Political and Other Organizations.
APPENDIX NO. 3 - Terrain Study and Military Geography.
APPENDIX NO. 4 - Climate and Weather - AOMORI Area (w/2 Incls.).
APPENDIX NO. 5 - Beach Reports - AOMORI Prefecture.
APPENDIX NO. 6 - Port Facilities of AOMORI Prefecture (w/3 Incls.).
APPENDIX NO. 7 - Transportation Facilities.
APPENDIX NO. 8 - Communications (w/1 Incl.).
APPENDIX NO. 9 - Health and Sanitation, Northern HONSHU.
APPENDIX NO. 10 - Social and Political Organization of AOMORI Prefecture (w/1 Incl.).
APPENDIX NO. 11 - Industries and Resources, AOMORI Prefecture (w/1 Incl.).
APPENDIX NO. 12 - Intelligence Objectives.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as FO No. 8


SKETCH MAP
PREFECTURE OF
AOMORI
Scale 1: 700,000
From Map-Central Japan Scale 1:250,000
Prepared by AC of S, G-2 81st Inf. Division
20 August 1945
Spot Elevations in Feet
Legend
Cities 20,000-100,000 Population
Cities 5,000-20,000 Population
Towns 1,000-5,000 Population
Primary Highway 24 ft. or more
Improved Roads 18 ft. to 24 ft.
Railroads-Standard Gauge
Railroads-Narrow Gauge
Prefectural Boundary
Rice Fields
Barracks
Ammunition Dump
Warehouses
Oil Storage
Air Depot
Remount Depot
Airfield
Probable Defensive Areas
Allied PW Camps
Phase Line
Unit Boundary Line
Military District Boundary
SECRET
Annex No. 2 to FO No. 8
OPERATIONS MAP
Official: MUELLER CG
SEA OF JAPAN
TSUGARU KAIKYO
SHIMOKITA PENINSULA
PACIFIC OCEAN
MUTSU-WAN
AOMORI-WAN
TSUGARU MOUNTAINS
TSUGARU LOWLANDS
AOMORI PLAIN
CENTRAL RANGE
WESTERN RANGES
HACHINOHE LOWLAND
KITAKAMI HIGHLAND
FORT ??
KABAYAMA A/F
NAVAL BASE
HINOKI A/F
MISAWA A/F
HACHINOHE A/F
HIROSAKI A/F
AOMORI A/F
Barracks 3,000 MEN
57 DP
Mil. Dist. #1
Mil. Dist. #2
Mil. Dist. #3
Mil. Dist. #4
AOMORI
HIROSAKI
HACHINOHE
GOSHOGAWARA
TOWADA-KO
ODATE
AOMORI-KEN
AKITA-KEN
IWATE-KEN
Reproduced by Photographic and Reproduction Section, 81st Inf. Div.

[redacted]

AUTH: CG 81st Inf Div
INIT: [illegible] ACofS G-3
DATE: 10 September 1945

81 INF DIV (Reinf)
LEYTE, P. I.
1200, 10 September 1945

ANNEX NO. 3 TO)
:
FO NO. 8)

TROOPS

1. RCTs are constituted as follows:

a. RCT 321 (First Embarkation Group) Col Robert F. Dark, Infantry, Commanding:

321st Infantry (less Cannon Company)
316th Field Artillery Battalion
1 Platoon Co A 306th Engineer (Combat) Battalion
Co A 306th Medical Battalion
Det 2216th Transport Quartermaster Team
35th Visual Control Party
Det 313th Headquarters Intelligence Detachment
Det 81st Counter Intelligence Corps
Det 781st Ordnance (Light Maintenance) Company

b. RCT 322 (Second Embarkation Group) Col James C. Short, Infantry, Commanding:

322nd Infantry (less Cannon Company)
317th Field Artillery Battalion
Co B 306th Medical Battalion
1 Platoon Co B 306th Engineer (Combat) Battalion
Det 2216th Transport Quartermaster Team
36th Visual Control Party
Det 313th Headquarters Intelligence Detachment
Det 81st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
Det 781st Ordnance (Light Maintenance) Company

c. RCT 323 (Third Embarkation Group) Col Arthur P. Watson, Infantry, Commanding:

323rd Infantry (less Cannon Company)
906th Field Artillery Battalion
Co C 306th Medical Battalion

[redacted]

81-3898

ANNEX NO. 3 TO FO NO. 8, cont'd.

RCT 323, cont'd.

1 Platoon Co C 306th Engineer (Combat) Battalion
Det 2216th Transport Quartermaster Team
37th Visual Control Party
Det 313th Headquarters Intelligence Detachment
Det 81st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
Det 781st Ordnance (Light Maintenance) Company

2. Troops not assigned to RCTs, as follows, constitute the Fourth Embarkation Group, Brig Gen Rex W. Beasley, Commanding:

Headquarters 81st Infantry Division
Division Artillery, 81st Infantry Division (less 4 battalions)
Headquarters Special Troops, 81st Infantry Division
Headquarters Company 81st Infantry Division
37th Order of Battle Team
159th Photo Interpreter Team
313th Headquarters Intelligence Detachment (less 3 detachments)
343rd Interrogator Team
371st Interpreter Team
388th Translator Team
81st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment (less 3 detachments)
Headquarters Counter Intelligence Corps Area No. 48
3235th Signal Photo Detachment
2216th Transport Quartermaster Team (less 3 detachments)
30th Support Air Party
781st Ordnance (Light Maintenance) Company (less 3 Dets)
Det 558th Ordnance Tank Maintenance Company
81st Quartermaster Company
Band, 81st Infantry Division
Military Police Platoon 81st Infantry Division
81st Signal Company
634th Ordnance Ammunition Company
81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop
306th Engineer (Combat) Battalion (less 3 Plats)
306th Medical Battalion (less 3 Coll Cos)
41st Portable Surgical Hospital
65th Portable Surgical Hospital
543rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (less Co A and 1 Plat Co B)

ANNEX NO. 3 TO FO NO. 8, cont'd.

543rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, cont'd.

1462nd Engineer Boat Maintenance Company (less 1 Plat)
Det 163rd Ordnance Maintenance Company
3160th Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon
Co A 263rd Medical Battalion
155th Engineer (Combat) Battalion
184th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 207th Quartermaster Battalion (Mobile)
3447th Quartermaster Truck Company
3474th Quartermaster Truck Company
3475th Quartermaster Truck Company
985th Quartermaster Service Company
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 493rd Port Battalion
266th Port Company
314th Port Company
402nd Port Company
610th Port Company
239th Military Police Company

3. Base Echelon 81st Infantry Division, Lt. Col. Richard L. Pooley, Infantry, Commander, comprised as follows will remain at Leyte, P. I., pending available shipping:

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Base Echelon, 81st Infantry Division
*710th Tank Battalion
318th Field Artillery Battalion
Cannon Company, 321st Infantry
Cannon Company, 322nd Infantry
Cannon Company, 323rd Infantry
184th Chemical Service Platoon
*43rd Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

* Detached from 81st Infantry Division effective upon embarkation of assault elements of 81st Infantry Division.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL MUELLER:

OFFICIAL:

J. J. LAPPAGE,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-3.

ANDREW E. FORSYTH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

[redacted] Inf Div
INIT: ACofS,G-3
DATE: 16 September 1945

81 INF DIV (Reinf)
LEYTE, P. I.
1200, 16 September 1945

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ANNEX NO. 4)
TO FO NO. 8)

CONDUCT OF TROOPS AND RELATIONS WITH CIVILIANS

References: a. Paragraphs 8 and 9a and b, Part Two, SOP.

b. Appendices Nos 2 and 10 to Annex No. 1 to FO No. 8

c. FM's 27-5 and 27-10

d. Annex No. 4 to Adm O No. 7

1. The quelling of all armed resistance and establishment of a state of Security in the occupied area is a tactical function.

2. An overwhelming display of force will be used whenever practicable in an effort to preclude occurrences or incidents of definitely unfriendly acts by the Japanese.

3. Troops will not fire unless fired upon.

4. Operations against recalcitrant enemy elements will be instituted without delay.

5. All enemy active resistance will be destroyed, utilizing the minimum force necessary to expeditiously accomplish the mission.

6. All commanders are responsible that small, sporadic outbreaks do not spread to a general fire fight.

7. All commanders will take positive action to insure:

a. That private property is not confiscated or damaged except as military necessity requires and then only on the orders of responsible authority.

[redacted]

[redacted] 81-3955

7. b. That confiscated stores and equipment are secured against pilferage and looting by members of our forces or by local inhabitants.

c. That within assigned zones of responsibility adequate protection is afforded objects of art, historic and religious monuments and their contents. All individuals will be impressed with the fact that profanation of shrines and holy places, even if unintentional, will only prejudice our efforts to achieve a peaceful and firm occupation.

8. a. Instructions relative disarming of civilian and military personnel will be communicated to senior commanders at a later date.

b. Unit commanders will report to DHQ locations of dumps containing ordnance stores. When located, guards will be placed on dumps and an inventory taken.

c. Local police will be allowed to retain such weapons as deemed necessary by DHQ. In case of doubt as to type and number of arms to be retained by local police senior commanders will refer the question to DHQ for decision.

d. Japanese military or civilian personnel will be disarmed by appropriate Japanese officials. No personnel of the US Armed Forces will disarm any military or civilian personnel except in an emergency.

9. Circulation and movement of population will be controlled to the extent necessary to prevent mass demonstrations, promote security, and to prevent interference with military traffic.

10. Initially a policy of complete non-fraternization will be strictly enforced. No unofficial or social dealings of any kind will be had with Japanese personnel, military or civilian. Violations and infractions of this code will be severely punished.

11. All commanders are responsible for the maintenance of a high and meticulous standard of conduct, discipline, and personal appearance among all troops.

12. All personnel will be advised that they will be considered by the Japanese as representatives of our people and nation. As such, their actions will determine the extent to which the prestige of the United States will be enhanced or adversely affected.

13. Troops will adopt a firm and dignified manner toward the Japanese people at all times. Rowdiness, free camaraderie, and lack of formality are not understood under the Japanese social order, and are considered by the Japanese to be outward manifestations of an uneducated, barbarous, weak, and vacillatory people and civilization.

14. All Japanese nationals will be excluded from bivouac areas except on official business. When permitted to enter they will be confined in a clearly defined area designated for and restricted to the transaction of business. They will be kept under the surveillance of an armed guard at all times. Areas designated for such purposes will be near camp entrances and will be so arranged to prevent observation of the internal camp area, installations or activities.

15. Except when on duty no personnel will be allowed to leave a unit bivouac area.

16. Arming of Personnel: a. Officers and men, except Medical Department personnel, of the Army of Occupation on duty or on pass will be armed at all times when outside of their bivouac area. Bayonets will normally be affixed by troops on duty. Labor parties working within established base or beach areas protected by sentries need not be armed. Labor parties in isolated areas will have their weapons with them, conveniently placed, and will have sentries or armed security detachments on the alert at all times.

b. Medical Department personnel will not carry arms on person upon debarking in Japan. Subsequently, arms will not be carried until specifically ordered by DHQ.

17. Disregard of regulations and orders governing the conduct of military personnel will reflect most adversely upon the Army and our Government and render the task of occupation more

[redacted]

17. difficult. Military personnel must fully understand that infractions of discipline and offenses of all kinds must be punished much more severely than heretofore.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL MUELLER:

ANDREW E. FORSYTH,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. J. LAPPAGE,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-3.

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AUTH: CG 81st Inf Div
INIT: [redacted] ACofS G-3
DATE: 10 September 1945

81 INF DIV (Reinf)
LEYTE, P. I.
1200, 10 September 1945

ANNEX NO. 5 TO)
:
FO NO. 8)

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

1. Signal Mission.

a. Initial signal mission: SOP.

b. Secondary signal mission: Exercise supervisory control over existing Japanese civilian and military communication facilities in the AOMORI PREFECTURE (See Par 9, Annex No. 5 to FO No. 8).

2. Signal Agencies and Means:

a. Radio: Radio silence effective upon embarkation; lifted when within sight of objective.

b. Wire:

(1) Use will be made of existing Japanese wire facilities after approval of Div Sig O.

(2) Wire will be primary means of communication.

(3) Temporary reconnection of damaged wire circuits will be effected by damaging agency. Such damage will be reported to communication officer concerned or Div Sig O.

c. Message Center: Div Msg Cen is designated as the Div collecting and distributing point for SAFEHAND COURIER MATERIAL.

[redacted]

3. Supply and Transportation.

a. Signal supply (See Par 4, Adm O No. 7).

b. Communication vehicles when performing missions definitely assigned as "priority" (See SOP) will display a white sign "Signal Road Priority". Signs will be provided by Div Sig O.

(1) Commanding officers will take disciplinary action in case of violation in the use of priority signs.

c. Communication vehicles will pull off road before stopping.

4. Radio, telegraph, telephone, cable, cryptographic documents and/or devices and all records pertaining thereto will be left undisturbed. Report of quantities and types of materiel and records will be made to DHQ (Sig O).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL MUELLER:

ANDREW E. FORSYTH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. J. LAPPAGE,
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AC of S, G-3.

[redacted]

AUTH: CG 81 Inf Div
INIT: [redacted] ACofS,G-3
DATE: 17 September 1945

[redacted] 81st INF DIV (Reinf)
LEYTE, P. I.
0730, 17 September 1945

ANNEX NO. 6)
:
TO FO NO. 8)

NAVAL GUNFIRE

1. Naval Fire Support Group will cover and support with naval gunfire the landings of the Division only as approved and ordered by CTF 34.

2. In lieu of JASCO attachments direct support FA Battalions will provide personnel and communications to request and adjust naval gunfire on the basis of one liaison section and one forward observer section per BLT.

3. FA personnel for naval gunfire control, fully equipped for combat, will be landed with assault BLTs.

4. Target designation: SOP. See TM 27, Hq 81 Inf Div, 15 March 1945.

5. Methods of adjusting fire: Naval Gunfire Procedure, Div Arty SOP.

6. Communications: See Appendix A.

   a. Fire request channels: Artillery LnO to Arty Bn CO to Division Artillery CG to CTF 34.

   b. Fire Adjustment Channels: FO or LnO to Arty Bn CO to firing ship.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL MUELLER:

ANDREW E. FORSYTH,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL
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Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-3.

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Incl - 1
Appendix A, Communications.

[redacted]

81-3955

[redacted]

APPENDIX A TO ANNEX 6 TO FO NO. 8, cont'd.

2. b. SFC frequencies and code names to be assigned for adjustment of approved missions:

3820	MANHATTAN	4740	MILKSHAKE
3940	STEW-POT	4785	CHAMPAGNE
4500	MILLIE	4915	SHERRY
4680	TOOTSIE ROLL	4965	GINGERALE
		5300	BECKIE

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL MUELLER:

ANDREW E. FORSYTH,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
J J LaPpage
J. J. LAPPAGE,
Lt. Col., G.S .C.,
Ac of S, G-3.

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS 81st INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 81

APPENDIX A TO ANNEX 6)
:
TO FO NUMBER 8)

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Radio Nets - Continuous Guard.



2. a. Call Signs: Voice

316th FA Bn: 810 Charlie
317th FA Bn: 820 Charlie
906th FA Bn 830 Charlie
81st Div Arty: Doglatin.

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

AUTH: CG 81 Inf Div
INIT: //s/ ACofS,G-3
DATE: 0730, 17 September 1945

81st INF DIV (Reinf)
CG TF, P. I.
0730, 17 September 1945

ANNEX NO. 7)
:
TO FO NO. 8)

AIR SUPPORT

1. Air Support Units: Air support for 81st Infantry Division will consist of carrier planes furnished by Task Force 34.

2. Air Support Provided on O-Day and until Further Notice:

a. Combat Air Patrol (6 VF) will be maintained over objective area from 0430 to 1650 daily.

b. Air Observer (2 VT) will be on station during period 0600-1650 in the best position for the purpose of observing and informing Landing Force Commander of the ground situation.

c.. Direct Support Group (6 VF) will be on station from 0600 to 1650 daily. If required, (10 VT) will be available on call.

d. Photo (1 VT) will be on station from 0900 to 1200 and from 1330 to 1630 daily for request missions.

e. Smokers (6 VT) The first flight of (6 VT) will be on station for initial landing. Succeeding flights of (4 VT) will be on call from 0600 to 1650.

3. Aircraft Armament:

a.. All planes will carry full load of machine gun ammunition.

b. Direct Support Group:

(1) VF planes will carry 6 rockets and 2 - 100 lb GP bombs.

(2) VT planes will carry 8 rockets and either 2 - 500 lb GP or 10 - 100 lb GP bombs.

c. Napalm will be available on call.

[redacted]

[redacted]

81-3955

4. Demonstrations: A ircraft which have been launched for air support missions and which are not utilized for their intended purpose, or which may be released prematurely from such employment, will be used on demonstration flights over predetermined demonstration routes.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL MUELLER:

ANDREW E. FORSYTH,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. J. LAPPAGE,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
AC of S, G-3

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AUTH: CG 81st Inf Div
INIT: [illegible] ofS, G-2
DATE: 10 September 1945

UNCLASSIFIED

81 INF DIV (Reinf)
LEYTE, P.I.,
1200, 10 September 1945

ANNEX NO. 1 TO ACCOMPANY
FO NO. 8, 81 INF DIV

I N T E L L I G E N C E

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Our heavy bombardment of TOKYO and other cities of Central and Northern HONSHU has caused the almost complete destruction of a large portion of the built-up area of those cities. Public utilities and transportation facilities have been hard hit. Millions of persons are homeless and are suffering from shortage of food and other necessities. It is also probable that normal governmental functions have been seriously disrupted by the death of key officials and destruction of government buildings, with the consequent loss of important records. The Japanese Navy, and to a lesser extent, the Air Force have been largely neutralized. The ground forces, however, still retain a formidable fighting potential. (See Appendix No. 1).

b. Air strikes in AOMORI have caused considerable damage. The majority of the schools and governmental buildings have been destroyed, and the dock area has suffered some damage. The railroads and marshalling yards are intact as are also the bridges over the TSUTSUMI-GAWA. The commercial and residential district between the TSUTSUMI-GAWA and the ferry marshalling yard suffered most heavily.

c. The extremely unpredictable nature of the Japanese character makes it difficult to judge accurately what the reaction of the populace will be to our occupation. In the past, there have been no instances of surrender of large organized groups of either civilians or military personnel. The only precedent at hand is the reaction of small groups and individuals to surrender. In the main they have proved docile and willing to cooperate. The Japanese armed forces and the populace on the whole will comply with surrender terms if such compliance is initially directed by or through the Emperor. Secret societies, however, with their fanatical beliefs may offer resistance in the form of espionage, sabotage, assassinations and organization of underground movements.

d. In addition to the peculiar national psychology of the Japanese, a considerable language barrier exists. Because of the limited Allied language personnel and the tremendous amount of language involved, maximum use must be made of local English-speaking Japanese. It is estimated that approximately 15% of the Japanese have a speaking knowledge of English.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

a. Will the enemy offer armed resistance in the initial phases of our landing and occupation?

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. Will any elements of the Japanese armed forces refuse to comply with surrender terms?

c. Will the Japanese civil population refuse to cooperate with our occupation forces? If so, what will be the nature and extent of their opposition?

d. Will the secret societies offer resistance to our occupation forces? If so, which societies will resist and what will be the nature of their effort?

3. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE TASKS.

a. Secure and safeguard intelligence information of value to the U.S.

b. Suppress activities of individuals and organizations which may be inimical to the operations of the occupational forces.

c. Investigate war criminals.

4. ESTIMATED ORDER OF PRIORITY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE TASKS.

a. Initiate investigation of intelligence objectives and establish intelligence control of specific individuals. (See Appendix No. 12).

b. Preservation and security of documents and archives.

c. Locate and investigate all Japanese organizations for espionage, sabotage and subversive activities.

5. SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE TASKS. Intelligence functions to be performed by Headquarters 81st Infantry Division and its subordinate units within assigned zone of action will be:

a. Carry out general intelligence tasks listed in paragraph 3 above, in conformity with established theater policies and specific directives to be issued by this headquarters.

b. Arrange for the safeguarding and control of documents, making them available on approval of DHQ to agencies requiring their use.

c. Early security and exploitation of intelligence targets according to priorities to be established.

d. Execution of counterintelligence measures.

e. Control and disposition of enemy headquarters below army group level as directed.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. General. - SOP.

b. Civil Censorship.

[redacted]

(1) Japanese communication facilities will be permitted to continue in operation for the use of officials of the Japanese Government acting under instructions of GHQ and Army Headquarters unless it becomes apparent that such facilities are being employed in a manner adverse to the best interests of Allied occupation forces.

(2) Unit commanders will report to DHQ all cases where it is thought that the operation of any communication facilities is contrary to Allied interests.

(3) Where practical employees and officials of telegraph, telephone, and radio agencies whether under civilian or state ownership will continue operating in their professional duties under such supervision as DHQ may prescribe. Unit commanders will submit their recommendations to DHQ covering supervision of facilities within their zones of occupation.

(4) Radio broadcast networks will operate under supervision of the IX Corps Commander.

(5) Active surveillance of wire and cable circuits will be maintained to prevent illicit transmissions by Japanese civilians or military personnel. In the absence of civil censorship personnel the CIC will assist in the required control.

(6) Details for operation of civil censorship detachments, if attached, will be published later.

c. Counterintelligence Corps.

(1) All CIC personnel attached to the Division will execute counterintelligence missions as directed by the Commanding Officer 48th Area Detachment.

(2) Personnel of the 48th Area Detachment and 81st CIC Detachment will be placed with infantry regiments to assist with search for and seizure of documents and records containing important intelligence and counterintelligence information; and to investigate espionage, sabotage and other subversive activity. They will operate under instructions from DHQ but will coordinate their efforts with unit commanders and assist unit intelligence officers in carrying out their counterintelligence missions.

(3) CIC Detachments will:

(a) Investigate and clear key Japanese officials for military government authorities.

(b) Advise and assist military government and military police authorities on the issuance and enforcement of regulations and proclamations governing the movement and travel of

civilians. Initially, all individuals will be restricted to their immediate communities and travel and communication prohibited. Such rigid control may be gradually relaxed.

(c) Investigate and seize, or impose suitable restrictions on, non-Japanese individuals who are determined to be inimical to the interests of the United States.

(d) Advise commanders concerning the physical security of our own installations and maintenance of security of information within United States Army units.

(e) Supervise and cooperate in the seizure of all public or private water plants, electric plants, or other public utilities.

(f) Cooperate in the establishment of a civilian identification and pass system.

(g) Insure the positive identification of all persons entering or departing from restricted areas.

d. Units taking over documents, public buildings, archives, prisoner of war camps, public works and other military objectives will place guards around them for security and will report immediately the location and nature of the installation to this headquarters. Operation of the installation will not be interfered with and no positive action will be taken except to preserve the installation and prevent destruction or sabotage of any part of it. A detailed list of intelligence objectives is shown in Appendix No. 12.

e. Linguists: Maximum use will be made of English-speaking Japanese nationals in work where their knowledge thereof does not involve a security risk. They will not be used in the interrogation of members of the HOKURYU-KAI (Black Dragon Society), TOKUMU KIKAN, KEMPEI TAI, NISSHO, or other terrorist organizations, or in the translation of documents pertaining to them. They may be used for normal interrogation and translation of such documents as a member of the Division Language Team may determine are not of a highly secretive nature.

7. HANDLING AND TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS, INTERROGATION AND INTERPRETATION.

a. General. - SOP.

(1) Documents will be secured and safeguarded as soon as located and report made to DHQ.

(2) No documents will be moved from their locations without the approval of the Division AC of S, G-2.

b. Diplomatic and Consular Documents.

(1) Such documents in the custody of the protecting power (neutral) will be respected.

(2) Documents not in the custody of the protecting power (neutral) will be guarded pending instructions from DHQ as to their disposal.

(3) If substantial reason exists for believing diplomatic or consular premises are used for war-like operations, the protecting power (neutral) may be asked for permission to search the premises. If permission is refused report will be made to DHQ.

c. Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Suspects: SOP.

8. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE. Captured materiel will be handled as provided by Division SOP except that it will not be removed from the objective area.

9. AUGMENTATION OF PERSONNEL.

a. 81st Reconnaissance Troop will be prepared to accomplish specific counter-intelligence missions under the supervision of CIC personnel.

b. It is anticipated that English-speaking Japanese nationals recruited through Military Government and checked by CIC will be available to assist units of the Division in handling their interrogation problems.

c. Technical Intelligence Teams may be attached to the Division. When attached they will operate under the special staff officer of their corresponding service in accordance with theater policies.

10. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS. SOP.

11. REPORTS.

a. General. - SOP.

b. Violations of surrender terms involving enemy activity will be transmitted immediately to G-2 by URGENT message.

c. Daily S-2 Periodic Reports required by Division SOP will be submitted as of 1800 to reach DHQ by 2000.

MUELLER
Maj Gen

OFFICIAL:
Goddard
GODDARD
G-2

12 APPENDICES:

APPENDIX NO. 1 - Order of Battle and Military Installations (w/1 Incl.).

APPENDIX NO. 2 — Japanese Intelligence, Political and Other Organizations.
APPENDIX NO. 3 - Terrain Study and Military Geography.
APPENDIX NO. 4 - Climate and Weather - AOMORI Area (w/2 Incls.).
APPENDIX NO. 5 - Beach Reports - AOMORI Prefecture.
APPENDIX NO. 6 - Port Facilities of AOMORI Prefecture (w/3 Incls.).
APPENDIX NO. 7 - Transportation Facilities.
APPENDIX NO. 8 - Communications (w/1 Incl.).
APPENDIX NO. 9 - Health and Sanitation, Northern HONSHU.
APPENDIX NO. 10 - Social and Political Organization of AOMORI Prefecture (w/1 Incl.).
APPENDIX NO. 11 - Industries and Resources, AOMORI Prefecture (w/1 Incl.).
APPENDIX NO. 12 - Intelligence Objectives.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as FO No. 8

UNCLASSIFIED

AUTH: CG 81 INF DIV.
INIT: AC of S, G-2.
DATE: 22 AUGUST 1945.

Intelligence

APPENDICES TO ANNEX NO. 1

TO

ACCOMPANY FIELD ORDER NO. 8

81ST INFANTRY DIVISION

FOR INFORMATION AND PLANNING PURPOSES

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX NO. 1 TO BE ISSUED LATER

DISTRIBUTION:
SAME AS FIELD ORDER NO. 8

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]: CG, 81 Inf Div
IN: ACofS, G-2
DATE: 11 September 1945.

81 INF DIV (Reinf)
LEYTE, P.I.
11 September 1945.

AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO APPENDIX NO. 1

TO ANNEX NO. 1, FO NO. 8.

1. Paragraphs No. 1a, 2a, 2d, and 2f are hereby rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

"1. COMMAND OF THE MILITARY FORCES:
a. Army Ground Force units in AOMORI Prefecture are under the immediate tactical control of the XXVII Army (Corps) and the 11th Area Army (Field Army); both with headquarters at SENDAI, on the east coast of HONSHU, 230 miles south of AOMORI."

* * * * * *

"2. UNITS IDENTIFIED IN DISTRICT:
a. Mobile Combat Units:

157th Ind Division **	HIROSAKI	13,000 (estimated)
308th Inf Division	NOHEJI	13,000 (estimated)
95th Ind Mixed Brigade	HACHINOHE	4,000 (estimated)
8th Ind Tankette Co	HIROSAKI	150
		30,150

**Believed to have been formed from the 57th Depot Division."

* * * * * *

"d. Air Units:

66th Airfield Bn	HACHINOHE	600
HACHINOHE Air Depot	HACHINOHE	400 (estimated)
		1,000

Recapitulation

Mobile Combat	30,150
Base and Service	2,730
Naval	2,390
Air	1,000
Total Identified:	36,270"

* * * * * *

"f. Estimate of Strength:
It is estimated that, in addition to the foregoing identified troops, there are 35,000 to 45,000 additional troops in the area, making the estimate of strength for AOMORI Prefecture a total of 80,000. It is possible that a part or all of these troops may be disarmed and demobilized prior to our arrival in the area."

OFFICIAL: Goddard
GODDARD
G-2

MUELLER
Maj Gen

DISTRIBUTION: Same as FO No. 8.

[redacted]

81-3921

APPENDIX NO. 1 TO ANNEX NO. 1, INTELLIGENCE

TO ACCOMPANY FO NO. 8, 81 INF DIV

22 AUGUST 1945

UNCLASSIFIED

ORDER OF BATTLE AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

1. COMMAND OF THE MILITARY FORCES:

a. Army Ground Force units in AOMORI Prefecture are under the immediate tactical control of the XXVII Army (Corps) and the 11th Area Army (Field Army), both with headquarters at SENDAI on the east coast of HONSHU 230 miles south of AOMORI. Administrative command is believed to be asserted by the 57th Depot Division, (with headquarters at HIROSAKI, 25 miles south of AOMORI), which is charged with conscription, training, supply and activation of new units in the HIROSAKI divisional district of which AOMORI is a regimental district. It is also believed that administrative matters are controlled by the Northeastern District Army, with headquarters at SENDAI, although there is some evidence that the latter may have been disbanded on the formation of the 11th Area Army.

b. Army Air Forces: Inasmuch as the air defense of the Empire assigned combat units to the south and west of TOKYO and in HOKKAIDO, there are few combat units in Northern HONSHU. It is believed that those air units stationed in AOMORI Prefecture are commanded by the 1st Air Army at TOKYO.

c. Naval Forces: Naval units are commanded by the OMINATO Naval District located at OMINATO Naval Base.

2. UNITS IDENTIFIED IN DISTRICT:

a. Mobile Combat Units: *

57th Depot Division (less 2 Inf Regts and 1 Engr Regt replacement units)	HIROSAKI	11,000
8 Ind Tankette Co	HIROSAKI	150
		11, 150

b. Base and Service Units:

4 Sig Regt Repl Unit	AOMORI	1,650	
SAIBONGI Remount Branch Depot	SAIBONGI	800	(estimated)
Branch agencies located at	NOBEJI		
	HERAI-MURA		
	SCHICHINOHE		
AOMORI Military Hospital	AOMORI	40	
HACHINOHE Military Hospital	HACHINOHE	40	
HIROSAKI Military Hospital	HIROSAKI	200	
		2730	

c. Naval Units:

OMINATO Naval Guard District	OMINATO	300	(estimated)
OMINATO Naval Defense Force	OMINATO	290	

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

81-3724

OMINATO Naval Communications Unit	OMINATO	100
OMINATO Submarine Base	OMINATO	300 (estimated)
OMINATO Air Depot	OMINATO	300 (estimated)
MISAWA Air Depot	MISAWA	300 (estimated)
OMINATO Naval Air Unit	OMINATO	400 (estimated)
MISAWA Naval Air Unit	MISAWA	400 (estimated)
		2390

d. Air Units:

66th Airfield Bn	HACHINOHE	600
HACHINOHE Air Depot	HACHINOHE	400 (estimated)
		1,000

Mobile Combat	11,150
Base and Service	2,730
Naval	2,390
Air	1,000
	17,270

* In addition to the above listed combat units, it is believed that the following may be located in the area:

U/I Medium Arty Regt	1,200
U/I Inf Regt	3,000 (barracks in AOMORI)
Detachment of TSUGARU Fortress on south shore of TSUGARU Straits	1,000
AA Units	1,000
	6,200

e. Unit Depots in AOMORI:

The following depots, consisting of administrative offices, barracks and training areas are located in AOMORI Prefecture:

Home Code Number	Type	Station	Unit Occupying
N49	u/i	HIROSAKI	u/i
N74	Air	u/i	u/i
E56	Hq	HIROSAKI	57 Dp Div Hq
E57	Inf	HIROSAKI	52 Inf Regt Repl Unit (57 Dp Div)
E60	Rcn	HIROSAKI	57 Rcn Regt Repl Unit (57 Dp Div)
E69	Arty	HIROSAKI	57 FA Regt Repl Unit (57 Dp Div)

E79	Sig	HIROSAKI	57th Sig Unit Repl Unit (57 Dp Div)
E80	Transport	HIROSAKI	57th Tnspt Regt Repl Unit (57 DP Div)
E93	Sig	AOMORI	4 Sig Regt Repl Unit

f. Estimate of Strength: An accurate estimate of the total strength in AOMORI Prefecture cannot be made at the present time. As of 6 August 1945, estimates indicate that there are 160,000 troops in the Northeastern Army District. Of this number, it is believed that 40,000-60,000 are stationed in the HIROSAKI Divisional District.

3. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS:

The following are the known installations in AOMORI Prefecture. It is thought that additional bases will be found on occupation.

a. Probable defense areas are indicated on the sketch map, Inclosure No. 1 hereto. Information is lacking as to detailed defenses, but it is expected that they are equipped with heavy coastal, anti-aircraft and mobile artillery weapons.

b. Barracks: In and about the city of HIROSAKI, there are barracks for approximately 20,000 troops. In the city of AOMORI, there are two camp installations in the southern part of the city with barracks facilities for approximately 3,000 troops. Schools and other public buildings will also be available for quarters.

c. Naval Bases: The OMINATO Naval Base, home of the OMINATO Naval District, is both an operational as well as a maintenance base. It is equipped with substantial berthing and docking facilities, landbased and seaplane aircraft equipment, a submarine base, floating drydocks, oil storage and supply and repair depots.

d. Oil Storage: At OMINATO Naval Base, there are facilities for the storage of 800,000 barrels of oil. At NOHAI (east of AOMORI), there are facilities for the storage of 210,000 barrels of oil.

e. Ammunition Dumps are believed to be located in HIROSAKI and AOMORI.

f. Warehouses will be found at OMINATO Naval Base and in the City of AOMORI. It must be remembered that, in addition to regular warehouses, the Japanese employ all types of buildings for storage purposes.

g. Remount Supply Depots are maintained, under the supervision of the SAMBONGI Remount Branch Depot at SAMBONGI, HERAI-MURA, NOBEJI, and SCHICHINOHE. These depots are charged with procurement and supply of horses.

h. Air Supply and Repair Depots for the repair and supply of aircraft materiel are located at HACHINOHE Airfield, MISAWA Airfield and OMINATO Airfield.

i. Allied Prisoner of War Encampments located at FURUMAKI Station, HIROSAKI, and HACHINOE were employed primarily for staging prisoners transported to HOKKAIDO.

j. Airfields: There are eight airfields in AOMORI Prefecture, as indicated on the attached map and are:

(1) AOMORI Naval Airfield four miles northwest of the City of AOMORI, between the AOMORI-KONITA highway and railroad.
(2) HACHINOHE Army bomber field southwest of the City of HACHINOHE.
(3) HINOKI Army fighter field.
(4) HIROSAKI Medium bomber airfield two miles south of the city.
(5) KABAYAMA Navy fighter and bomber airfield.
(6) MISAWA Navy bomber and fighter airfield one mile south of MISAWA.
(7) OMINATO (1) Navy seaplane station three miles southwest of OMINATO, operated in conjunction with the bomber airfield.

4. PERSONALITIES IDENTIFIED:

The following military personalities have been identified:

a. Army: (surname first)

Gen YOSHIMOTO, Teichi	CG Northeastern Army
Maj Gen ISHII, Masayoshi	C of S Northeastern Army
Lt Gen YOSHIDA, Minetaro	CG 57th Depot Division
Maj Gen SUZUKI, Shiyori	CG AOMORI Regt District
Maj Gen ENDO, Shundan	CG IWATE Regt District
Maj Gen IZUKA, Keinosuke	CG AKITA Regt District
Maj Gen TAKEUCHI, Zenji	CG TSUGARU Fortress
Lt Col MITAMURA, Hayahiko	CO 22 Tank Regt
Lt Col TANAKA, Yoshio	CO 6th Air Tng Unit
Lt Col ITO, Hanrohu	CO HACHINOE Mil Hosp
Capt TANAKA, Yoshinori	CO 8 Ind Tankette Co
Capt TADA, Nobukichi	CO 66 Airfield Bn

b. Navy: (surname first)

Vice Adm KANJI, Ugaki	Comdt OMINATO Naval District
Capt KANOME, Zensuke	C of S OMINATO Naval District
Capt KASAI, Torazo	CO OMINATO Defense Unit and OMINATO Submarine Base
Comdr KITANO, Motomu	Exec OMINATO Defense Unit
Comdr FUTUGAMI, Enzo	CO OMINATO Naval Barracks
Capt KOGAMI, Terazo	OMINATO Harbor Master
Capt KIMURA, Takaichiro	Personnel Officer, OMINATO Naval Base

SKETCH MAP
PREFECTURE OF AOMORI

Scale 1: 700,000

From Map-Central Japan Scale 1/250,000
Prepared by AC of S, G-2 81st Inf Division
20 August 1945
Spot Elevations in Feet

Inclosure No. 1 to Appendix No. 1, Intelligence, to Accompany Annex No. 1 to FO No. 8 81st Inf Div.

Legend

- Cities 20,000-100,000 Population
- Cities 5,000-20,000 Population
- Towns 1,000-5,000 Population
- Primary Highway 24 ft or more
- Improved Roads 18 ft to 24 ft
- Railroads-Standard Gauge
- Railroads-Narrow Gauge
- Prefectural Boundary
- Rice Fields
- Barracks
- Ammunition Dump
- Warehouses
- Oil Storage
- Air Depot
- Remount Depot
- Airfield
- Probable Defensive Areas
- Allied PW Camps

SEA OF JAPAN
TSUGARU KAIKYO
TSUGARU MOUNTAINS
TSUGARU LOWLANDS
AOMORI PLAIN
AOMORI-WAN
MUTSU-WAN
KOMINATO-WAN
NOHEJI-WAN
PACIFIC OCEAN
SHIMOKITA PENINSULA
CENTRAL RANGE
WESTERN RANGES
EASTERN LOWLAND
KITAKAMI HIGHLAND
FORT ??
KABAYAMA A/F
NAVAL BASE
ONNATO
OMINATO
HINOKI A/F
KURO-SAKI
MUTSU-WAN
AOMORI A/F
AOMORI
HACHINOHE
HACHINOHE A/F
MISAWA A/F
HIROSAKI A/F
HIROSAKI
57 DP
(-2 Inf And 1 Engr Regt Reinf)
Barracks 3,000 MEN
Capacity 210,000 bbl
Repl. Unit
AOMORI-KEN
AKITA-KEN
IWATE-KEN
TOWADA-KO
ODATE
GOSHOGAWARA
KUROISHI
SHICHINOHE
SAMBONGI
GONOHE
TAKKO
KAMINOHE
SANNOHE
OWANI
ITAYANAGI
KANAGI
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APPENDIX NO. 2 TO ANNEX NO. 1, INTELLIGENCE

TO ACCOMPANY FO NO. 8, 81 INF DIV,

22 AUGUST 1945

JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE, POLITICAL AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

1. INTELLIGENCE. There are two primary organizations in JAPAN concerned with the wartime attitudes of the people. They are KEMPEI TAI and TOKUMU KIKAN (or Special Service agency).

a. KEMPEI TAI: This organization, a part of the Army Military Police, is frequently compared with the Nazi Gestapo in purpose and methods. Prisoners of War have indicated that the reputation is justly deserved. KEMPEI TAI jurisdiction extends to detecting and reporting dissaffected personnel within the Army, and, at times, among the civilians in JAPAN and elsewhere. Their methods are ruthless and include torture as a means of getting information, whether it be true or false. Their agents are feared in JAPAN as well as her occupied territories.

The personnel are carefully selected and highly trained and their powers in the discharge of their mission are almost unlimited over civilian and military personnel. The members of this organization are capable of undertaking fifth column and undercover activity for which they have been trained. They can be expected in uniform or civilian clothes.

One of the first points of interest on any advance into Japanese territory is the office of the KEMPEI TAI. Their files are copious and contain valuable information on the population's individual sympathies. Through this information it is possible to find people who may usually be depended upon for civil administration and information.

b. TOKUMU KIKAN: In some respects the activity of the TOKUMU KIKAN and KEMPEI TAI are overlapping. Information on the higher echelons of these organizations is lacking.

Personnel of the TOKUMU KIKAN are to a great extent made up of retired Army and Navy Officers. Prior to the war these were the ones who visited other nations of the world in the role of business men, shipping company employees, bankers and observers with the sole purpose of gaining valuable information for Japan's future war. Students were also used for this purpose. Since 1941, however, many regular Army and Navy Officers, as well as civilians of various trades and talents, have been attached to TOKUMU KIKAN for duty. Their primary concern is civilian activities, but it at times extends into the military sphere. The workings of this organization are more secret than that of KEMPEI TAI and their mission includes espionage, sabotage, counter-espionage, propaganda and straight intelligence.

TOKUMU KIKAN agents will be found in harbor and factory towns, business houses and professional offices. The agent's distinctive insignia is a yellow, green and red arm band worn with the military uniform (when not operating in civilian clothes). The most important role of TOKUMU KIKAN in JAPAN proper has

been to keep in touch with and report civilian sentiments and morale. The files of this organization should prove valuable to Allied intelligence agencies. If there is trouble among the civilians after U.S. troops arrive it is likely to have been inspired by TOKUMU KIKAN and/or personnel of KEMPEI TAI. Officially, there may be a disbandonment of both organizations. It will probably be on paper only. Allied intelligence anticipates that these Japanese agents will continue to operate. Their mission will be to collect information on Allied equipment, strategy, and organization. They will continue to keep files, particularly on Japanese cooperating with the Allies and on Allied personnel. Murders, sabotage, raids, kidnappings and a certain amount of terrorist activity can be expected. The past few days following surrender have shown that the Japanese violent war-like spirit is not broken.

2. CIVIL POLICE. Japanese Civil Police wield a power unusual even in totalitarian nations. This power permeates all aspects of the life of the people. In all matters of intelligence and security the Civil Police jurisdiction overlaps that of the Military Police (KEMPEI TAI). The head of the entire civil police system in JAPAN is located in TOKYO. In the towns and cities the police are independent of any municipal authority and take orders through channels from TOKYO headquarters through the Prefectural Police Superintendent and the Prefectural Bureau. The police are feared by the people because of their brutal methods, which include torture, in obtaining confessions; searches and seizure without a warrant or explanation, and holding victims for long periods without notification to family or friends.

Reports of all police investigations are kept in the HIBAYA building in TOKYO and in the large cities of the provinces. Detailed records of all members of each family, pertinent dates and activities are also kept at the police stations. These records are important to the occupying troops.

3. "HOKO" SYSTEM. Briefly, HOKO is a communal spy-hostage system in which all members of every group of ten neighboring houses are punishable for a crime or the failure to report a wrong doing—even an infraction of the "Thought Control Law"—by any member of the group in time to prevent the commission of such wrong doings. There is a warden for each house; another warden for each group of 10 houses (called a "HI"); and one for each group of 100 houses (called a "KO"). Ten KOs (1000 households) are formed into a "HO" and the HOs are then organized into ten HOs (10,000 households). Using this system 66,476 Japanese police are able to keep fingers on the entire population of the Japanese home islands, 70,000,000 people, with amazing success. During the war this HOKO System became even tighter. When it is realized that this system has operated in JAPAN for centuries it is understandable why the people are so docile to police and government authority. The people know that they or a member of their families can do nothing without a report reaching the national police. The HOKO system is thus very closely tied in with the police system and will therefore be one of the most important means by which CIC, Military Government, and the Provost Marshal can control civilian activities.

4. THE BLACK DRAGON SOCIETY. Behind all Japanese intelligence activities, at home and abroad, among civilian and military alike, lies the horrifying influence and operations of an organization whose sole aim is perpetuation of the SAMURAI (Warrior Class) beliefs. Nothing stops their activity, because the leading political and military figures of JAPAN are among its members, including General TOJO. Its scope is Pan-Asiatic and its operations are super-secret. Murder is its primary weapon. Secrecy and stealth are its bywords. Once apprehended for a crime, a guilty member is usually released because the government recognizes that the continuation of the SAMURAI class is the only means to attain the ultimate goal as taught by the Japanese religion and as expressed by unprecedented fanaticism—the Emperor will rule the world (Shintoism). This organization is the Black Dragon Society.

The Society was formed by an insignificant crippled Japanese civilian who died last year. His national influence was second only to the Emperor. Since his death, control has been taken over by a deputy and the Society's influence is as powerful as ever.

Allied intelligence agencies have been able to obtain very little information about this organization or its great number of members. It is recognized, however, that if the militaristic spirit continues to permeate the general Japanese population and Army and Navy elements, the Black Dragon Society will most likely be the responsible agent.

5. ORGANIZATIONS OF POTENTIAL USE TO THE UNITED STATES.

a. Japanese Peace Party. The party is controlled by MATSUDAIRA, Household Minister to the Emperor. The aim was to bring an end to the war with as lenient terms as possible for JAPAN. MATSUDAIRA is a former ambassador to ENGLAND and is considered pro-ENGLISH. The party members probably are not spread beyond the TOKYO metropolitan area.

b. Communist Party. Since the war and during a few prior years, this group had to work underground. Because of this, it is doubtful whether its membership is very extensive. Reports indicate that the membership consists mostly of teachers and college students. Members may be found in the large cities and cooperation may be expected from them. Before the war liaison and contact was maintained with the Communist Party in RUSSIA. Some Communists in JAPAN will be found involved in underground labor movements.

c. SUIHEISHA (ETA). This is an underground and semi-Communistic organization. It was formed over three hundred years ago by people known as ETA, who have been treated as an outcast class because of their original menial occupations such as shoemakers and butchers. They have been segregated and discriminated against until their one aim is to do anything which will eventually allow them recognition, freedom and equality. If Allied occupying forces make it clear that ETA will be fairly treated and recognized, they may prove to be among the most valuable groups.

The stronghold of ETA is on KYUSHU but there are some members on HONSHU. Many of the Communist Party members are ETA people. It must be remembered that this ETA element of the Japanese population is looked down upon and regarded as the lowest social class in the home islands. Because of this attitude we may find that many accusations and complaints from them and about them will be brought about through prejudice and the possibility of revenge, and may be the source of discontent and obstinancy. This may be especially true if any ETA people are put into a position of responsibility where they will be governing other elements of the Japanese population. Their chief value will probably be in the capacity of confidential informants.

d. Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (IRAPS). In May 1940, all political parties were dissolved and amalgamated into this society, which was designed to unite all political elements and the people in the face of national crisis. Information regarding all Japanese organizations is sparse, most of it coming from Prisoners of War and civilian internees during the PHILIPPINE and OKINAWA campaigns. It is recognized that most cooperation will be on a selfish basis, hoping to gain the good will of the Allies. However, if the information gained is found reliable, the motive is immaterial.

APPENDIX NO. 3 TO ANNEX NO. 1, INTELLIGENCE,

TO ACCOMPANY FO NO. 8, 81 INF DIV,

22 AUGUST 1945.

TERRAIN STUDY AND MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

1. GENERAL:

a. Relief: Low mountain ranges or high hills form the backbone of the two peninsulas to the E and W of MUTSU-WAN. A narrow coastal plain lies on the South shore of MUTSU-WAN with two larger coastal plains to the SE and SW, beyond the hill and mountain rim. The HACHINOHE Lowland, SE of MUTSU-WAN, reaches to the northern end of the KITAKAMI Highland and faces the Pacific Ocean. The terrain is undulating, with flood plains along the streams and undulating inter-stream areas 100 to [illegible] feet higher. The HIROSAKI Plain, SW of MUTSU-WAN, is a level plain which abuts in the S against the Western Ranges, faces the JAPAN SEA, and is separated from it by a broad dune belt.

b. Drainage: Rivers are similar to each other, and differ mainly in their length, width, depth, and period of flood. They are essentially mountain streams in their upper stretches, flowing through narrow, gorge-like valleys with many falls and rapids. Their courses across the interior basins and coastal lowlands spread out in multiple channels separated by wide, barren, flood-scoured flats of sand, gravel, or boulders. Streams have wide fluctuations in volume, and are confined within dikes to prevent flooding of adjoining lowlands. Floods are most likely in AOMORI PREFECTURE during April. There are no extensive swamp areas that would be major terrain barriers. Drainage ditches, canals, and stream channels could be used effectively to supplement defenses and impede our progress. The coastal lowlands could be flooded effectively during high-water periods. Most large streams have storage dams, destruction of which would assist flooding operations.

c. Water Supply: Adequate. All sources should be treated.

d. Seasonal Changes: Snow on ground from early November to April. More than one foot deep December through March. June and October-November especially favorable for operations. April floods. Broadleaf trees lose leaves in November. Marshes and lakes frozen over in winter.

2. DETAILED RELIEF:

a. MUTSU-WAN Lowlands and Peninsulas:

(1) Two peninsulas and three lowlands surround strategic MUTSU-WAN (bay) at the northern end of HONSHU. Mountainous TSUGARU-HANTO (peninsula) forms the west side of the bay; hilly and mountainous SHIMOKITA-HANTO shelters it on the north and east. The entrance to the bay, TAIRADATE-KAIKYO (strait), is only six miles wide. A naval base at OMINATO, and the HONSHU-HOKKAIDO ferry harbor at

AOMORI have the advantage of protected locations on MUTSU-WAN. Of all the mountain ranges and highlands in NORTHERN HONSHU, only the Central Range reaches to MUTSU-WAN and forms a rocky peninsula on its southern shore separating the smaller NOHEJI-WAN from AOMORI-WAN. Between the northern end of the KITAKAMI Highland and the southern end of the hills of the SHIMOKITA-HANTO is the lowland of HACHINOHE, which faces the Pacific Ocean. Between the mountains of the TSUGARU-HANTO and the northern end of the Western Ranges is the TSUGARU Lowland, which faces the SEA of JAPAN. A third and smaller lowland, the AOMORI Plain, borders AOMORI-WAN between the TSUGARU-HANTO and the promontory formed by the Central Range.

(2) HACHINOHE Lowland: This sub-region is mainly an undulating plain which slopes gently eastward. In the south and southwest, a belt of hills, 300 to 800 feet high, forms a transition towards the KITAKAMI Highland and the Central Range. North of SAMBONGI, the Central Range rises rather abruptly from the plain. In the central section of the lowland, level areas occur only along the major stream courses and are laid out in irrigated rice fields. Inter-stream terrace areas are approximately 200 feet higher and are flat or undulating, but are cut in to numerous spurs by ravines 50 to 100 feet deep. In the northern part of the plain, the lowest sections are occupied by shallow lakes and swamps. The largest of the lakes, OGAWARA-NUMA (lake), is eight miles long and two miles wide. The lakes are flanked by land 100 to 200 feet high, which is flat to undulating, and ravine-dissected like the level interstream plains in the south. Toward the coast, the plain generally ends in a low scarp, ten to fifty feet high, fronted by a continuous beach. Movement in the HACHINOHE Lowland is relatively easy. The lakes and swamps in the north, the stream courses, and (during the summer) the irrigated rice fields adjoining them are the greatest obstacles to movement. The generally good drainage, and the large areas of higher land, prevent widespread inundation. The HACHINOHE Lowland is separated from MUTSU-WAN by a low hill belt at the south end of SHIMOKITA-HANTO. These hills are approximately 300 feet high and interfere little with movement. Routes from the HACHINOHE Lowland south to the KITAKAMI Lowland are more difficult, and utilize the two passes on either side of NISHI-DAKE (peak).

(3) SHIMOKITA-HANTO: An elongated narrow arm, to the east of MUTSU-WAN, and a massive area north of the bay comprise SHIMOKITA-HANTO. A range of hills forms the backbone of the narrow eastern part of the peninsula. In the south, the hills are low, have gentle slopes, and interfere little with movement. In the center and north, the hills are higher and more rugged, rising to 1,706 feet; movement here is more difficult. On the shore of MUTSU-WAN, an uninterrupted beach extends along the base of the hills. On the Pacific side, the coast is also fronted by beaches, with the exception of a stretch five miles long at the foot of the highest peak of the central hill section. The MUTSU-WAN shore is more favorable to north-south movement than is the Pacific shore, because the hills adjoining the beaches are low.

The northern part of SHIMOKITA-HANTO is a mountain mass, measuring twenty miles north-south and east-west, and reaches 3,049 feet in ASAHINA-TAKE (peak). Numerous other peaks exceed 2,000 feet. Streams flow in short, steep ravines, flanked by steep ridges. Generally the coast is bold; a coastal plain is present only in the southeast near the OMINATO Naval Base. Movement in this mountain section of SHIMOKITA-HANTO is extremely difficult. Between the mountainous parts and the hilly terrain to the east stretches the plain of TANABU, a level to undulating area six miles wide and six to ten miles long. In the south, it is fronted by extensive beaches; in the north it ends in a scarp less than 100 feet high. Terrain is favorable, and movement is handicapped only by occasional swamps and an extensive forest cover. TANABU Plain is the northern gateway to MUTSU-WAN and the naval base at OMINATO.

(4) AOMORI Plain: At the southern edge of AOMORI-WAN is the AOMORI Plain. It is flanked on the east by the Central Ranges and on the west by the TSUGARU Mountains. The coastal plain is approximately two miles wide, nearly level, and is laid out in rice fields. Mountains rise abruptly from the plain on its landward margins. Lowlands to the east and west can be reached only by crossing this mountain rim. The route leading eastward to the HACHINOHE Lowland and to SHIMOKITA-HANTO utilizes a low saddle, 101 feet high, at the north end of the Central Range; from there it follows a flat-floored, eastward draining valley, flanked on the north by rough hills, and on the south by mountains. The approach from AOMORI to this low saddle is along a rugged coast. The route westward from AOMORI crosses the mountain rim at the junction of the TSUGARU Mountains with the Central Range. Here the terrain consists of rolling hills 300 to 600 feet high.

(5) TSUGARU Mountains: The TSUGARU Mountains form a range trending from north-northwest to south-southeast. The mountains have a relatively even crest line varying from 900 to 1,800 feet elevation. Occasional peaks rise to 2,300 feet. Despite the relatively low elevation, the terrain is quite rugged, consisting of numerous narrow valleys separated by steep-sided ridges, and is very unfavorable to movement.

(6) TSUGARU Lowland: Wedged between the TSUGARU Mountains on the north and the northern end of the Western ranges on the south is the TSUGARU Lowland. It is composed of three areas of differing terrain; the plain of HIROSAKI, the dune belt along the coast, and the foothills of the Western Ranges in the southwest.

The HIROSAKI plain is almost 40 miles long from north-northwest to south-southeast and attains a width of eight to twelve miles. It is level and traversed by numerous streams, irrigation ditches, and drainage canals which all trend northward. There are numerous ponds and lakes on the edges of the plain. JUSAN-GATA, the largest lake, is at its northern end and measures four miles from east to west. Numerous and extensive swamps occupy the northern end of

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the lowland on either side of the KUKI-GAWA (river), and almost the entire plain is devoted to wet rice. Movement is little impaired except by the water courses and wet ground. Lack of slope on the plain favors inundation.

Dunes form a continuous belt, generally two to three miles wide, along the coast of the plain, and are responsible for its poor drainage. The dunes consist of east-west oriented sand ridges, 100 to 150 feet high, separated by depressions in which the water stands in numerous lakes and more numerous swamps. A continuous beach fronts the dune belt. Movement in this area is impaired by the looseness of the sand and by the abundance of wet ground, although the general forest cover indicates that the sand is not wind-blown at present.

Foothills are especially characteristic at the base of KUKI-YAMA, a volcano rising to 5,331 feet at the southwestern edge of the HIROSAKI Plain. These foothills consist of radiating, gently sloping ranges with rounded crests which are separated from each other by ravines 50 to 100 feet deep.

(6) Routes and Barriers: The major route southward from the TSUGARU Lowland utilizes a pass (YATATE-TOGE, 846 feet high) located between the Western Ranges and the Central Range. This pass gives access to the OTATE Basin, and is crossed by the national highway and a railroad. Approach to the pass from the north and south is through narrow valleys flanked by ranges 500 to 1,000 feet high. Terrain off the road is quite unfavorable to movement of mechanized forces and to deployment of troops.

The importance of the region around MUTSU-WAN lies in its beach-fronted lowlands which could be used in an invasion of HONSHU. Both the HIROSAKI Plain and the HACHINOHE Lowland are large enough to provide bases for further southward advance. Such advance would be made difficult however, by the ranges and highlands of NORTHERN HONSHU which join to form a solid mountain front, traversable only through a few passes, difficult of access and easily defended.

3. SOIL TRAFFICABILITY:

a. General Factors Affecting Soil Trafficability: Soil trafficability is the capacity of soils to support the movement of vehicles. It refers especially to cross-country movement of vehicles and to traffic on unimproved roads made of local soil. Soil trafficability is determined by the type of soil (textural grade, organic matter content, and other profile features), topography, vegetation and weather factors. The principal factors considered in this topic are soil textural types and weather elements. Soil texture determinations were made from soil, geologic, and topographic maps, and are of necessity general in nature. In this area, the important weather factors are precipitation (duration, intensity, and character); temperature as it affects evaporation, plant growth, and the freezing and thawing of soil; and wind, cloud cover, and humidity, which affect evaporation of soil moisture.

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b. Weather Factors: The general soil trafficability in this area is moderately unfavorable. On all types of soil, weather factors cause periods of poor trafficability, at least seasonally. At most places the precipitation is high, ranging from 30 to 112 inches annually; most of the area experiences between 50 to 80 inches. Almost all the area, except the western coastal regions and west-facing slopes of the adjacent mountains, has a distinct dry season from November through February or March. Heavy precipitation during the rest of the year results in periods of poor trafficability. In the western coastal regions there is no distinct dry season and the annual precipitation is in most places greater than in the eastern regions and is particularly high from July through January. Winter snows and spring thaws cause more severe non-trafficable conditions in the western coastal regions than in the east.

Almost everywhere in CENTRAL JAPAN the heaviest rains occur during summer or early fall but they are often of short duration. Occasionally during this period four to sixteen inches of rain fall in 24 hours, and result in floods which halt cross-country vehicular movement in lowland areas.

Over most of the area, precipitation falls on 140 to 220 days per year and rainfall frequencies resemble rainfall amounts in areal and seasonal contrasts. For example, in western coastal areas there are more than 215 days during the year with precipitation equal to or greater than .004 inch, and during the late fall, winter, and early spring months there are only a few days without precipitation. On the other hand, in most eastern areas there are less than 180 days per year with precipitation, and during the seasons of greatest frequency, summer and fall, there are usually less than 20 days each month with precipitation.

During late fall, winter, and early spring in western coastal regions, and during summer and early fall in most eastern regions, days with precipitation are so frequent that there is little time for the soil to regain normal trafficability between successive periods of precipitation. Furthermore, moderately high humidity characterizes the whole region at all seasons, especially during summer, and impedes rapid evaporation of soil moisture.

In eastern lowland regions, snow is not a serious obstacle to the movement of vehicles, since it is seldom as deep as one foot. In mountain areas, western coastal regions, and the vicinity of AOMORI in the north, from December through March snow often reaches depths of two to three feet and at some places, five to eight feet, seriously reducing the ability of most vehicles to move cross-country. Where tracks are not protected by snowsheds, even railroad traffic is sometimes halted.

Soil freezing in eastern lowland regions should not affect trafficability except to the extent that it disrupts normal soil drainage. If shallow freezing occurs when the soil is already saturated, vehicles will break through the crust and trafficability will be poor. In mountainous areas of HONSHU, in the Intermontane Basins, and in the western coastal regions, there are occasional periods during December through March when soil freezing is deep enough to support light military vehicles. However, these periods do not usually last long. For instance, At MORIOKA, about 100 miles south of AOMORI on the TOKYO highway, the percentage frequency of surface soil temperatures below 30° F. is

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only 17.4 during January and 23.7 during February (7-year record 1926-1932 taken at 1400, 135° East Meridian Time). The first date of freezing surface soil temperatures during the period 1926-1932 occurred, on the average, during the middle of December, and the last date during the latter part of March.

c. Soil Trafficability in Northern Lowlands Area: As a whole, this area consists of protected lowlands and has lower annual precipitation than the other areas in CENTRAL JAPAN, and extremely poor trafficability is less common. The most favorable soil trafficability conditions occur on the large areas of terrace loams of the eastern part of MUTSU-WAN Lowlands.

Except on rice lands, the most favorable periods for cross-country ground operations in this area are during May and June after the drying of soil moisture of spring thaws, and during late October through November before any persistent snows. May and June are more favorable than October and November in this area, while the reverse is true of areas farther south.

During December through March, snows are frequent and somewhat reduce trafficability. Snow on the ground seldom accumulates to more than two feet in the lowlands except in the extreme northern interior and in the vicinity of AOMORI. During early April, melting snow and ground thaws produce very poor trafficability conditions. During July through September, rainfall is abundant and frequent, and there are intermittent periods of poor trafficability.

4. VEGETATION:

a. General: Rice fields occupy most of the irrigable lowlands and some swamp areas. Dry crops of millet, potatoes, rape, and apple orchards grow on the higher lowlands and lower mountain slopes.

b. The TSUGARU Lowland, facing the JAPAN SEA, has much of its area occupied by rice paddies, as does the AOMORI Plain. Along the main streams of these plains are higher belts of land of varying width, occupied by dry crops, especially apple orchards and potato and rape fields. Other higher areas among the paddy fields are occupied by either scrubby trees or dry crops. Dry crops are more extensive at the southern ends of both of these lowlands, and spread over many of the lower slopes of the adjacent mountains. Apple orchards are especially important.

c. The HACHINOHE Lowland, facing the Pacific Ocean, has relatively less irrigable area than the other sections. Beach ridges line the shore and have marshy strips behind them. The paddy areas are much broken by higher flattish or slightly rolling lands. Parts of these are devoted to dry crops but a greater area is woodland (largely conifers), grass and wasteland. Some of the grasslands are used for horse pastures. Millet is particularly important among the dry crops on the higher lands. Grains in this region are planted in both fall and spring.

d. Mixed forests cover the hilly peninsulas and the hills that border the lowlands. The broadleaf deciduous trees, beech, ash, and oak predominate; the chief conifer is hiba (cedar). Patches of grassland are scattered throughout the forest.

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APPENDIX NO. 4 TO ANNEX NO. 1, INTELLIGENCE,
TO ACCOMPANY FO. NO. 8, 81 INF DIV,
22 AUGUST 1945.

CLIMATE AND WEATHER AOMORI AREA

1. GENERAL CLIMATE:

The climate of CENTRAL JAPAN which includes AOMORI KEN in its northern limits, is characterized by warm, cloudy, and rainy summers; by cold, snowy winters on the western side of the island; and by cold but sunny winters on the eastern side of the island.

a. Winter: From November through February, the prevailing direction of air flow (approximately 100% of the time) is from the north and northwest out of a region of high pressure in SIBERIA. When the air masses leave the continent of ASIA, they are cold and dry, but in passing over the JAPAN SEA the lower layers absorb heat and moisture. When the air subsequently moves over JAPAN, heavy snows and considerable cloudiness occur in the mountains of WESTERN HONSHU, but on the eastern slopes, particularly along the Pacific coast, clear skies prevail.

b. Summer: From June through August, the prevailing direction of air flow is from southerly directions. For approximately 50% of the time, this direction prevails but the pressure gradients are weak and the winds more variable than in winter. Because of their long trajectory over the ocean, these air streams are warm and heavily laden with moisture, hence there is considerable cloudiness and local precipitation in the form of showers over CENTRAL JAPAN in the summer months.

c. Spring and Autumn are short transitional seasons when the Siberian High and the North Pacific High alternately become the dominant control of the direction of air flow over HONSHU. The zone of convergence between the southward flowing polar or Arctic air and the northward flowing maritime air is identified as the Polar Front. The position of the front varies considerably, but on the average, in winter, it lies considerably to the South and East of HONSHU, and in summer, to the North and West of HOKKAIDO. In spring and autumn, however, the zone of convergence lies approximately over the main islands of JAPAN; directions of air flow are variable and storms more frequent. Occasionally, in late summer or autumn, typhoons, or intense tropical storms, move north-eastward along the Pacific coast of JAPAN. These typhoons sometimes converge with an extra tropical cyclone moving in from the west, and the resulting storm brings heavy rainfall, high winds, and high seas.

2. WEATHER AND OPERATIONS:

a. Ground Operation:

(1) Precipitation: Of the annual 56.3 inches of rainfall, the larger

[redacted]

portion falls during fall and winter months, (See Inclosure No. 1 - Tables). Precipitation in winter months falls as snow and accumulates on the ground. The average maximum depth of snow on the ground in February at AOMORI is 42 inches, while at AKITA, on the SEA of JAPAN, 85 miles southwest it is 27 inches. Records show that the number of days per month which have precipitation equal to or greater than 0.004 inches increase from 17 to 27 during the months of September to December. (See Inclosure No. 1).

(2) Temperature: Except during winter months, temperatures are generally moderate, but during December through January, the mean temperature will be below 40° F, and as a result, snow is frequent and freezing rain or snow may be expected between November 1 and May 1.

(3) Humidity:

Because of the prevalence of maritime air, humidities are high at all seasons and the presence of salt particles in the air make conditions particularly favorable to rusting and corrosion of equipment. Thunderstorms are infrequent, one per month for September and October, and none November and December or during winter. Skies are clouded over completely, ten to twelve days per month with partial cover the balance of the days, except three or four days in each of the fall and spring months. Fog however, is infrequent and throughout the year varies from none in winter to a high of three days per month in July and August.

b. Amphibious Operations:

(1) Sea and Swell: The most adverse conditions of sea and swell occur in winter. At this season the average for the east and west coasts of the island are high seas (over nine feet) 40% and high swell (over twelve feet) 20%. The most favorable sea conditions occur in summer when low seas (under two feet) average for both coasts about 45% of the time.

(2) Surface Winds: Moderate winds (four to twelve MPH) prevail for more than half of each month and those three MPH or under occur the balance of the days, except for winds thirteen-thirty-one MPH occurring five to twelve days in winter months but only two days in July, August and September.

2 Inclosures:
INCLOSURE NO. 1 - Meteorological Tables.
INCLOSURE NO. 2 - Tide Predictions (September-October).

Line		Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Annual
1.	Mean precipitation (in.)	6.3	4.7	3.8	2.5	2.8	3.2	5.6	4.1	5.6	5.0	5.8	6.9	56.3
2.	Mean no. of days w/precipitation equal to or over 0.004 in.	27	23	22	14	14	13	15	13	17	18	23	27	224
3.	Mean no. of days with snowfall (Trace or more)	27	24	20	4	0	-	-	-	-	1	10	24	110
4.	Mean maximum depth of snow on the ground. (in.)	36	42	35	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	18	
5.	Mean temperature (°F)	28	29	33	45	53	61	69	73	65	54	43	32	49
6.	Mean daily maximum temperature	34	36	41	54	63	70	77	81	74	64	50	38	57
7.	Mean daily minimum temperature	22	22	26	36	45	55	64	66	58	46	36	26	42
8.	Extreme high Temp. (°F)	56	53	68	78	85	87	93	97	97	80	73	70	97
9.	Extreme low temp. (°F)	-1	-2	4	14	30	40	47	48	40	30	15	5	-2
10.	Average no. of days with fog	0	0	1	2	2	2	3	3	1	1	0	0	
11.	Cloudiness:													
	Clear (0-19% cloud cover)	0	1	2	5	4	3	2	4	3	4	2	1	
	Partly cloudy (20-79% cloud cover)	10	10	14	15	17	15	14	17	16	18	14	8	
	Cloudy (80-100% cloud cover)	21	17	15	10	10	12	15	10	11	9	14	22	
12.	Thunderstorms	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	
13.	Mean relative humidity (%)	80	79	74	71	74	79	82	81	79	76	76	79	77
14.	Mean percent of sky covered by cloud	82	78	72	57	59	64	70	59	62	57	71	82	68

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO APPENDIX NO. 4

[redacted]

INCLOSURE NO. 2 TO APPENDIX NO. 4 TO ANNEX NO. 1,

INTELLIGENCE, TO ACCOMPANY FO NO. 8, 81 INF DIV,

22 AUGUST 1945.

TIDE PREDICTIONS

AOMORI - KŌ, HONSHU, JAPAN

Lat. 40° 50' N Long. 140° 44' E

Reference Point: NAHA

All Times: ITEM (-9).

SEPTEMBER 1945

DATE		HW	FT	HW	FT	LW	FT	LW	FT	MOON PHASE
SEPTEMBER	1	1152	1.8	2235	1.9	0459	0.9	1722	1.4	
	2	1319	1.9	——	——	0610	0.8	1830	1.4	
	3	0004	2.0	1403	2.0	0704	0.6	1924	1.2	
	4	0112	2.1	1435	2.1	0750	0.6	2005	1.1	
	5	0202	2.2	1506	2.2	0829	0.5	2041	1.0	
	6	0243	2.3	1535	2.2	0902	0.5	2115	0.9	
	7	0321	2.3	1603	2.3	0935	0.5	2147	0.8	
	8	0357	2.3	1627	2.3	1004	0.6	2217	0.8	
	9	0430	2.3	1653	2.2	1031	0.7	2247	0.8	
	10	0504	2.2	1720	2.2	1057	0.8	2316	0.8	
	11	0539	2.1	1746	2.1	1122	0.9	2349	0.8	
	12	0617	2.0	1815	2.1	1148	1.0	——	——	
	13	0700	1.9	1848	2.0	0025	0.9	1216	1.2	
	14	0758	1.8	1930	1.9	0115	0.9	1253	1.3	
	15	0919	1.7	2035	1.8	0238	1.0	1426	1.5	
	16	1118	1.7	2208	1.8	0429	1.0	1711	1.5	
	17	1246	1.8	2333	1.9	0548	0.8	1820	1.3	
	18	1329	2.0	——	——	0640	0.7	1907	1.2	
	19	0047	2.1	1406	2.1	0727	0.6	1948	1.0	
	20	0141	2.2	1440	2.2	0807	0.4	2024	0.8	
	21	0230	2.4	1511	2.3	0846	0.4	2100	0.6	
	22	0313	2.4	1542	2.4	0924	0.4	2137	0.5	
	23	0354	2.5	1615	2.4	1001	0.5	2215	0.5	
	24	0438	2.4	1650	2.3	1037	0.6	2253	0.5	
	25	0524	2.3	1723	2.3	1112	0.8	2335	0.5	
	26	0612	2.2	1800	2.2	1149	0.9	——	——	
	27	0704	2.0	1841	2.1	0023	0.6	1229	1.2	
	28	0807	1.8	1931	1.9	0121	0.7	1325	1.3	
	29	0936	1.7	2040	1.8	0253	0.8	1541	1.5	
	30	1148	1.8	2221	1.8	0438	0.8	1729	1.4	

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INCLOSURE NO. 2 TO APPENDIX NO. 4 (cont'd)

TIDE PREDICTIONS

AOMORI - KU, HONSHU, JAPAN

Lat. 40° 50' N Long. 140° 44' E

Reference Point: NAHA

All Times: ITEM (-9). OCTOBER 1945

DATE	HW	FT	HW	FT	LW	FT	LW	FT	MOON PHASE
OCTOBER 1	1303	1.8	——	—	0553	0.8	1832	1.2	
2	0003	1.8	1340	2.0	0647	0.7	1916	1.1	
3	0109	1.9	1408	2.1	0730	0.6	1953	0.9	
4	0156	2.0	1434	2.1	0805	0.6	2024	0.8	
5	0234	2.1	1500	2.2	0836	0.6	2053	0.7	
6	0308	2.1	1522	2.2	0904	0.6	2121	0.6	
7	0338	2.2	1545	2.2	0931	0.7	2150	0.6	
8	0412	2.1	1609	2.2	0958	0.7	2218	0.5	
9	0443	2.1	1634	2.2	1023	0.8	2246	0.5	
10	0520	2.0	1659	2.1	1048	0.9	2317	0.6	
11	0558	1.9	1728	2.0	1115	1.0	2353	0.6	
12	0642	1.8	1802	2.0	1150	1.2	——	——	
13	0737	1.7	1849	1.8	0037	0.7	1227	1.3	
14	0855	1.7	1955	1.8	0142	0.8	1400	1.4	
15	1026	1.7	2127	1.7	0335	0.8	1616	1.4	
16	1152	1.8	2306	1.8	0505	0.8	1754	1.2	
17	1243	1.9	——	—	0607	0.6	1841	1.0	
18	0025	1.9	1325	2.1	0657	0.5	1923	0.7	
19	0125	2.1	1358	2.2	0740	0.5	2000	0.5	
20	0215	2.2	1433	2.2	0820	0.4	2038	0.3	
21	0300	2.3	1508	2.3	0858	0.5	2116	0.2	
22	0343	2.3	1542	2.3	0936	0.6	2156	0.2	
23	0428	2.3	1616	2.3	1013	0.6	2236	0.2	
24	0515	2.2	1651	2.2	1050	0.8	2319	0.3	
25	0603	2.1	1732	2.1	1128	1.0	——	——	
26	0656	1.9	1816	2.0	0008	0.4	1212	1.1	
27	0800	1.8	1906	1.8	0103	0.5	1319	1.3	
28	0922	1.7	2023	1.7	0227	0.7	1542	1.3	
29	1107	1.7	2202	1.6	0406	0.7	1720	1.2	
30	1215	1.8	2345	1.6	0521	0.7	1816	1.1	
31	1259	1.8	——	——	0615	0.7	1858	0.9	

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APPENDIX NO. 5 TO ANNEX NO. 1, INTELLIGENCE,

TO ACCOMPANY FO. NO. 8, 81 INF DIV,

22 AUGUST 1945

UNCLASSIFIED

BEACH REPORTS AOMORI PREFECTURE

1. AOMORI BEACH.

a. General: AOMORI beach lies between 40°51'N, 140°50'E, and 41°03'N, 140°39'E. It is a narrow, sandy beach, with a total length of 19.4 miles. The beach follows along a broad arc, forming the south shore and part of the west shore of AOMORI WAN. The city of AOMORI interrupts the beach with the portion east of town 3.6 miles long, and that to the west and north, 15.8 miles long.

b. Landmark: The town of AOMORI may be located and recognized by the chimney of an electric plant on the eastern side of KOMAGOME-KAWA.

c. Beach Northeast of AOMORI:

(1) Location: Northeast of AOMORI, a 3.6 mile stretch of beach, lies between BAKKONO-SAKI to the northeast and the stream KOMAGOME-KAWA to the southwest.

(2) Width: Beach averages 50 to 80 feet, somewhat narrower between NONAI and BAKKONO-SAKI.

(3) General Character: Composition of beach: Sandy. At intervals small streams cross the beach, usually forming small lagoons, which may have mud bottoms. The greatest interruption in the beach is the mouth of NONAI-GAWA, which is about 100 feet wide.

d. Beach Northwest of Aomori:

(1) Location: North and northwest of AOMORI, a 15.8 mile stretch of beach continues along the gently curving shore to a point about 1 mile north of KANIDA.

(2) Width: Average 80 feet or less. Maximum width of 200 feet attained near SHIMIZU, 6 miles northwest of AOMORI.

(3) Beach Slope: Moderate, varies little from one part to another.

(4) General Character: Beach composed uniformly of sand, which is generally firm, except near the mouths of the numerous small streams. These open for the most part into small lagoons or marshes, and the beach near them is relatively soft.

e. Nearshore: Slope of the bottom from the shore is moderate, with the 30 foot depth line lying 600 to 900 feet from the shoreline. Northwestward the slope becomes increasingly gentle, and is almost inappreciable off the northwest half

UNCLASSIFIED

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of the beach. The nearshore bottom of the southern half of the beach near AOMORI is shelving; the slope from the shore to the 18 foot depth line is less than that from the 18 foot line to the 30 foot line. Along the northwestern part of the beach the slope is generally uniform from the beach to the 30 foot line. The bottom material south of the harbor limit of AOMORI-KO is mud with only local areas of fine sand; north of the harbor limit fine sand is the rule.

f. Bottom: Muddy bottom both east and west of AOMORI is overgrown with seaweed. East of the town the seaweed covered area borders a flat which dries at low tide. The flat has a maximum width of 600 feet close to the mouth of the KOMAGOME-KAWA, and gradually narrows eastward. The seaweed area fronts the flat for 2000 feet east of river mouth.

West of the main harbor structures, the drying mud flat bordering the shore averages 500 feet in width, and is fronted by a seaweed area for at least 0. mile, except off the mouth of the small stream OKIDATE-GAWA which is relatively clear. No rocks are known in the approach to the beach, although they lie scattered beyond the northwest end of the area. Depth of 9 fathoms is found at 1500 feet from the shore abreast of AOMORI, with good holding ground

g. Adjacent Terrain: The coastal plain backing the beach has a fairly uniform width of approximately 1 mile through most of the area, rising inland to hilly country. The northernmost part of the beach, for about 4 miles, rises directly inland to hills. The hills are forested in pine, broad-leaved trees, and brush; the greater part of the plain is under rice. Small lakes are numerous within a mile or so of the shore, and countless little streams, less than a mile apart, drain across the coastal plain and beach.

h. Highways and Exits: The villages northeast of AOMORI are connected with that city by a main highway paralleling the coast about 300 feet to $\frac{1}{4}$ mile inland, except at AOMORI where it is about 0.5 mile inland. Where the highway is any distance from the shore a network of roads offers easy access to it. A standard-gauge single-track railway parallels the road a few feet to 0.3 mile on the inland side. Northwest from AOMORI a prefectural road closely follows the shore throughout the area, permitting easy access to AOMORI from all the fishing villages along the coast and to AOMORI Airfield. Numerous secondary roads of varying widths lead inland, from the highway to the railroad.

i. Communications: Three cables land at AOMORI, and the city is connected with the Japanese telegraph system.

2. TANABU BEACH.

a. General: TANABU Beach lies between 41°17'N - 141°12'E, and 41°07' N - 141°16'E. It is a sandy beach extending for 12 miles from the vicinity of TANABU to a point 1.3 miles southwest of HAMADA. City of TANABU only large settlement near beach.

b. Beach:

(1) Location: Beach extends from a tidal flat on east side of OMINATO-

KO near TANABU south-southeast in a gentle curve 9.5 miles to a point 1.3 miles south of HAMADA, then curves south-southwest for 2.5 miles.

(2) Width: Beach 150-200 feet wide at north, narrows steadily southward, 50 feet locally near HAMADA.

(3) Beach Slope: Foreshore slope - gentle to mild, flatter to north, steeper to south, very steep near and to south of HAMADA.

(4) General Character: Composition of beach: firm sand, with gravel and pebbles to south. Beach is interrupted by mouths of small fordable streams; at south end, parts around coves are more or less isolated by intervening points, around which beach is very narrow. Northern half of beach is backed by a belt of sand dunes; south of HAMADA, by bluffs up to 60 feet in height.

c. Nearshore: Within MUTSU WAN, approach to 30 foot depth line is clear. Thirty foot line averages 0.5 mile offshore; in general is close in at north end (0.3 miles in places), and farther out at south end, (1 mile at HAMADA). The 18 foot depth line is 0.25 to 0.3 mile offshore, except from HAMADA south, where shallower water extends as much as 0.6 mile offshore.

d. Bottom: Off HAMADA for 1 mile to north there are sunken rocks; elsewhere the bottom is fine sand, with patches of mud offshore. The bottom slope is generally mild; slightly steeper to the north, where it is nearly flat to the 18 foot line, then drops abruptly. Southward slope is irregular with rocky bottom 1.3 miles off HAMADA.

e. Adjacent Terrain: Back of north half of beach, terrain is low, cultivated land, broken by a line of conifer-covered sand dunes just behind beach. Three miles south of OMAGARI (OMAGA), there is an area of marsh with small ponds directly behind the dunes. South of this point, land behind beach is rolling, and rises inland toward hills. From a point 2 miles north of HAMADA southward, the belt of lower land between the beach and hills is only ½ mile wide, a large part of which is moorland or scrub-growth. All streams are small and fordable; some at south end flow into small ravines that are difficult to cross.

f. Highway Exits: A Prefectural road, and the OMINATO branch of the government railroad parallel the beach, never more than 3/4 miles away from it, generally closer. They are closest at south end, but are separated from beach by low bluffs with few good exits.

g. Communications: Telegraph power lines parallel highway, and there are telegraph stations at TANABU near north end, and at YOKOHAMA south of south end of beach. A powerhouse is reported close to railroad at north end of beach.

3. NOHEJI BEACH.

a. General: NOHEJI Beach lies between 41°04'N, 141°15'E and 40°04'N, 140°59'E. It is a narrow sandy beach, with a total length of 24.9 miles.

b. Beach

(1) Location: Beach curves around the shores of the bay, NOHEJI-WAN, the southeastern portion of MUTSU-WAN, extends from a point one mile south of YOKOHAMA on east side to KOMINATO-WAN (SHIRAHAI BAY) on southwest side, a distance of 24.9 miles.

(2) Width: Beach is generally narrow, usually less than 100 feet wide. It is widest in certain stretches along northeastern 7 miles where it reaches 200 feet in width, and narrowest between ARITO and NOHEJI where it is rarely over 50 feet wide. This narrow portion extends for 4.8 miles.

(3) General Character: Composition of beach: sandy and firm, some gravel reported at end northwest of KARIBASAWA. The beach is interrupted by the mouths of many streams, most of these small and fordable with the exception of NOHEJI-GAWA and SHIMIZU-GAWA (KIYOMIZU-KAWA) which are too large to ford except in dry weather, or when water is removed for irrigation. The beach ends at a tidal flat in KOMINATO-WAN.

c. Nearshore: Within MUTSU-WAN approach to 30 foot depth line is clear. The 30 foot depth line averages 0.5 mile off shore but is rather irregular, lying closer inshore between FUKKOSHI and ARITO and between MAKADO and SHIMIZU-GAWA (KIYOMIZU-KAWA), but much farther out off NOHEJI (1 mile in places).

d. Bottom: Largely gravel and sand nearshore, fine sand and mud with patches of shell offshore.

e. Adjacent Terrain: Except for a low corridor leading south from NOHEJI, hills over 200 feet high come within two miles of beach along entire extent. In most places the land immediately behind the beach is rolling, rising steadily inland to these hills; around NOHEJI there is considerable flat land. Land is mostly scrub growth or moor land, cultivated only near villages and in flat area near NOHEJI. The NOHEJI-GAWA and probably the SHIMIZU-GAWA will require bridges at least part of the year; other streams can be forded, but many of these flow in small, steep-sided ravines. NOHEJI, the largest settlement in the area, is an important road and railroad junction.

f. Highways and Exits: The main TOKYO-AOMORI road and railroad parallel the beach west of NOHEJI and are less than 0.7 mile from it. The OMINATO branch railroad and prefectural road parallel the beach from NOHEJI northeast at a maximum distance of 0.5 mile. In general, road and railroad are readily accessible from the beach, but from NOHEJI to ARITO and at a few points northeast toward FUKKOSHI they lie behind a cliff 20-50 feet high; west of NOHEJI the railroad has a succession of low embankments and cuts. At KARIBASAWA the road is on an embankment, though a mile to north and south it is practically on the beach.

g. Communications: Telegraph and power lines parallel the main roads;

there are telegraph stations at YOKOHAMA, MOHEJI, and KOMINATO, and a power station at MOHEJI.

4. OMINATO BEACH.

a. General: OMINATO Beach lies between 41°11'N - 141°04'E and 41°14'N-141°08'E. It is a sand beach and extends 9 miles along the western shore of OMINATO-KO from .75 mile northeast of KURO-SAKI to inner side of sand spit opposite OMINATO. Behind this spit is a well sheltered inlet, which has been developed into the OMINATO Naval Base and Air Station.

b. Landmark: Principal landmark is the mountain, KAMABUSE-YAMA, 2,880 feet high, just over 3 miles inland from northeast end of beach area.

c. Beach:

(1) Location: Lies between a point .75 mile northeast of KURO-SAKI, and the inner side of the sand spit 9 miles northeast of KURO-SAKI.

(2) Width: Narrow to the southwest; in places less than 50 feet wide. Wider at the northeast end where beach averages 200 feet in width.

(3) Beach Slope: Gentle at northeast end, somewhat steeper at southwest end of beach.

(4) General Character: Composition of beach: firm sand, probably some gravel to southwest. The beach extends for 7 miles to tip of the spit, and continues along its western side for 2 miles. It is interrupted by a few fordable streams. Only structures along beach are those of the naval base.

d. Nearshore: The approach to 30 foot depth line is entirely clear within MUTSU-WAN. The 30 foot line parallels the shore at about 0.7 mile, along southwest end of beach, but swings in closer to northwest, and is not over three-hundred feet offshore around the end of the sandspit. The inlet behind sandspit has a depth of over 30 feet most of its length.

e. Bottom: The bottom is largely mud offshore and fine sand inshore. There are a few offshore rocks, ½ mile southwest of ICHIRIGOSHI (SATOKOE), otherwise nearshore approach is clear. Along southwest part of beach, bottom slope is mild to flat; on both sides of sandspit bottom slopes gradually for a few hundred feet, then drops abruptly. Inlet behind sandspit is a protected anchorage at all times.

f. Adjacent Terrain: Terrain behind beach is gently rolling, much of it cultivated along coast, but five miles inland rises to mountains (wooded) over 2,000 feet high. All streams are small and readily fordable. Except for OMINATO,

at entrance to inlet, settlements are small fishing villages.

g. Highway Exits: Unimproved road extends along southwest end of beach, generally two-hundred feet from shore. Improved road connects southwest end of inlet with OMINATO, which is also reached by a branch of the government railroad.

h. Communications: Telegraph and power lines reach OMINATO and Naval Base, and probably Airfield, located just southwest of inlet. There is a radio broadcasting station in the area.

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APPENDIX NO. 6 TO ANNEX NO. 1,

INTELLIGENCE, TO ACCOMPANY FO NO. 8,

22 AUGUST 1945.

PORT FACILITIES OF AOMORI PREFECTURE

1. AOMORI TOWN.

a. AOMORI has two artificial basins. Basin No. 1, the older basin or harbor to the west, is protected by two breakwaters and has an entrance 125 feet wide with a depth of seven feet. Basin No. 2, immediately east of Basin No. 1, has an entrance 850 feet wide between the outer west and north breakwaters protecting the basin. The depth of water at the outer breakwaters is 50 feet; at the inner breakwaters it is 32 feet. Depth of water in Basin No. 2 is 10 to 50 feet. East of Basin No. 2 there has recently been under construction five piers; one is completed and four are under construction. This information is as of 1940 and the work may well have been completed since that date. The length of the proposed wharf area behind these piers is approximately 4,000 feet. Each pier is 600 feet long and 300 feet wide. The space between piers measures 300 feet and the depth of water alongside averages 37 to 42 feet.

b. The AOMORI port is most important because of its excellent rail facilities; and the town itself is a rail terminus and distribution point. Rail connections between the islands of HONSHU and HOKKAIDO are via large railroad ferries which use Basin No. 2. One railroad ferry slip is adjacent to the west breakwater quay or railroad pier; the second railroad ferry slip is about 250 feet southward. Both ferry slips are equipped with transfer bridges and three tracks.

c. The port is secondarily important because it is the center of a large logging industry. The five piers under construction, though not having any known rail facilities, may have been used for handling lumber. There is also a shipyard located south of the two eastern piers. Small steel vessels under 100 tons and wooden fishing vessels 50 to 60 feet long can be constructed there.

d. A basin for fishing vessels was being constructed off the east side of the mouth of the TSUTSUMI Kawa in 1940. The proposed length was 2,550 feet and the width 525 feet. It was to be inclosed by breakwaters, and plans included the construction of a jetty. A retaining wall also was being constructed from the west side of the mouth of the river.

[redacted]

e. The estimated loading capacity for working general cargo alongside and in the stream by ship's gear totals 7,000 short tons per day -- 4,500 tons handled alongside and 2,500 tons discharged from an estimated five Libertys riding at anchor. If the five piers then under construction have been completed the total unloading capacity would be 12,000 tons per day. In 1937, AOMORI accommodated 9,258 vessels totaling 3,720,498 tons including 5,900 steamships totaling 3,659,677 tons. One electric crane, 15-ton capacity, and 1 hand crane, 10-ton capacity, are reported, but their precise locations are not known.

f. Storage facilities at the port are two open sheds, 30 feet by 700 feet in the rear of the west breakwater. An area of 10 acres westward of Basin No. 1 is served by railroad tracks and could probably be used as a supply dump. Size of the warehouses south of Basin No. 2 are not available, nor are those for the wharf area behind the five new piers.

g. Digest of port and facilities:

Title: Basin No. 1.		
Location on waterfront	: West of west breakwater.	
Purpose for use	: Working railroad freight.	
Dimensions:	W Side	E Side
Length (Berthage)	: 820 feet.	490 feet.
Depth of water alongside	: 6 to 13 feet.	7 to 13 feet.
Berthing space available	: 820 feet.	490 feet.
Transit sheds	: Building 80 x 60 feet.	Building 80 x 400 feet.
Rail connections	: 1 track 1,000 feet long.	2 tracks 1,370 feet and 950 feet long.

Title: Basin No. 2.	
Location on waterfront	: Along SE side of west breakwater.
Purpose for use	: Probably working railroad freight.
Dimensions:	
Length (Berthage)	: 890 feet.
Depth of water alongside	: 20 feet.
Berthing space available	: 850 feet. One 450 foot and one 350 foot vessel drawing 20 feet.
Transit sheds	: No information available.
Rail connections	: Two 785-ft tracks on apron and one 490-ft track behind buildings.

Title: Quay A.	
Location on waterfront	: E of south railroad ferry slip.

Purpose for use	: No data.
Dimensions:	
Length (Berthage)	: 275 plus 410 feet.
Depth of water alongside	: 12 to 15 feet.
Berthing space available	: 275 plus 410 feet.
Transit sheds	: No data.
Rail connections	: One spur from freight yards.

Title: Quay B.	
Location on waterfront	: S of north breakwater.
Purpose for use	: No data
Dimensions:	
Length (Berthage)	: 1,800 feet.
Depth of water alongside	: 10 to 12 feet.
Berthing space available	: 1,800 feet.
Storage sheds	: One building 300 x 50 feet, and one building 350 x 60 feet, both two stories. Also Aomori Refrigerated and Hakodate Air Conditioned warehouses.
Rail connections	: One track 1,900 feet long.

Title: Proposed five piers.	
Location on waterfront	: W of TSUTSUMI Gawa.
Purpose for use	: General dock work.
Dimensions:	
Length (Berthage)	: 600 feet on each of 9 sides of 5 piers; 300 feet on each end of pier.
Depth of water alongside	: 37 to 42 feet.
Berthage space available	: 5,400 feet on 9 sides of 5 piers; 1,500 feet on end of 5 piers.
Transit sheds	: No data.
Rail connections	: No data.

Title: NONAI Oil Pier.	
Location	: 6 miles NE of AOMORI.
Purpose for use	: Handling bulk and packaged petroleum.
Dimensions:	
Length	: 784 feet on N and S sides.
Depth of water alongside	: 26 to 3 feet on both sides.
Transit sheds	: No data.
Rail connections	: Railroad spur length of pier.

[redacted]

Mechanical handling facilities	: Pumps, capacity 1,300 barrels per hour. Regular pier pipe lines and 6-inch floating fuel lines.

h. See Inclosure No. 1 for sketch of port and facilities.

2. HACHINOHE. In addition to the principal port of AOMORI there is a port of secondary importance at HACHINOHE (1940 population 73,494). It is on HACHINOHE-Ko, an open bay on the northeast coast of HONSHU 38 miles southeast of AOMORI. Around the head of the bay from east to west are the villages of SAME, SHIROGANE, MINATO, KONAKANO-Chō, suburbs of HACHINOHE. The center of the city is about 2 miles inland. HACHINOHE is a fishing and industrial city. Most of the industries are near the mouth of the NIITA-Gawa. Anchorage is good with southerly winds, but exposed and dangerous with northerlies. There are 4 first-, 12 second-, and 18 third-class anchorage berths in the bay. The port has wharfside berthage for three 200-foot vessels drawing 12 feet.

a. Harbor. HACHINOHE-Ko, formerly SAME-Kyochi is about three miles wide between SAME-Kaku and the shore westward. The bay recedes one mile southward to the head. Depths in the bay are two to ten fathoms. An artificial harbor on the eastern side of the bay and fronting the village of SAME is protected by two detached breakwaters and to some extent by KIEBURA-Jima. The harbor is about 1,400 yards long and averages 1,000 feet wide, with depths of three to five fathoms in the northern part, and it has a quay with 12-foot depths alongside. Inshore depths in other parts of HACHINOHE-Ko are in the general less than three feet.

(1). Entrance channel: The entrance to the harbor is open to the westward and is about 1,300 feet wide between the breakwaters, the depths in the channel is 4½ to 5 fathoms leading to depths of 3 to 5 fathoms in the harbor.

(2). Anchorage: The bay provides protective anchorage from southerly winds, but is exposed to northerly winds and may become dangerous. Anchorage may be found midway between the breakwaters, where the depth is four to five fathoms and the bottom is mud and sand. Berths listed in introduction.

(3). Significant hydrographic features: The mean high water interval at HACHINOHE-Ko is 3 hours 50 minutes. Spring tide is 4.3 feet; neaps rise 3.2 feet. In the harbor the southward resultant of the current and the tidal streams diverts the outflow from the NIITA-Gawa, and there is always an easterly set that causes a counter current in the vicinity of KABURA-Jima, particularly for two days after a strong westerly or northerly wind. The easterly

[redacted]

set is usually sufficient to cause vessels at anchor to ride heading westward even with an easterly wind.

b. Landing facilities. A quay about 1,300 feet long is in the artificial harbor off SAME. A shoal at the south end of the quay reduces the usable length to 800 feet with 12 foot depths alongside. This provides berthage for three 200-foot vessels drawing 12 feet. One source reports that there are two piers near the quay and that the harbor has been dredged. The same source also reports that a stretch of the NIITA-Gawa channel at the coastal termination of the HACHINOHE railway has been dredged and two small piers are located there.

c. Storage facilities. (No data available).

d. Capacity and clearance. The estimated unloading capacity is 700 short tons plus 500 tons for one vessel in stream.

The HACHINOHE rail line, which passes about 500 feet behind the quay, connects with the TOHOKIE main line about three miles inland. There may be rail tracks on the quay. A branch from the HACHINOHE line terminates on the west side of the NIITA-Gawa just inside the mouth, where two small piers are charted. Two improved roads lead westward from HACHINOHE and one improved road leads southeast to KUJI.

e. Supplies. Two oil tanks owned by the Rising Sun Petroleum Co. are at the rear of the southern end of the wharf. These tanks each have a capacity of 658 barrels of diesel oil. Another oil tank, owned by the Kamei Commercial Co., is believed to be near the Rising Sun tanks. The Kamei Commercial Co. is reported to have another oil tank near the Niita Chemical Co. at KONAKANO-Cho.

f. Repair facilities. Small hull and machinery repairs might be made at KONAKANO-Cho on the NIITA-Gawa, where an iron foundry and a small shipyard are reported.

g. See Inclosure No. 2 for sketch of port and facilities.

3. OMINATO. The naval base of OMINATO on SHIMOKITA peninsula 36 miles northeast of AOMORI is considered to be the Japanese Navy's base for operations in waters to the north, including the KURILES.

Depths in the open harbor are generally from 15 to 20 fathoms while depths inside the inner port range from 3 to 6 fathoms. There is unlimited anchorage in MUTSU Wan with ample space for a fleet of any size in the outer harbor.

There are five concrete piers at the Naval Base Headquarters varying in length from 100 to 200 feet. No definite information as to water depths offside is available, but their use by mine layers is recorded.

See Inclosure No. 3 for sketch of port and facilities.

4. NONAI. At NONAI, three and a half miles northeast of AOMORI, is the oil pier of the Rising Sun and Socony Vacuum Oil Co. This pier about 748 feet long has depths ranging from 3 to 24 feet at the outer end.

INCLOSURE NO. 1 TO APPENDIX NO. 6 TO
ANNEX NO. 1, INTELLIGENCE, TO ACCOMPANY
FO NO. 8, 81 INF DIV, 22 AUGUST 1945.



SKETCH - AOMORI, HONSHU, HARBOR FACILITIES

INCLOSURE NO. 2 TO APPENDIX NO. 6 TO

ANNEX NO. 1, INTELLIGENCE, TO ACCOMPANY

FO NO. 8, 81 INF DIV, 22 AUGUST 1945.

Port Facilities At
HACHINOHE, HONSHU

Scale of Feet
1000 0 5000



INCLOSURE NO. 3 TO APPENDIX NO. 6 TO ANNEX NO. I, INTELLIGENCE.

OMINATO NAVAL STATION



1 Jetty
2 Main docks
3 Harbor master
4 Warehouses
5 Hosp & serv bldgs
6 Barracks
7 Hq and radio sta.
8 WO & [illegible]
9 Officers' quarters
10 Barracks
11 Munition storage
12 Warehouse

13 Machine shps
14 Coal sheds
15 Coal pile
16 Main road
17 Cruiser moorings
18 General anchorage
19 DD moorings (Buoys)
20 DD moorings (Buoys)
21 Sp. dy. craft moo'gs
22 Flo ating drydocks
23 Sma ll craft moor'gs
24 Road to spit
25 Revetted magazine
26 Oil docks
27 Oil tanks
28 Pumphouse
29 Oiler moorings
30 Signal station
31 Entrance buoys
[illegible]
[illegible] Hangars
34 Ordnance Supplies
35 Ramp
36 Hangars
37 Oil tank

APPENDIX NO. 7 TO ANNEX NO. 1, INTELLIGENCE,

TO ACCOMPANY FO. NO. 8, 81 INF DIV,

22 AUGUST 1945.

TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

1. GENERAL.

a. All forms of land transportation and communication are under rigid government control. Main railroads are owned and efficiently operated by the state and the few short private lines are under strict supervision. Water transportation is still in private hands and enjoys a degree of freedom, but under war conditions it has been increasingly subject to government direction. Mountainous character of the islands has hindered the development of land transportation facilities.

b. The use of canals and rivers for inland water traffic is relatively unimportant. Most rivers are scarcely more than mountain torrents and few streams are navigable even by shallow draft vessels because of rapids, hydroelectric plants, silt and bar formations.

c. Because of dependence upon railroads and coastwise shipping, development of a highway system has been largely neglected. This has been partially remedied during the past two decades with national highways now connecting the principal cities. Except for short stretches, these do not come up to first class standards.

A system of secondary prefectural and municipal roads has been planned but never developed. Towns and village roads are little more than tracks or paths, suitable only for bicycles and carts.

2. WATER TRANSPORTATION.

a. With the advent of railroads much coast shipping was diverted to the railroads. Ships continue to haul a majority of all freight traffic, with small boats playing an important part in the movement of commodities along the coast.

b. Five 4,250-ton steamers operate out of AOMORI as train ferries. A capacity of one ferry is twenty-five 15-ton freight cars or twenty 15-ton cars and two bogie baggage cars. The upper decks of these steamers are used for passenger traffic.

c. Air and naval attacks have greatly reduced available shipping.

3. RAILROADS.

a. Steep grades, deep cuts, and many vulnerable bridges and tunnels are found on practically all lines. These factors plus the narrowness of gauge require the use of short trains and light equipment, thus limiting the capacity of the system. There is an average of four bridges per mile, with 95% of them of simple plate or truss girder construction generally placed on piers of reinforced concrete faced

with concrete blocks or masonry. Arches constitute less than 3% of the total length of bridges. There are practically no wooden bridges, and suspension and lift types are rare.

A main line parallel to the coast and 40 to 50 miles inland leads from TOKYO to HACHINOHE, and thence to AOMORI. Roads in the AOMORI area are standard 3'6" gauge, single track, steam operated. A railroad ferry connects the TOKYO-AOMORI line with HOKKAIDO.

b. In 1942 it was estimated there were 5,000 locomotives, 15,000 passenger cars, and 85,000 freight cars in service. Passenger cars are 65.5 feet in length, and have 4 or 6-wheel trucks. Freight cars are mostly 4-wheel type of 10 to 15-ton capacity. Gondola cars have a capacity of 17 tons, and there are a number of 30-ton box, flat, gondola, and other special cars with 4-wheel bogie trucks. Steel cars are standard equipment, but wooden ones are still numerous. The average 15-ton box car is supposed to carry 40 soldiers for troop movements. All rolling stock is equipped with Westinghouse air brakes and Buckeye cuppers.

4. HIGHWAYS.

a. Highways are classified as national, primary arteries of traffic, generally two-lane, paved in some level stretches, but as a rule nomore than good gravel roads through the mountains. Prefectural roads accommodating secondary traffic are usually gravel with 18 to 24-feet beds. Municipal roads are generally unimproved, 6 to 12 feet wide, accomodating only cart or possibly light automotive traffic. Modern Japanese bridges are the work of American and European-trained engineers, and are similar to U.S. type in design and construction. Interruption of rail and watertraffic has increased the use of trucks, bicycles and carts for hauling. Most highways are approximately parallel to the main rail lines.

b. National Highways. The AOMORI-SAMBONGI--SENDAI-TOKYO Road (RIKUU Highway) is a two-lane national highway running generally north and south along the east coast. It is graveled along its entire length, and may be paved in some areas. There are numerous bridges which are in fair condition. Much of the road bed is built up across rice paddies, and widening would be difficult.

The USHU Highway runs from AOMORI southwest through HIROSAKI, OWANI, ODATE, to NOSHIROMINATO and TOKYO. It is part gravel, part paved, but becomes impassable during the winter months when snow covers it as much as 15 feet in some places. Between AOMORI and HIROSAKI it crosses rice paddies, and the width is limited.

c. Prefectural Roads. The MATSUMAE Highway, an unimproved, wide bed road, runs north from AOMORI to the northern end of the west peninsula, ending at MIMAYA. A foot path continues northwest from MIMAYA along the coast to KODOMARI,

where it joins another prefectural road going south through KANAGI across rice paddies to GOSHOGAWARA, ITAYANAGI and FUJISAKI to join the USHU Highway. Another improved road leads from DAISHAKA on the USHU Highway across rice paddies to GOSHOGAWARA and thence southwest to KANAJIRI on the west coast. It will not stand up well under motor traffic.

From KANAJIRI a road leads southeast to HIROSAKI along the edge of the mountains and rice paddies. It could probably be widened and improved. Unimproved roads lead easterly from it across the rice paddies to other prefectural roads in the area.

A prefectural road leaves the USHU Highway at HANIOKA, bypasses HIROSAKI, and goes south to KUROISHI and SAKAISHI. This road is joined to the national highway by a prefectural road extending from KUROISHI west to FUJISAKI. These roads are in rice paddy areas and will require additional road bed and surfacing material to widen or improve them.

A little improved gravel or dirt surfaced secondary road runs from SAMBONGI to the HAKKODA Mountains and TOWADA-KO (lake).

AOMORI is connected with TANABU and OMINATO on the SHIMOKITA Peninsula by national highway west to NOHEJI and thence north by prefectural road.

d. A number of unimproved roads connect the villages of AOMORI prefecture with the national and prefectural highways. These are generally 6 to 12 feet wide, used by carts and pedestrians, and thought to be generally impassable to motor traffic. All roads in this prefecture are affected by winter conditions and become slippery during wet weather. Mostof the roads on the west side of the prefecture are blocked by snow during the winter months.

e. Construction Materials. Gravel may be obtained from stream bed deposits, but its quality will be reduced by the large amount of silt present in most streams. Rock suitable for crushing might be found in this area, but locations of quarries are not known.

A manufacturing plant at HACHINOHE with an annual capacity of 585,000 metric tons makes cement from soft limestone and clay. Abundant timber in the area provides lumber for bridge construction.

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX NO. 8 TO ANNEX NO. 1,

INTELLIGENCE, TO ACCOMPANY FO NO. 8,

22 August 1945.

COMMUNICATIONS

1. GENERAL.

a. All forms of communication in Japan are under rigid governmental control. Telegraph and telephone systems have always been a governmental monopoly. Radio control is complete; there are no private stations.

b. The communications network is widespread and well-equipped, although service in rural areas is frequently very poor and little attention is given to civilian requirements. The presence of such modern apparatus as high speed telegraph printers and ship-to-shore radio telephone stands in sharp contrast to the antique handkeys and wall telephones usually found in Japan. In all cities, except the very largest, the telephone exchange, telegraph office, and post office will be found in the same building.

c. In the city of AOMORI there is a communication training center, newspaper office, telegraph and wireless station. Local stations in AOMORI Prefecture are shown on Inclosure No. 1 hereto.

2. RADIO. Radio broadcasting is a monopoly, controlled by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, which maintains a net-work of stations connected by relays to station JOAK in TOKYO. For dissemination of all information, recent emphasis has been placed upon radio. The powerful stations in TOKYO, NAGOYA, and OSAKA can reach all parts of the world as well as each community in JAPAN.

3. RADIO TELEPHONE AND RADIO TELEGRAPH. Radio telephone and telegraph facilities are used to supplement cable and telephone circuits between the home islands and the territories of the Empire. Coastal transmission stations are located at numerous points throughout HONSHU.

4. TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH, AND CABLE.

a. Telephone instruments are difficult to obtain and service is likely to be slow. In the large cities, there are automatic exchanges, and equipment is similar to that found in the United States. Best service is found in the industrial areas. The public system is supplemented by the police network and by the system connecting Imperial estates and radio broadcasting stations.

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b. Nearly all cities are served by land telegraph which is supervised by a local administrative center. Communications from or to AOMORI are serviced by the SENDAI central.

c. Submarine cables are an important part of the communication system. In AOMORI there are at least one dozen cables for telegraph, telephone and radio, connecting with stations in HAKODATE in HOKKAIDO.

5. PRESS AND PUBLICATIONS.

a. In 1941 there were approximately 450 newspapers published daily. However, to conserve newsprint, many of these papers were consolidated. Principal publications are printed in OSAKA and TOKYO. At present, only one publication is printed in English. Policies of the press are directed by Domei News Agency. All news for the Japanese radio is also issued by Domei.

b. Under wartime conditions the press is rigidly controlled and discussion is limited. Criticism of the Imperial House or of the Military Command are strictly forbidden, but castigation of the government, of political parties, and of individuals is permitted. Much of the censorship is performed indirectly through the cooperation or intimidation of the newspaper publishers. Before distribution, newspaper proofs must be submitted to the police for approval.

c. Supervision of all publications is a function of the police department. The publication of every item of printed matter must be reported, and copies must be submitted to the police. Secret publications are prohibited.

6. POSTAL FACILITIES. No detailed information is available concerning Japanese postal system, but it is known to be a governmental function. It is thought to operate similarly to our own postal system, but its service may not be as extensive.

RADIO INSTALLATIONS IN AOMORI PREFECTURE

Station	Coordinates	Call	Frequency (in kc)	Watts	Remarks
Aomori	40° 50' 13"N 40° 51' 52"N 140° 40' 17"E	JOTG JXR	1,050 329 5,167.5 6,593 6,975 9,132.5	500 500 500 500 500 500	Broadcasting station. Land to plane radio-telephone and radio telegraph
Aomori	40° 50' 13"N 140° 43' 21"E	JGU2 JGU3 JGJ JGJ	270 410 600 1,100	250 100 250 250	Radiotelegraph.
Aomori	40° 50' 13"N 140° 43' 21"E		232	125	Radiotelegraph available at Aomori Railway station.
Aomori	40° 49' N 140° 47' E				Meteorological station.
Aomori-ko	40° 49' 32"N	JHM	310		Ship to shore radio-telegraph. Radio beacon.
Aomori-ko	40° 50' 33"N 140° 43' 00"E	JHM2	285		Ship to shore radio-telegraph. Radio beacon.
Hachinohe	40° 30' 20"N 141° 34' 00"E				Radio masts reported at Tatega-hana.
Hirosaki	40° 36' 38"N 140° 28' 20"E	JORG	840	300	Broadcasting station.
Ishizaki	41° 13' N 140° 38' E	JKK	72,000	30	Radiotelephone to Hakodate.
Oma-saki Light Station	41° 33' 12"N 140° 54' 48"E	JLG	375 500		Radio direction-finder station.

Station	Coordinates	Call	Frequency (in kc)	Watts	Remarks
		JLG	305 500		Ship-to-shore radiotelegraph
Ominato	41° 16' N 141° 09' E				Navy high frequency direction finder.
Shiriya-saki Light Station	41° 25' 38"N 141° 27' 58"E	JLD	375 500 295	350	Ship-to-shore radiotelegraph. Radio direction finder station. Beacon on 295 kc.
Tappi-saki Light Station	41° 15' 24"N 140° 20' 46"E	JLL	375 500 315	350	Ship-to-shore radiotelegraph. Radio direction finder station. Beacon on 315 kc.

[redacted]

APPENDIX NO. 9 TO ANNEX NO. 1, INTELLIGENCE,

TO ACCOMPANY FO NO. 8, 81 INF DIV,

22 AUGUST 1945.

HEALTH AND SANITATION NORTHERN HONSHU

This outline is concerned with environmental and public health factors influencing health and sanitation, with medical facilities in the wider sense, and with information on diseases.

1. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS:

a. Natural water resources are fairly bountiful. The water of streams is generally clear and free of sediment. Water is also frequently obtained from wells, and in the larger cities adequate facilities for filtration and chlorination are found.

b. Methods of waste disposal greatly influence health in JAPAN. Human excreta are deposited in privies, similar to the Western variety, except that the night-soil is removed at intervals to be used as fertilizer in the fields. The material is allowed to decompose for some time before it is removed for fertilizer, but generally some of the later excreta does get used before pathogens contained therein are destroyed. Trash, garbage and sewage are handled in a manner similar to that used in the States. There are sewers in most large cities, but these only accomodate surface waste water, and the latrine method of excreta disposal is in use almost everywhere. Garbage and trash are carried away by city disposal system. Sometimes incinerators are employed, and in smaller communities the garbage is fed to fowl and stock.

c. A good many of the animal vectors of disease are to be found in this area. There are mosquitoes capable of carrying malaria, filariasis, dengue, B encephalitis and other diseases. The common house flies are fairly numerous, and help spread intestinal disease. There is a rat-flea combination that threatens to carry plague at any time. A harvest mite is present and carries the dreaded scrub typhus fever. There are bed bugs, lice, ticks and other vermin of potential influence on health. Gnats may be very annoying.

2. FOOD:

a. Rice is the most important item in the diet. Eighteen percent of this must be imported. Law requires that a certain amount of it be used unpolished to avoid beriberi, which has always been a serious problem in JAPAN. Fish and other sea products are relatively more plentiful in JAPAN than in other countries. Fresh water fish often carry the fish tapeworm. Some poisonous fish are found in Japanese waters, and when eaten, even in very small quantities, may prove fatal. Meat and dairy products play a minor role in the diet, because of the limited area available for pasture and feed crops. There is no law for the control of bovine tuberculosis.

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b. NORTHERN HONSHU is the second most important agricultural zone of JAPAN. The proportion of cultivated land devoted to rice is larger here than anywhere else in the home islands. AOMORI PREFECTURE, is famous for its apples and produces 75% of the total Japanese crop. There are other temperate fruits grown. All of the common vegetables are also grown in this agricultural area.

c. Animal husbandry is not developed because of the lack of pasture land. The native grasses are not suitable for feed and most of the people cannot afford meat. Very few hogs are to be found in NORTHERN HONSHU. There is no law for the control of bovine tuberculosis.

3. PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL FACILITIES:

a. There is an elaborate public health organization. Prominent in this organization is the Bureau of Sanitation and the Bureau of Preventive Medicine. Even in village offices there is a sanitation bureau, and in each hamlet a special person is concerned with matters of sanitation. The system works in a manner much like a Western public health setup.

b. Since before the undeclared war against CHINA, a Health Insurance Law has been in force, which provides for compulsory insurance for workers under the protection of the Factory and Mining laws. Accident, sickness, maternity, and burial benefits are provided.

c. Hospital facilities have always been quite adequate, although the number of beds to population has never been as great as in the United States. There are public, private and charity hospitals as in the States, and there are also clinics and health centers. There are at least nine Imperial Universities with medical schools in the Empire. Dental facilities have been similarly adequate.

d. The Japanese Red Cross Society is required by Imperial Ordinance to assist in the health services of the Army and Navy.

4. DISEASES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE:

a. Dysentery is very common in JAPAN. The bacillary type of infection is much more severe than in the UNITED STATES (our maneuver type of diarrhea), and death rates per hundred cases sometimes range as high as 40% Simple diarrheas are also common.

b. Venereal diseases are very common in JAPAN. Gonorrhea is the most widespread infection, followed by chancroid and syphilis. Lymphogranuloma venereum is also said to occur. In Japanese conscripts the rate of venereal disease per thousand is known to have been thirteen on our last report. Prostitution in JAPAN is controlled by the police, licensed prostitutes being confined to prostitute quarters. There is widespread clandestine prostitution by waitresses and low class geishas.

c. The dreaded Japanese B encephalitis is not so frequently found in this area of JAPAN. The virus is believed to be transmitted by certain mosquitoes, among which are Culex and Aedes varities. Fatality rates with this disease sometimes reach as high as 60%.

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d. Skin diseases are quite common and are similar to the conditions which we have already been in contact with. In addition frostbite and trench foot will be a menace because of the cold, wet winters.

e. There are three main typhus-like diseases occurring in JAPAN: the epidemic or louse-borne typhus is caused by a Rickettsia that is carried by the body louse. This disease might be breaking out again in war time. Endemic typhus fever, a second variety, is spread by rat fleas. This type of typhus is generally found in seaports and other places where the rat population is high. Scrub typhus is spread by the harvest mite, and is endemic along rivers in the mountain districts. This disease occurs especially in summer and fall.

f. There are mosquitoes capable of carrying malaria, and with war time movement of the populace this disease may be found in this district. There is a great amount of malaria in JAPAN as a whole.

g. Similarly there might be a northern migration of filariasis during war time, so this disease must be guarded against. Relapsing fever is endemic in JAPAN. It is carried by the louse. There are no reports as to the frequency of this disease. Cholera, plague and dengue may also be introduced.

h. Tuberculosis, leprosy and trachoma are common among the civilian populace, but will probably not bother the army, as they are not likely to be contracted without sustained contact with the people.

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APPENDIX NO. 10 TO ANNEX NO. 1,

INTELLIGENCE, TO ACCOMPANY FO NO. 8,

22 AUGUST 1945.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF AOMORI PREFECTURE

1. THE PEOPLE.

a. Race. The Japanese are basically of Mongoloid racial stock, drawn principally from the mainland of Asia. Minor racial strains which have left their traces in some present-day individuals include those of the aboriginal people, known today as the Ainus, characterized by abundant hair on face and body, believed to be of Caucasian origin; and a Malayan or southeast Asiatic strain, accounting for waviness of hair among some Japanese. A small group of Ainu people compose the only noteworthy minority group of northern HONSHU.

b. Population Statistics (1940). The population figure for AOMORI prefecture was 1,000,509, which represents 1.4% of the total population of Japan proper. The density is 104 persons per square kilometer, of which 22.4% are urban and 77.6% are rural.

There are three cities in AOMORI prefecture (ken). AOMORI, the prefectural capital and 47th largest city in JAPAN, has a population of 99,065. HACHINOHE, 65th largest city of JAPAN, has a population of 73,494, and HIROSAKI, 99th city, has a population of 51,498.

c. Social Structure.

(1). The Emperor and Imperial Family. The Emperor, as head of the Japanese family, is the ruler in all things temporal and spiritual.

(2). The Nobility. These families have a prestige and significance in Japanese society, always commanding respect but varying according to family origins as well as rank.

(3). The Army and Navy. Army and Navy officers receive special respect as servants of the Emperor. Their prestige is greater than that of civilians and of civil officials of similar rank.

(4). Civil Service. As officials of the Imperial Government and therefore civil agents of the Imperial will, members of

the Japanese civil service have prestige second only to Army and Navy officials.

(5). Leaders of Industry. This group, sometimes referred to as the ZAIBATSU (financial clique), have sought public favor by large donations to charity and by endowment of research laboratories, as well as by placing shares in their enterprises on the open market. Economic control of most large businesses, however, is still highly concentrated.

(6). Professional Groups. Probably because of the prestige of higher education in JAPAN, trained professional personnel such as university and college teachers, lawyers, physicians, and other scientists are accorded a place in the social scale relatively higher than corresponding ones in the United States. Educators are in a somewhat more favorable position than medical practitioneers or purely research workers because, in some cases, they are imperial appointees. Especially in recent years they have acted as mouthpieces for governmental policy.

(7). Lower Middle Class. Included in this class are small business and professional men of low income, and other groups above the economic level of farmers, fishermen and industrial workers. Within this grouping, a man's social status in a given community is determined more by length of residence and by family connections than by his financial position.

(8). Laborers and Farmers. Lowest in the social scale are the laboring classes, which may be divided into rural labor, comprising farmers and fishermen, and urban labor, made up chiefly of factory and household industry workers and unskilled labor.

(9). The Family. The primary unit in Japanese society is the family. The law of primogeniture governs social leadership as well as inheritance, while the male is always, in principle, dominant over the female. Every Japanese is taught that he is important only as part of his family and, in a larger sense, as a member of the Japanese family led by the Emperor; that his every action reflects upon the family rather than upon himself as an individual. He must therefore be guided by his elders and obey them.

(10). Organization of the Community. In any group of families functioning as a unit, the family elders manage community affairs through a system of communal responsibility. A man's acceptability as a leader is affected by his length of residence in a community, his family connections, and his financial position. In practice, one or more families are accorded superior status by the rest of the community. These leaders are expected to assume responsibility in community affairs, receive important visitors, and officiate at community functions.

A typical and important example of privately formed organization is the cooperative society comprised of families who enter for group benefit. Cooperatives formed from older credit societies in many cases are extending their functions to the fields of purchasing, trading and utilization of goods.

Besides the men's, women's and youth corps under the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, there are Patriotic Service Associations and Volunteer Labor Corps. People are organized on the basis of religion, sex, and occupation. Representative organizations are the Dai Nippon Buddhists Association, Dai Nippon Women's Association, the Patriotic Agricultural League, the Patriotic Literature Association, and the Dai Nippon Education Corps.

d. Cultural Characteristics.

(1). Language. Although standard Japanese is understood, the people in northeastern HONSHU speak among themselves a dialect very difficult to understand.

(2). Education. Universal elementary education has existed since 1872. Education on all levels is carefully regulated by the Government through the Department of Education. It is used as a system of uniform political indoctrination. All elementary schools became Kokumin Gakko (National Schools) in 1941.

(3). Religion. Religion is carefully supervised by the Government. All religious groups except State Shinto are under the supervision of the Bureau of Religion in the Department of Education.

(a). Shintoism. Shintoism today consists primarily of communion with and dedication to the spirit world of departed ancestors and rulers with all the nationalistic implication of such worship. A distinction should be made between Shinto as a State cult and the several Shinto sects. State Shinto is administered separately from other religious groups and is considered not a religion but an expression of patriotism and loyalty. Every Japanese is considered a Shinto first; regardless of his other faiths, he must include a Shinto god shelf in his home and carry out the prescribed Shinto ceremonies. Shinto dogma stresses especially the divinity of the Emperor, the Japanese spirit, and the divine mission of Japan. Sectarian Shinto is, in theory, difficult to distinguish from State Shinto, but in practice those sects which stem from individual founders and which emphasize some special aspect of Shinto doctrine are administered as religions under the Department of Education.

(b). Buddhism. Since the Restoration (1868) the doctrines of Buddhism have been branded as unpatriotic by the

nationalists, with the result that there have recently been many apologetics for Buddhism designed to prove its value to JAPAN and its complete accord with the Imperial Rescripts.

(c). Christianity. Despite the relatively few adherents of Christianity, as one of the main channels of occidental culture, it has had much influence on the attitudes of the Japanese as a whole. Many Christians have had sufficient contact with occidentals to be more receptive to occidental ideas than most Japanese. However, except in a few individual cases, their influence in the community probably is weakened by their affiliation with a religion foreign to most Japanese.

e. Temperament. The farmer of northeastern HONSHU leads a difficult life, working with poor soil and enduring hard winters. Here people are close to the soil and extremely reticent, especially with strangers. This region has a strong military tradition, and its residents are apt to be militaristic and to have little physical fear.

f. Housing. The average Japanese-style home, in both rural and urban areas, is usually built of unfinished wood or of earth reinforced with wooden poles. Roofs are made of straw thatch, tiles, shingles, or sheeting. These houses are easily destroyed and easily rebuilt. Furniture is rarely used in poorer dwellings. Buckets containing small charcoal fires provide the only source of heat during the winter months. Light and ventilation are inadequate in crowded areas and plumbing is a luxury few can afford.

2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

a. Relation Between Local and National Government. The Japanese local government system is centralized similar to the French local system and in contrast to the decentralized system of the United States. Thus the Home Minister, a cabinet member, controls local government down to the smallest local administrative unit. The principal instruments for national control are the powers to appoint or nominate local executives and to dissolve local legislative bodies or overrule their decisions. Under this system the administrative regions (e.g. Tohoku) may be likened to a grouping of counties within a state in the United States, and the prefectures or kens are equivalent to our counties. The municipalities are the equivalent of the cities and towns of our local system.

The Japanese homeland is divided into eight administrative regions, which are further subdivided into 43 rural prefectures (ken), two urban prefectures (fu), two territorial administrative units (cho), and the capital, TOKYO. AOMORI is a subdivision of the administrative unit TOHOKU (Northeastern Administrative Region).

Each of the administrative units is under the control of a regional president, assisted by two regional councilors and

eleven administrative heads. Both the regional president and regional councilors are appointed by the Home Minister. The administrative heads supervise the administration of the bureaus, which include the Customs Bureau (Zeikan), the Forestry Bureau (Eirin Kyoku), the Engineering Bureau (Komukan Jimusho), the Local Fuel Bureau (Chiho Nenryo Kyoku), the Communications Bureau (Romukan Jimusho), the Finance Bureau (Zaimu Kyoku), the Local Retails Bureau (Chiho Hambai Kyoku), the Mining Bureau (Kogyo Kantoku Kyoku), the Maritime Affairs Bureau (Kaimu Kyoku), the Railway Bureau (Tetsudo Kyoku), the Post Office, and the Youth Superintendance Bureaus. The administrative heads are appointed and supervised by the various cabinet ministers within their respective spheres of administration.

b. Prefecture (Ken). The prefecture is an administrative subdivision of the national government, enforcing national policies and operating within a sphere of self government closely limited by national governmental control exercised through the Regional Administration. For channels of authority see Inclosure No. 1.

The highest prefectural authority is the prefectural governor, appointed by the Premier, and possessing considerable prestige and influence. The governor bears chief responsibility for prefectural administrative functions. The prefectural government directly supervises elections, municipal government, education, police, health control, forests, postal service, taxes, fees, budgets, telephone and telegraph, and maritime and railway administration.

The governor is assisted by the following prefectural administrative bureaus: General Affairs Bureau (Naimu-bu), the Police Bureau (Keisatsu-bu), the Economic Bureau (Keizai-bu), the Assembly, the Council, and the prefectural police.

The prefectural assembly (ken-kai), consisting of 20 to 40 members, based upon the population of the prefecture, is elected to a 4-year term by qualified voters (i.e. males 25 years of age who have resided in the prefecture for over a year), and meets for a one-month session once a year. A special session may be called by the governor or demanded by 1/3 of the assembly or one-half of the council. The prefectural council consists of 7 to 10 members elected from and by the assembly, the prefectural governor and two high prefectural officials. The assembly may be dissolved by the Home Minister. When this happens a new election must be held within three months. The assembly may deliberate and vote on such items as the budget, taxes, and public works. The governor, however, may annul or resubmit to the assembly such of its acts as he deems illegal. The assembly has neither a veto or power to override the governor's veto.

[redacted]

The main function of the Prefectural Council (Ken Sanji-kai) is to assist and advise the assembly, but action taken by the council when the assembly is not in session has the same effect as if passed on by the assembly.

c. Municipalities (Shi-Cho-Son). The prefecture is divided into municipalities of three types: cities (shi), towns (machi or cho), and townships (mura or son).

Municipal citizenship, which carries with it the right to vote for members of the municipal assembly, is open to male citizens of JAPAN over 25 years of age who have resided in a municipality for two years or more. Citizenship is denied to paupers, incompetents, bankrupts, criminals or ex-convicts. Furthermore, soldiers on active service and persons who refuse to assume public office without salary, or decline to discharge civic duties are denied the exercise of citizenship rights.

(1). Cities (Shi). A municipality with a population of 30,000 or more may attain the legal status of a city by obtaining the approval of the Home Minister. There are three cities in AOMORI Ken. (See Sec. II, b).

The city mayor (Shi-Cho) administers the city government under the supervision of the several prefectural and national agencies within their spheres of competence. He is a salaried official, nominated by the prefectural governor, elected by the municipal assembly, and installed with Imperial sanction. The Home Minister retains the power to appoint a mayor if the city assembly fails to select one within a month after nominations have been made, and may obtain an Imperial decree removing one at any time he considers it necessary.

The mayor is assisted by one or more deputies, a treasurer, elected by the assembly, and other city officials appointed by him.

The city assembly (shikai), consisting of 30 to 150 members based on the population, is elected for a 4-year term, meets about once a month, and participates in the government jointly with the mayor. It is restrained by the power of the prefectural government to veto its decisions and the power of the Home Minister to dissolve it.

The city council (shi sanjikai) consists of 10 to 15 members selected from the assembly by that body. It advises the mayor and assumes the duties of the assembly when that body is not in session.

For administrative purposes, large cities are divided into wards (ku), presided over by unsalaried heads.

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City governments have the power to prepare and adopt a budget, borrow money, levy and collect taxes, own public utilities, conduct primary schools, care for public health and dependency, and build roads, bridges and canals. Their authority does not extend to matters of fire prevention or building regulations, all of which are reserved to the prefectures.

(2). Towns (Machi). Town governments resemble those of cities. Town mayors are nominated by the prefectural governor and elected by the assembly for a four-year term. A mayor may be appointed by the Home Minister if the assembly fails to elect one from the nominees within 30 days, and he may be dismissed by the governor. The mayor appoints and supervises the heads of the administrative agencies of the town government and is assisted in administration by a deputy and a treasurer who are elected by the assembly.

The mayor serves as chairman of the assembly which is elected to a 4-year term by male residents of the municipality who are 25 years of age or over. There is no provision for a town council.

(3). Townships (Mura or Son). Most townships are agricultural and include villages and hamlets.

The mayor (soncho) of the township is usually a member of an old landed family, who receives a very small allowance and is elected by the assembly with the prefectural governor's approval. He can be dismissed by the governor or appointed by the Home Minister should the assembly fail to elect one in 30 days. He helps settle disputes and encourages the well-being of his constituents. He is seconded by an elected assistant, a treasurer, an agricultural adviser, and two clerks.

A township assembly (sonkai) consisting of 12 members is elected by universal manhood suffrage (i.e. males 25 years or over) for a 4-year term, but the position is an honorary one without salary.

Within the townships there are smaller subdivisions known as buraku, natural communities of about 20 households. A buraku head (nushidori), elected for two years by the heads of the households, serves as the caretaker of buraku affairs, which include funerals, festivals and road and bridge care and upkeep. For each buraku, or, in some cases, each group of buraku (ku), a deputy (ku-cho) is appointed by the village office to perform such duties as collecting taxes and attending mura shrine ceremonies.

Vital statistics and the koseki (individual identification registers for every Japanese) are kept by the township

office. The township policeman, a national official who is transferred every few years, and the agricultural adviser, appointed by the prefectural governor, are important functionaries in the locality. Local school teachers and Shinto priests are appointed by the prefectural government, from which the priest receives part of his salary.

(4). Neighborhood Associations (Tonari-gumi). The neighborhood association is the smallest of the many bodies by which the life of the average Japanese is regulated. Each association is composed of approximately 10 families and is presided over by a neighborhood group head (tonari-gumi-cho). He circulates instructions among members of each neighborhood association by means of a circular (kai-ran-bu) which must be read by every household and stamped with the family seal. In cities and large towns, the neighborhood associations are the constituent units of the chokai, the head of which supervises their activities. In the largest cities, the cho-kai are in turn under the jurisdiction of the ward heads through whom the chain of command leads to the city administration. In the townships the neighborhood associations are the constituent units of the buraku.

Through the tonari-gumi, government propaganda reaches the ears of the individual Japanese. The associations are the principal units of civilian defense, administration of rationing, and sale of government bonds. Equipment for association activities is provided by assessments of its members.

3. THE LEGAL SYSTEM.

a. Japanese Law. The Japanese legal system offers the individual little protection from police activities. While the Constitution contains a bill of rights providing for freedom of speech, religion, and association, and trial by legally constituted authority, these rights are all subject to legal modification. The right of habeas corpus does not exist.

b. The Courts. The Minister of Justice (Shiho-daijin) has administrative jurisdiction over the law courts, the procurator's offices, juvenile courts, penal institutions, reformatories, and bureaus of deposit. He directs the bureaus of Civil Affairs, Criminal Affairs, and Penal Affairs, the Bar Examining Board, and a number of committees performing investigatory functions.

Although the courts are not empowered to interpret the Constitution they may interpret legislative enactments and ordinance. Where laws enacted by the Diet are concerned, courts are limited to an examination of form and may not look into constitutionality in the substantive sense. Interpretation of ordinances, however, extends to substance as well as form.

In Japan all judicial posts are filled by competitive examinations. Service in a lower court is usually a prerequisite to appointment to a higher court.

The Court of Justice consists of Local Courts, which exercise only original jurisdiction, and District Courts, Appellate Courts, and the Supreme Court, all of which exercise both original and appellate jurisdiction. Local Courts are presided over by a single judge. The District and Appellate Courts are collegiate courts, divided into sections each consisting of three judges. The Supreme Court, also a collegiate court, is likewise broken up into divisions in each of which five judges sit.

There are juvenile courts in TOKYO, OSAKA, NAGOYA and FUKUOKA, which exercise jurisdiction over offenders under 18 years of age. The Court of Administrative Litigation hears and determines complaints against administrative branches of government.

Although not strictly a part of the judicial system, the police courts have summary jurisdiction over minor offenses, which in the United States would be exercised by recorders, justices of the peace, or police magistrates.

The procurators, like members of the judiciary, are men of university training and are appointed under civil service regulations upon completion of examinations. They function principally as prosecuting attorneys in criminal cases. They represent the public interest in civil cases of public concern but play no part in civil actions against the state, such cases being heard in the Court of Administrative Litigation. A procurator's office is attached to every court.

The Jury System Law was enacted in 1923 but was not made effective until October, 1928. According to the terms of this law jury trials are mandatory, unless waived by the accused, in all cases where the accused is liable to the death penalty, penal servitude for life, or life imprisonment. Persons accused of crimes punishable by limited penal servitude or imprisonment for a term exceeding three years are entitled to jury trial upon demand. However, the privilege of trial by jury is denied by law to those accused of most political offenses. The verdict of the jury does not bind the judge who, if dissatisfied with the verdict, has the right to dismiss a jury and empanel another repeatedly. Jury trials are not popular in Japan.

c. Police. One or more resident policemen may be expected in each village or larger community.

d. Prisons. Local jails may be found in medium sized towns and cities where offenders are brought from rural areas. A prefectural prison is maintained near the capital.

CONFIDENTIAL

JAPANESE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CHANNELS OF AUTHORITY



INCLOSURE NO. 1 TO APPENDIX NO. 10.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX NO. 11 TO ANNEX NO. 1, INTELLIGENCE,

TO ACCOMPANY FO NO. 8, 81 INF DIV

22 AUGUST 1945

[redacted]

INDUSTRIES AND RESOURCES, AOMORI PREFECTURE

1. AGRICULTURE.

AOMORI prefecture produces rice, wheat, and barley on the northwestern and northeastern coastal plains. Food production is barely in balance with local requirements. Intensive farming methods employed make heavy fertilizing necessary. Military demands for nitrogen compounds have decreased fertilizer supplies to such a degree that agricultural production has been affected. AOMORI prefecture is the most important producer of rapeseed in Central JAPAN. The fatty-oil from this seed is employed for lubrication, lighting and soap making. Seventy-five percent of the apple production comes from this area. There is also a limited amount of vegetable production.

2. FISHING.

Fishing is one of the important industries of JAPAN. Sardines are taken with gill nets and the fishing fleet moves northward with the season. Alaska pollak and cod are caught in the JAPAN SEA off western AOMORI prefecture. Giant kelp (kombu) is gathered for industrial and food purposes along the northeastern coast of AOMORI.

3. FORESTRY.

The prefecture has extensive timber tracts. In 1938 some 2,200 sawmills were operated in northern and central HONSHU. One of these sawmill centers is in the AOMORI prefecture. Lumbering is a major industry and lumber is relatively more important as a construction material in JAPAN than in the western world. Urban residences are primarily of wood, generally with paper partitions and tile roofs, although, thatched roofs are not uncommon in rural districts. Most commercial establishments are of wood-frame construction, often with brick facings.

4. MINES.

a. Mineral deposits include iron pyrites in the IWATO area which provide a source for the manufacture of sulfuric acid. An iron sand deposit is located near HACHINOHE and another in the AOMORI area. A small manganese mine is located in the mountainous central section.

b. Clay and limestone suitable for cement production are widely available in Central JAPAN, and there are considerable quantities near HACHINOHE.

[redacted]

5. INDUSTRY.

a. Before the war one government-owned ship yard was in operation at OMINATO naval base and had one small drydock. There are two wooden shipyards, one at AOMORI and another at HACHINOHE.

b. A cement plant operated by the Iwaki Cement K. K. at HACHINOHE produces 585,000 metric tons of cement annually. No brick, tile or slate products are produced in the AOMORI prefecture.

c. One class D steel mill is operated by the Nippon Takushu Kokan K. K. at OMINATO-MACHI with a capacity of 100,000 to 250,000 metric tons annually. This includes 165,000 metric tons of pig iron from which 100,000 metric tons of steel ingots, and 70,000 metric tons of rolled products are produced. Another steel plant is located at HACHINOHE and is operated by the Nippon Sitetsu K. K. with an annual capacity of 25,000 metric tons of pig iron.

d. The Nitto Kagaku Kogyo K. K. operates an alumina and aluminum plant at HACHINOHE and the capacity of this plant is 5,000 metric tons of purified aluminum. The ore is shipped in from Formosa or Manchuria.

e. There are no petroleum products produced in this area and it is largely dependent upon stockpiles and production from the East Indies.

f. An ammonia synthesizing plant located at HACHINOHE has an annual capacity of 5,000 metric tons of nitrogen which will produce 6,000 metric tons of ammonia or 24,500 tons of ammonium sulfate.

g. Calcium carbide, an intermediate product in making calcium cyanamide, is manufactured in a plant located in AOMORI-KEN, TSUTSUI-MURA, and HIGASHITSU-GARA-GUN. The plant is operated by Tekkosha K. K. and has an annual capacity of 9,500 metric tons.

7. UTILITIES.

a. Water Systems. (1) General. Water levels in the plain area vary from 5 to 20 feet below the surface. Streams, except at their headwaters, are polluted and, as a result, most cities and towns have their own purification systems. Water is unsafe, however, except in the largest cities. Water is distributed by gravity through cast iron mains. Many of the larger systems are as modern as those in American cities.

(2) AOMORI's water system has a maximum capacity of 1,100,000 gallons per day and served 83,686 people in 1927. Its source is a reservoir seven miles from the city on the YOKOUCHI-GAWA, formed by a dam five feet high and twenty feet long. The purification system has two settling basins, each 179' by 89' by 10' and three filter beds 104' by 89'. Two reservoirs each 74' by 60' by 10' complete the system.

(3) The HACHINOHE system has a capacity of 132,000 gallons per day but its source of supply is unknown.

(4) It is known that HIROSAKI has a municipal system but no information is available concerning its size or source.

(5) The GOSHOGAWARA water system serves 7,000 people. The source is the IWAKI-GAWA six miles from the city where a dam and collection well are employed. Purification facilities consist of a filter basin and a purewater reservoir. Maximum capacity is 250,000 gallons per day.

b. Electric Power. There are twelve hydro-electric power plants and four thermo-electric plants in the AOMORI area. These plants have a total capacity of 64,071 K. W. and their output is distributed as three phase alternating current. For location and capacity of all power plants see Inclosure No. 1

INCLOSURE NO. 1 - ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS, AOMORI PREFECTURE.

INCL. NO. 1 TO APPENDIX NO. 11

TO ANNEX NO. 1

ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS, AOMORI PREFECTURE



No.	Name of Plant	Capacity in KW
1	Akanuma Hydro-electric Plant	4,240
2	Hirosaki Karyoku Gas Plant	1,000
3	Haryo Hydro-electric Plant	4,050
4	Ichinowatari Hydro-electric Plant	2,230
5	Itadome Hydro-electric Plant	1,035
6	Kami Matsuzawa Hydro-electric Plant	3,600
7	Kansuizawa Hydro-electric Plant	1,060
8	Kaseshinai Hydroelectric Plant	4,420
9	Konakashima No. 3 Hydro-electric Plant	1,200
10	Minato No. 2 Factory Steam Plant	4,200
11	Ofudo Hydro-electric Plant	1,416
12	Okiura Entei Hydro-electric Plant	2,000
13	Ominato Factory Steam Plant	3,000
14	Ominato Steam Plant	1,920
15	Tateishi Hydro-electric Plant	7,100
16	Towado Hydro-electric Plant	21,600

[redacted]

APPENDIX NO. 12 TO ANNEX NO. 1, INTELLIGENCE

TO ACCOMPANY FO. NO. 8, 81 INF DIV

22 AUGUST 1945

UNCLASSIFIED

INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. GENERAL.

a. Intelligence Objectives are designated as the locations of personnel, headquarters, archives, installations, and organizations which either: constitute a menace to the security of the armed forces, or require safeguarding and preservation to facilitate processing by intelligence personnel and to insure the establishment of civil and military order.

b. This list of intelligence objectives is furnished as a guide for action to be taken by the occupying forces in ALL areas. Application of this list is general except in those cases where the target is peculiar to a certain area, and is considered to be of sufficient importance to be specifically listed in plans.

c. Unless otherwise directed below, the objective will be guarded and no one except authorized personnel will be permitted to remove the contents. Guards will be alert to prevent sabotage efforts, fire, looting, rioting, and souvenir hunting.

d. Reports: Intelligence objectives seized will be reported immediately in the clear by the most rapid means to DHQ. A summary of intelligence objectives seized, giving location, type, condition, and action taken, will be included in the daily S-2 Periodic Report.

2. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES:

a. Airports - Known locations: AOMORI, HACHINOHE, HIROSAKI, MISAWA, NOHEJI.

b. Banks - Financial Offices, including Post Offices - Impound and guard all monies and securities therein.

c. Bridges - Road and rail.

d. Churches - Important that religious temples and all cultural establishments be declared "Off Limits" and protected.

e. City Hall (All civil administration buildings) - Permit operation, but do not permit removal of records.

f. Communications - Permit continued operation. Report all instances of apparent violations of security regulations.

g. Dock, Shipyards, and Port Facilities.

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81-3724

h. Electric Power and Light Companies - Known locations: AOMORI, HACHINOHE, HIROSAKI, and near TAKKO.

i. Factories and Mills - War production will be terminated. All other production will be permitted to continue.

j. Civilian Food Supplies, Fuel and Clothing Concentrations above retail level.

k. Hospitals, Clinics - Permit continued operation.

l. Mercantile Retail establishments will not be interfered with.

m. Ordnance Depots and Warehouses.

n. Patrol Boat Headquarters.

o. Police Headquarters - To continue in operation subject to supervision by Military Government, Provost Marshal, and the Counter Intelligence Corps.

p. Potentially Subversive Individuals - Names of persons which constitute a menace to the security of the Allied Forces will be compiled and maintained by Counter Intelligence Corps with the AC of S, G-2. These "Black Lists" will include members of secret enemy organizations for espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities, and certain members of political organizations, youth societies, and military staffs.

q. Prison Buildings - Allow no inmates to escape or be freed.

r. Prisoner of War Camps - Important that no records be destroyed, and that all Prisoners of War be screened by MIS-X and the C.I.C. Known location: FURAMAKI (East Coast).

s. Radio, Telephone and Telegraph Stations - Will be continued in operation, subject to supervision to be announced later.

t. Schools - All schools above elementary grades will be closed.

u. Supply Depots (Military) of all types.

v. Water Systems and Reservoirs.

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL

APPENDIX A TO ANNEX No. 2 "OPERATIONS MAP" To F.O. No. 8

81ST INF. DIV.

OFFICIAL
LaPpuge
G-3

Mueller
CG

AOMORI-WAN

5½ MILES TO USHIROGATA

2MI

RED BEACH 2
600 YDS APPROX

RED BEACH 1
700 YDS APPROX

GREEN BEACH 2
500 YDS APPROX

GREEN BEACH 1
500 YDS APPROX

NONAI

MIYATA

LUMBER YARD AREA

LOGGING RAILROAD

RACE TRACK

GAPPO PARK

TOHOKU MAIN LINE

OU MAIN LINE

USHO NATIONAL HWY

KOTATE LUMBER MILL

MILITARY RESERVATION

5TH INF REGIMENTAL AREA

3 MILES TO ARAKAWA FROM RAIL ROAD TRACK

20 MILES TO HIROSAKI

O-SANNAI

NAMITATE

ONA

VASUTA

NAMADATE

TOYAMA

KOMAGOME

2½ MILES TO ARAKAWA FROM RAILROAD YARD

AOMORI
AOMORI PREFECTURE, HONSHU, JAPAN

SCALE 1:15,000

1 MI.
500 METERS
500 YDS

POLYCONIC PROJECTION
CONTOUR INTERVAL 10 METERS

COMPILED FROM
1. AERIAL PHOTO 27TH JUNE 45; 3PR5M 307-2(17-22)
2. AERIAL PHOTO 10TH AUG. 45; MOSAIC OF CV 9472 B AND CV14-191, INTERPRON TWO-461.1
3. JAP CITY PLAN JANIS 85-2

PREPARED BY 150TH R.I. TEAM 81ST INF. DIV. AUGUST 5TH 1945

1 2

600' OR 100 MILS

128' OR 2¢ MILS

LEGEND

1. FACTORY & SMALL BOAT MFG. & REPAIR AREA
2. FACTORY
3. FACTORY
4. ZODO GRADE SCHOOL
5. RACE TRACK & PARK
6. URAMACHI STATION
7. FACTORY
8. FACTORY
9. ABANDONED RACE TRACK
10. STORAGE YARD (PROBABLY LUMBER)
11. SLAUGHTER HOUSE
12. FACTORY
13. FUJITA LUMBER MILL
14. 5TH INFANTRY REGIMENT CAMP
15. TUSTSKI GRADE SCHOOL
16. TOWN OFFICE
17. WADA SOY SAUCE COMPANY
18. ELECTRIC SUB STATION
19. AOMORI PAPER MILL
20. KAWAMURA MATCH FACTORY
21. AOMORI ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY
22. TSUTSUMI-GAWA BREAWATER
23. NEW BRIDGE
24. KOTATE LUMBER MILL
25. MILITARY RESERVATION
26. ASIATIC CAN COMPANY
27. AOMORI SHIP BUILDING COMPANY
28. KOTATE LUMBER MILL
29. WEATHER BUREAU
30. URAMACHI STATION
31. TERROSHA IRON WORKS
32. CUSTOMS HOUSE
33. TEMPLES & CEMETERY
34. ROUND HOUSE
35. GOVERNORS RESIDENCE
36. JAP GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS & CITY HALL
37. WAREHOUSE
38. WATER POLICE STATION
39. IWARI CEMENT COMPANY
40. AOMORI LUMBER MILL
41. RAILWAY HOSPITAL
42. RAILWAY FERRY PIER
43. AKITA LUMBER MILL
44. POST OFFICE
45. POSSIBLE HOSPITAL
46. SCHOOL
47. LUMBER BASIN
48. MATSUDA LUMBER COMPANY
49. OKIDATE HOSPITAL
50. RADIO STATION & TOWERS
51. LUMBER YARD
52. AIR FIELD (NOT COMPLETE, LACKS PHOTO COVERAGE)
53. MARSHALLING YARD (APPROX. 35 TRACKS)

REPRODUCED BY PHOTOGRAPHIC & REPRODUCTION SECTION 81ST INF. DIV.

NONAI OIL STORAGE
Scale Approx 1:4,825

AOMORI-WAN (BAY)

WAREHOUSE
OFFICE
DOCK
TANKS
RISING SUN PETROLEUM CO
RAILROAD MAIN LINE
RAILROAD NONAI STATION
PIER
BENTING & KEROSENE

THE AREA BETWEEN TSUTSUMI-GAWA AND RAIL ROAD CAR FERRY AND OTHER SCATTERED AREAS HAS BEEN HEAVILY DAMAGED BY FIRE. BUILDINGS SHOWN ON MAP ARE THOUGHT TO BE FIREPROOF AND INTACT.

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

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