






Northern Islands



Eastern Islands



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It became more apparent that acute shortages were developing in the enemy's supply of water, ammunition, and signal equipment. His repeated attempts to secure water from Grinlinton Pond, in spite of the heavy losses suffered by his carrying parties, made it evident that the need was desperate. Shortly after dark on 29 October and again on 31 October, Japanese float planes dropped parachutes to which were attached baskets and cylinders containing hand grenades and signal equipment. Most of the parachutes fell outside of the perimeter and were recovered by our troops. On the 31 October attempt to supply his troops by air the enemy dropped leaflets printed in English, which stated in part: "We thank you for the offer to surrender, but why should we surrender when your force will be totally destroyed in a few days?"

In addition to conducting operations to destroy the enemy on Peleliu, the Division continued on its mission of defending the Southern Palau Islands against amphibious counterattack. On Angaur Island a part of the Division Headquarters operated the Angaur Defense Force which consisted of the 322d Inf, 317th FA Bn, 52d Engr (C) Bn, and other elements of the Division (*).


On Peleliu beach defenses were constantly manned and certain units, including the 323d Inf in the central combat zone, required to furnish mobile reserve forces on call from Division Headquarters. Field and coast artillery units were prepared to fire anti-boat missions and to assist in the beach defense against a hostile landing. Amphibious patrols made repeated reconnaissances of the outlying islands which were unoccupied by our troops. A number of observation posts, surface search radar stations, and searchlights were established on Peleliu and the outlying islands from which all approaches to Peleliu were under constant observation. The Ground Defense Headquarters, operated by the Division since 0800, 20 October, was the agency which coordinated the activities of all units of the Division and those attached for operational control in the fulfillment of the defense mission. The Ground Defense Headquarters received reports from all units charged with the operation of observation posts and radar stations and disseminated information relative to friendly ground, air, and naval forces as well as information of the enemy.

1 November 1944

On 1 November plans were made for the resumption of offensive action in the central combat zone. In order to support operations in the Wildcat Bowl-China Wall area it was necessary to secure Old

(*) FO 21, Headquarters 81 Inf Div, 18 October 1944.

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OVERLAY SKETCH MAP
 Peleliu Island Central Sector
 SCALE 1:3,000

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Baldy and the Five Sisters for observation and position areas for supporting weapons. Furthermore, the enemy continued to make excellent use of this high ground to observe our movements and resist with fire our activities along the east flank of the perimeter.

The mission to seize Old Baldy and the Five Sisters was assigned to the 2d Bn. The attack was to be preceded by a 25 minute 4.2" mortar preparation.

Two napalm bomb strikes were made during the day on enemy positions in front of the 2d Bn and in Wildcat Bowl. Results were excellent as bombs fell exactly into the designated target areas.

Throughout the night, 4.2" mortars placed fire on the objectives of the next morning's attack.

2 November 1944

The attack was launched at 0630, as Co G moved on Old Baldy and Sister No. 4. Resistance was surprisingly light and consisted only of sporadic sniper fire. At 0730 advance elements of Co G were on top of Old Baldy and Sister No. 4. One hour later our troops were on all the Sisters and receiving enemy fire from the south end of the China Wall. Consolidation of the newly captured positions was begun immediately. The remainder of the day and part of the night were spent in the construction of sandbag fortifications to protect troops in the counterattack that was sure to come before the next day. Japanese tactics in the central combat zone seemed to dictate a night counterattack against key positions occupied by our troops during the previous day.


At 0845 the 3d Bn was ordered to move southward along its right flank. Only slight gains were made by Co L on the extreme right. Enemy resistance in that zone continued strong and troops had to sandbag their way forward a few yards at a time.

Shortly after midnight the enemy attempted to retake the Five Sisters, but was repulsed. Thirty-eight Japanese were killed in the attack.

3 November 1944

Shortly after 1200, 3 November the 2d Bn sent an infantry-tank reconnaissance patrol into Death Valley. Unlike the experience of a similar patrol in the same area on 29 October, strong resistance was encountered. Infantry troops were caught in the crossfire of enemy snipers hiding in the caves and holes of both sides of the valley wall. All attempts to extricate our dead and wounded were met with heavy fire from the enemy who had apparently occupied the valley in force.

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OVERLAY SKETCH MAP
 Peleliu Island Central Sector
 SCALE 1:3,000

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During the afternoon a group of 18 Japanese were killed by a combat patrol of the 323d Inf along the beach to the west of Co A's position.

Co C completed a final mop-up of the sector in which it had been operating against the pocket of enemy resistance on the southern edge of Umurbrogal Mt since 20 October. At 1700 Co C was relieved of its mission and returned to the regimental rear area for rest and reorganization.

A number of attempts at infiltration were made by the enemy along the western perimeter and in the vicinity of Old Baldy.

4-9 November 1944

During the period 4-9 November little offensive action occurred in the central combat zone. Heavy rainfall beginning early on 4 November and culminating into a typhoon on 6 November continued through the forenoon of 8 November, and reduced operations to a minimum. Troops made further improvements in defensive positions along the entire perimeter. Pack howitzers were emplaced in the vicinity of the Five Sisters to support operations in Wildcat Bowl and along the eastern ridge of the China Wall.

Enemy activity during the period fell off sharply. Isolated attempts were made to infiltrate our lines, but the nights were generally quiet.

On the afternoon of 5 November advantage was taken of a brief period of clear weather to drop surrender leaflets into the area occupied by the enemy. This was followed by two loudspeaker surrender broadcasts on the following day. Results were negative. On the northwest flank Co L, and to a lesser degree Co K, made some gains southward by continuing to seize and fortify with sandbags successive objectives at bounds of 10-25 yards. These advances brought our troops to the high ground along the northwestern rim of Wildcat Bowl and close to the northern edge of the China Wall. On 9 November Co C returned from its rest period in the regimental rear area and replaced two platoons of Co B along the western perimeter. The close proximity of our troops to all targets seemed to make the continued employment of 4.2" mortars inadvisable and Co D 88 Cml Wpns Bn was detached from the 323d Inf on 5 Nov. One platoon was attached to the 321st Inf and the remainder of the company to Division Artillery.

In the northern defense sector, the 321st Inf continued to improve its beach defenses. A number of Japanese who managed to slip through the 323d Inf perimeter during the period of heavy storms

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Schoniian Harbor

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DENGES PASSAGE

NGEREGONG I.

GOROKOTTAN

ARIMASUKU I.

NGEMELIS I.

GARYO I.



BAIRAKASERU I.

GARAKAYO I.

MURPHY I.

KONGAURU I.

NGESEBUS I.



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and poor visibility were killed or captured on northern Peleliu and the reef leading to the northern islands.

On 5 November the Division was notified that Army troops of LCI Flotilla 13 had landed on, occupied, and would defend Ngeregong Island just to the south of the east entrance to Denges Passage(*). Presumably the island was to be used as a recreation center for troops of the 111th Infantry who were assigned to the LCI Flotilla for the operation of its 4.2" mortars. On 7 November the Division was notified that LCI Army Troops had occupied Garyo Island and would conduct daily reconnaissance of Ngemelis and Arimasuku Islands (**). These islands had been previously reconnoitered by elements of the 2d Bn 321 Inf on 11 October.

At 1645, 9 November the Division received information that an enemy force estimated at 100 had landed on Ngeregong Island sometime during the previous night and were discovered there by LCI Army troops at 1000, 9 November. As reported, a skirmish ensued in which LCI Army troops withdrew under the cover of 20mm and 40mm LCI fire after killing or wounding 5 Japanese. Subsequent to the withdrawal of U. S. troops from the island, LCIs and destroyers placed naval gunfire on the island for the remainder of the day and on through the night. A flight of 47 Navy planes, each carrying a 500 lb bomb, attacked the island shortly after dark on 9 November.

10 November 1944

The ground defense of Peleliu was dependent in a large measure on the capabilities of the naval surface force stationed in the inland water passages north of Peleliu, particularly Schonian Harbor. The occupation of Ngeregong by a strong enemy force would preclude the free passage of this naval force through Denges Passage. From this point of view Ngeregong Island was important to the ground defense, and the continued presence of the enemy on it could not be countenanced.

As long as U. S. forces were present on Ngeregong, it was not considered particularly important to use Gorokottan Island, 3 miles east of Garakayo, as an observation post in the ground defense of Peleliu. With Ngeregong in the hands of the enemy this outlook was changed. Moreover, the occupation of Gorokottan had to be effected prior to the initiation of an amphibious operation for the recapture of Ngeregong. As a consequence, orders were issued for Gorokottan Island to be occupied on the morning of 11 November.

(*). U. S. Naval Despatch 042348, Com LCI Flotilla 13.

(**) U. S. Naval Despatch 071055, Com LCI Flotilla 13.

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~~SECRET~~

The Commanding General 81st Infantry Division transmitted the foregoing to the Commander Western Carolines Sub Area, and requested instructions relative to the seizure of Ngeregong (*). Instructions from the latter directed the seizure, occupation, and defense of Ngeregong Island by elements of the 81st Infantry Division (**). In consequence, at 1130, 10 November the Division issued a combined order for operations against both Gorokottan and Ngeregong Islands (***).

The mission to seize Gorokottan Island and to establish and operate an observation post thereon pending further orders was assigned to the 81st Cav Rcn Tr (less 1 platoon), reinforced by 4 amphibian tanks and sufficient LVTs to transport personnel. The troop was to be temporarily detached from the 321st Inf during which time it was to operate directly under Division Headquarters. Since a previous reconnaissance of Gorokottan Island indicated that it was unoccupied, no casualties were anticipated. However, preparations were made for any eventuality. One battery 318 FA Bn was placed in direct support of the Troop from its firing position on Peleliu (***).

The mission to seize and occupy Ngeregong Island was assigned to the 321st Inf. Due to the lack of sufficient information of the reported enemy force on Ngeregong, the CO 321st Inf was directed to reconnoiter the island to determine the location, armament, and number of Japanese there; and based thereon, to submit plans for the seizure of Ngeregong Island to Division Headquarters for approval. No effective date was set for the operation (***).

At 0830, 10 November a second air attack was made on Ngeregong Island by a flight of 51 Navy planes. A total of 3,500 lbs of bombs and twenty 20 lb fragmentation clusters were dropped on the island. Planes also strafed the island with machine gun fire. It was reported by pilots that an estimated 90% of the bombs hit the target area and that light machine gun fire was met over the target area. One of the planes crashed into the lagoon in the vicinity of Ngeregong Island. An LVT patrol was sent by elements of the 2d Bn 321st Inf on Garakayo to retrieve the body of the pilot and destroy workable weapons on the plane wreckage. However, the wreckage could not be found that day, but a close offshore reconnaissance was made of Ngeregong Island without enemy interference.



During the day, elements of the 81st Cav Rcn Tp scheduled to assault Gorokottan Island on 11 November were relieved from the defense of Ngabad Island by elements of the Antitank and Cannon Cos, 321st Inf.

(*) Letter Headquarters 81st Infantry Division, 10 November 1944.

(**) Naval Speedletter, 10 November 1944, COMWESCARSUBAREA.

(***) FO No. 24, Hq 81 Inf Div, 10 November 1944.

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In the central combat zone, Co F relieved the remaining elements of Co B along the western perimeter. The replacement of Co B with Cos C and F served to strengthen considerably the western perimeter, which up to this time had been rather lightly held over an extended front by the 1st Bn.

The 2d Bn spent the day improving its defenses and clearing caves around the east slope of Old Baldy. One such cave attacked with LVT flamethrower yielded 16 dead Japanese.

On the north Co L made slight gains by continuing to sandbag its way forward. The remainder of the 3d Bn 323 Inf made further improvements in its defenses.


11 November 1944

Artillery support for the assault on Gorokottan consisted of scheduled barrages by a battery of the 318 FA Bn during the night 10-11 November and continued until 0930, 11 November. The landing force departed from Ngabad at 0830. An unopposed landing was made in the center of the lagoon side of the island at 0939. The northern and southern parts of the island were searched successively, but no trace of enemy occupation was discovered. At 1030 Gorokottan Island was declared secure. One platoon, reinforced with amphibian tanks and tractor remained on the island to defend it and operate an observation post. The remainder of the 81st Cav Rcn Tp returned to Ngargersiul Island. At 1715 the 81st Cav Rcn Tp reverted to control of the 321st Inf as part of the northern sector defense force.

Little activity occurred in the central combat zone during the Day. Engineers with the 2d Bn advanced an armored bulldozer 100 yards into Death Valley to construct a tank and LVT route over the extremely broken valley floor. In the 3d Bn zone, sandbags were hauled to forward positions in preparation for further movement to the south. The supply line to forward elements of Co K and Co L were 800 yards long and over rugged and precipitous terrain. More personnel were required to supply forward troops than were actually engaged in the occupation of the positions.

A second search party was dispatched during the morning by the 2d Bn, 321 Inf to locate the plane wreckage reported on 10 November. Parts of the plane were found 500 yards south of Ngeregong Island, but no bodies were in the vicinity. Since no interference was offered from Ngeregong to the movements of the patrol, a close reconnaissance of the beaches was made with negative results.

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OVERLAY SKETCH MAP
Peleliu Island - Central Sector
SCALE 1:3,000

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12 November 1944

On 12 November small gains were made by the 3d Bn 323 Inf as it continued to advance southward towards the China Wall. Co K and Co L worked towards each other to consolidate the ground between them, and in so doing elements of Co L occupied a key point to the front of Co K. Co I moved west from Brother No. 2 and cleared a number of caves in the area north of Wildcat Bowl.

Thirteen Japanese were killed and one prisoner of war captured along the beach in rear of Co A's perimeter where 18 Japanese were killed on 8 November. Interrogation revealed that the group infiltrated through the perimeter in an attempt to escape to the northern islands.



At 1500 orders were issued for a coordinated attack on 13 November by the 1st and 2d Bns along the west and south flanks respectively.

13 November 1944

The 1st Bn plan for the attack was for Co B to pass through the left flank of Co F and to compress the enemy pocket as much as possible. Co E, which was to follow behind Co B, and Co C on the left were to consolidate the gains of Co B. Co A on the north was to advance to the southeast to reduce the enemy salient pointing towards its position. The attack was launched at 0700. Co B passed through Co F as planned, but almost immediately thereafter was held up by 5 enemy strongpoints which required the remainder of the morning to reduce. The advance was resumed at 1130. By 1500 Co B was in position to cover the construction of sandbag fortifications on a general line which represented gains of 50-75 yards along the entire southwest perimeter. Strong enemy fire prevented any gains by Co A.

The 2d Bn launched its attack at 0630 by sending armored patrols into Wildcat Bowl and Death Valley. At 0700 part of Co G moved from the Five Sisters to seize the China Wall while other elements of the company went into Death Valley to attack the objective from the west. Initial enemy resistance was negligible. Presumably the enemy was preoccupied with our armored patrols which were attacking them in the caves along the sides of the China Wall. However, at 1000 strong enemy fire from the northern portion of the China Wall and the west wall of Death Valley stopped the advance after it had gained 75 yards of the China Wall. Co G spent the remainder of the day in fortifying its newly won positions with sandbags. Tanks were withdrawn from Death Valley and Wildcat Bowl at 1630.

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Considerable activity occurred along the front of the 3d Bn 323 Inf during the hours of darkness. Co L repulsed a counterattack and killed 13 of the enemy. Co I killed 13 Japanese in the area west of Brother No. 2. Our troops reported the Japanese in a jovial mood, singing and laughing as they walked about in the open.

14 November 1944

At 0750, 14 November Co B passed through Co C to repeat the plan of the previous day to seize and hold ground pending the consolidation of its gains by Co C. Difficult terrain and enemy mortar fire made progress slow and gains for the day were slight. Co C relieved Co B on forward positions at 1415. Small gains were also made on the fronts of Co A and Co L. Elsewhere along the perimeter there was little offensive activity.

On the basis of the reconnaissances of Ngeregong Island which were made on 10 and 11 November by amphibious patrols of the 2d Bn 321 Inf, it was estimated that the enemy strength on the island did not exceed one platoon of infantry, if in fact any enemy at all were there. Consequently, plans were made for the seizure of Ngeregong by a smaller force than was originally considered necessary to accomplish the task. The mission was reassigned to the 81st Cav Rcn Tp (less Det), reinforced with amphibian tanks, LVTs, DUKWs, and medical personnel. The 81st Cav Rcn Tp was to conduct the operation directly under Division Headquarters, and was detached from the operational control of the 321st Inf. Division reserve for the operation was to consist of one rifle company of the 321st Inf with necessary LVT personnel carriers, assembled on northern Pelaliu and prepared to move without delay on order of Division Headquarters(*)).

The plan of operations provided for elements of the assault force to assemble on Gorokottan Island on 14 November and depart therefrom in time to make an assault landing on the west beach of Ngeregong at 0800, 15 November. The scheme of maneuver ashore was to seize the northwest peninsula, prepare a hasty defense of the area and then complete the occupation of the remainder of the island. Air and naval support for the landing was to be furnished on call by LCIs and planes of Marine Air Group 11. Artillery support was to be furnished by one battery of the 316th FA Bn emplaced on Gorokottan and one battery of the 8th Bn 155mm (G) Marines on Pelaliu. Artillery concentrations were planned for the night 14-15 November and up to the time of landing. Upon completion of the


(*). FO No. 25, Hq 81 Inf Div, 14 November 1944.

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DENGES PASSAGE

Ø 81

NGEREGONG I



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operation the 81st Cav Rcn Tp was to defend Ngeregong and Gorokottan Islands, acting directly under Division Headquarters (*).

During the day, elements of the Antitank Co 321st Inf relieved elements of the 81st Cav Rcn Tp on Ngargersiul Island, and the assault force assembled on Gorokottan Island. One battery of the 316th FA Bn was moved from Peleliu and emplaced on the northern tip of Gorokottan. Artillery registration firing on Ngeregong was completed prior to dark by both batteries ordered to support the attack.

Concentrations of artillery fire were placed on Ngeregong during the odd to even hours throughout the night. During the even to odd hours LCIs in Denges Passage maintained close offshore watch to frustrate any attempt by the enemy to move to or from the island.


15 November 1944

An unopposed landing was made on Ngeregong Island at 0800, 15 November. Troops immediately seized the northwest peninsula, then advanced inland through dense jungle growth searching the island for the reported enemy. Only three dead Japanese in an advanced state of decomposition and some Japanese ordnance equipment were found. One emplacement showed signs of recent improvement, but it was the only evidence of recent occupation. The island was declared secure at 1155. One platoon of the 81st Cav Rcn Tp was left on Ngeregong to defend it and operate an observation post; the remainder of the troop returned to Gorokottan to occupy and defend that island as part of the Peleliu outpost system. Co B 321st Inf, which had been assembled on northern Peleliu as reserve for the operation, was released to the 321st Inf.

In the central combat zone, Co B again passed through Co C to further compress the enemy's area of resistance. However, its advance was held up immediately by intense enemy fire from a strongpoint built around a prominent banyan tree. As discovered later, this banyan tree was at the outlet of a huge subterranean cave against which all our fire was ineffective. A plan was devised to pour oil on the area in the immediate vicinity of the tree through a hose connected to a fuel tank some 300 yards away, and to ignite the fuel with WP grenades. The remainder of the day was spent in laying this hose to put the plan into effect. Co C relieved Co B on forward positions at 1630.

(*) FO No. 25, Hq 81 Inf Div, 14 November 1944.

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OVERLAY SKETCH MAP
Peleliu Island Central Sector
SCALE 1:3,000

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16 November 1944

Offensive action during 16 November was confined to the front of Co C where the center of resistance in the vicinity of the banyan tree was reduced with the aid of the improvised oil pipe line. This new weapon was used with such good results that its further employment by the 323d Inf became common throughout the remainder of the operation.

17-21 November 1944

During the period 17-21 November offensive patrolling was conducted on a large scale. Tanks and LVT flamethrowers operated throughout Wildcat Bowl and as far north in Death Valley as the terrain would permit, attacking enemy held caves at the bases of the Five Brothers Ridge and the China Wall. Infantry troops following closely behind with portable flamethrowers and demolitions attacked at close range and completed the destruction. Armored bulldozers sealed all accessible caves to prevent their reoccupation by the enemy.

At the beginning the enemy seemed nonplussed by our bold sorties into the very center of his resistance and offered little opposition to our activities. During the night 17-18 November widespread attempts were made by the enemy to escape from the pocket, and 33 of their number were killed. By 20 November the enemy seemed to have steadied himself, since our combat patrols were harried with strong enemy machine gun and sniper fire from caves which had escaped the previous attack. These caves and all others within range of our weapons were attacked throughout 20 November and part of the next day. By noon 21 November our patrols were able to operate without opposition all through Wildcat Bowl and in the south portion of Death Valley.


Along the west and northwest perimeter enemy resistance continued strong and no appreciable changes in our front lines took place during the period. Enemy snipers concealed in places that were most difficult to detect even at very close range caused a number of casualties among our troops. On 17 November the CO 1st Bn 323d Inf was killed at Co C's OP by enemy sniper fire.

The 1st Bn improved its improvised fuel weapon by the addition of a booster pump which quickened the flow of fuel and made it possible to shoot a stream of oil to more distant targets. Several enemy strongpoints were attacked with this weapon, and results were uniformly excellent.

In the northern defense sector the 321st Inf continued to improve its defenses. On Ngeregong Island a detachment of the 306th Engr(C) Bn completed the construction of an airstrip for artillery liaison planes to facilitate communications between the island and Peleliu.

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ISOLATED
JAPANESE
IN THIS AREA



OVERLAY SKETCH MAP
Peleliu Island Central Sector
SCALE 1:3000

DECLASSIFIED

22-23 November 1944

During the period 22-23 November it became apparent that the enemy had withdrawn the bulk of what remained of his force from the Wildcat Bowl area and had established himself for a final stand in the fastnesses of the China Wall. The inaccessibility of this position to tracked vehicles afforded him safety from our tanks and LVT flamethrowers against which he had no defense. The hollowed area between the two sides of the China Wall protected him from direct fire, and the close proximity of our troops made the use of mortars almost as dangerous to us as to him. Our infantry could approach the enemy's last defenses only by scaling the precipitous cliffs which protected his east and west flanks or advancing from the north or south. Each of these possibilities must have given the enemy prospects of a lengthy survival. A few snipers cleverly placed could hold off a company of troops from the east or west. The north and south approaches, although a little less easy to defend offered the enemy countless opportunities to exact a high cost for our advances.

In order to close in on this stronghold Co F was assigned the mission of securing positions on the northern end of the China Wall by approaching the objective through Wildcat Bowl. A consistently strong defense and unfavorable terrain had prevented the 3d Bn from reaching the China Wall from the north. Co F descended into the southern end of the bowl at 0700, 22 November and moved northward close to the eastern cliff of the China Wall. Its movement was covered by tanks and LVT flamethrowers. At the same time another group of tanks entered Death Valley to engage enemy troops in that area and prevent their movement towards Co F. At 0745 Co F reached the northern end of the bowl and began to scale the China Wall. By 0815 it was in possession of a prominent peak just to the south of Co L's foremost position. Immediate fortification of the peak was begun. At 0915 the first enemy fire struck Co F, causing a number of casualties. By late afternoon the position was completely fortified. Simultaneously with the move by Co F, Co H passed through the forward positions of Co G and established a machine gun post approximately 25 yards in advance of Co G.

On the northwest flank, Co A advanced its line 75 yards to the south after burning the area to its front with the improvised fuel weapon. Enemy resistance, which heretofore had stalemated activity in that sector, dropped off markedly.

At 0730 patrols of Co I 323d Inf moved from Brother No. 4 to Brother No. 5 without meeting opposition. Troops were immediately sent forward to consolidate the position.

DECLASSIFIED



OVERLAY SKETCH MAP
Peleliu Island Central Sector
SCALE 1:3,000

DECLASSIFIED

In view of the lack of contacts along the eastern perimeter, except for individual Japanese attempting to escape the pocket, orders were issued by Division Headquarters for the release of the 3d Bn 321st Inf from Walt Ridge and the area southeast of the swamp on 24 November. The 323d Inf prepared to shorten the perimeter by placing troops in the gap between Brother No. 5 and Old Baldy.

24 November 1944

At 1400, 24 November the 3d Bn 321st Inf was relieved of attachment to the 323d Inf and its positions occupied by the Cannon Co 323d Inf. The Antitank Platoon of the 2d Bn 323d Inf occupied positions along the saddle between Brother No. 5 and Old Baldy, thus completely closing off Mortimer Valley from the enemy.

During the day elements of Co A 306 Engr (C) Bn began the construction of a ramp from Wildcat Bowl to the top of the China Wall. The ramp was calculated to make the inside of the China Wall accessible to our tanks and LVT flamethrowers.

Some gains were made on the northern flank as our troops consolidated their front line positions and sealed small gaps in the perimeter which necessarily occurred due to the complex nature of the terrain.

During the night considerable activity occurred along the entire perimeter. Attempts were made by the enemy to break through the 1st Bn on the west, the 3d Bn on the north, and through elements of the 2d Bn on the saddle between Brother No. 5 and Old Baldy. In all a total of 45 Japanese, including two officers, were killed.

25 November 1944

On 25 November the 1st and 3d Bns closed in gradually from the west and north, making a thorough search of every yard of ground to leave none of the enemy bypassed. The 1st Bn flushed 30 Japanese from their hiding places and took one prisoner of war. Interrogation of the latter revealed that Colonel Nakagawa, commander of Japanese forces on Peleliu, and Major General Murai, a visiting officer, had committed suicide during the night 24-25 November after having conducted a ceremony in which the Japanese 15th Inf Regimental colors were burned.

In the south Co H moved northward along the China Wall, seizing and fortifying new positions from which to fire into the last cave area of the enemy.

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OVERLAY SKETCH MAP
Peleliu Island Central Sector
SCALE 1:3,000

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By dark the construction of the 306th Engineer Ramp to the top of the China Wall was completed.

During the night 21 Japanese were killed as they attempted to escape from the pocket.

26 November 1944

At 0630, 26 November tanks and an LVT flamethrower entered Wildcat Bowl from the south and proceeded northward to the 306th Engineer Ramp. At 0700 they began to ascend the ramp, followed closely by elements of Co F which were to occupy the China Wall in vicinity of the ramp. Supporting fires were furnished by Co H and Co L. By 0745 Co F had occupied its objective in the face of considerable enemy fire. In coordination with Co F's activity, Co G moved northward along the China Wall and occupied positions in the vicinity of forward elements of Co H, virtually completing the occupation of the entire east rim of the China Wall.

On the front of the 1st Bn, Co B and Co C made some gains against the salient from which Japanese snipers continued to hold off our effort to complete the seizure of the 323d Inf Ridge and close in on the enemy's positions from the west.


During the afternoon orders were issued for a coordinated attack at 0700, 27 November to capture the remainder of the China Wall and the northern end of Death Valley and complete the destruction of the enemy. The plan in general provided for a simultaneous convergence on the enemy's final positions by all available units.

27 November 1944

At 0700 the 2d Bn attacked to the north with Co E advancing through Death Valley and covered by Co G moving abreast of it along the China Wall. At 0730 Co K passed through Co L and in coordination with Co A to its right moved towards the north end of Death Valley and the west side of the China Wall. Co B and Co C pushed directly east towards Death Valley. Co F, Co H, and Co L remained in position to forestall an enemy attempt to escape.

Resistance to this multisided attack seemed to disintegrate completely. At 1030 units attacking from both the north and the south met in the enemy's final stronghold. Co B and Co C stood on the western rim of the 323d Inf Ridge overlooking Death Valley. The end of Japanese resistance came at a spot only a few yards removed from the cave which had served as their command post. The enemy had fulfilled his determination to fight unto death.

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OPERATIONAL
FEATURES

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A - OPERATIONAL DAMAGE TO THE ENEMY

Enemy Casualties

Enemy casualties during the period 23 September - 27 November resulting from the actions of elements of the 81st Infantry Division on Peleliu Island included 3,249 dead and 180 prisoners of war. The latter group included civilian laborers, mainly Korean, and sailors, soldiers, and officers up to and including the rank of captain. In typical Japanese fashion the majority of these prisoners gave information freely. Much of the information was of immediate tactical value, particularly that which pertained to the number of Japanese forces defending the hills.

The following enemy units were identified as having engaged in action on Peleliu:

2d Infantry Regiment, 14th Division
2d and 3d Bns, 15th Infantry Regiment, 14th Division
346th Independent Infantry Bn, 53d Independent Mixed
Brigade
Miscellaneous naval and service units

Material Damage to the Enemy

A large quantity of Japanese equipment and supplies was captured, destroyed, or buried during the operation. Large numbers of airplane engines and airplane bombs, in particular, were found on the island. Since disposition of most of this materiel was not under Division control, no report on quantity or disposition is available.

B - ENEMY DEVELOPMENTS

Defensive Installations

In preparing the defense of Peleliu the Japanese did not use any new types of emplacements or defensive construction. Maximum use was made of natural material and concrete in the construction of pillboxes, gun emplacements, and covered shelters.

Natural caves were utilized and improved to offer better protection for personnel and equipment. The openings were camouflaged and coral filled oil drums placed in such a way as to afford blast protection to the occupants. Firing ports had been drilled through

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the sides of some of the caves. A number of defensive caves were made from abandoned phosphate mine shafts. Concrete pillboxes had been constructed inside some of the caves with entrances from the top of the pillbox.

Mines were not used extensively against the Division on Peleliu. Some aerial bombs were utilized as land mines and a special engineer unit was responsible for setting off these mines. They were detonated by an electrical firing device with wires leading to a cave where the source of electrical power was located. A number of aerial bombs without fuses were found buried with nose up, particularly along Beach Purple.

Several aerial bombs were found to be equipped with trip wires and pull type detonators. Standard type booby traps equipped with the nose or tail fuse of an aerial bomb were found in caves and near their entrances. The charge used generally consisted of picric acid blocks packed around a grenade or bomb fuse.

Tactics

General tactics for the defense of Peleliu are set forth as follows in a captured Japanese document (*):

"If the enemy secures a foothold on the beach, we will attack with the reserve units and troops diverted from other sectors. We will attempt a daring attack from the sea and a violent counterattack. Taking advantage of the enemy's insecure bridgehead, we will attack and destroy him that night at the latest.

"If the situation becomes bad, we will contrive to hold out. We will maintain a firm hold on the high ground and prevent the enemy from establishing or using an airbase. We will commence a daring guerrilla warfare, and in cooperation with the Naval Landing Force, we will wipe out the enemy. We will be prepared to fight enemy airborne troops at all times, and will carefully guard the breaks in the high ground."

In furtherance of this plan of defense, the enemy assigned sectors of defense to his infantry units. Each sector was under the direct control of the Island Commander, Colonel Nakagawa, and was not an independent tactical group as was common in the past. When one sector was threatened by an amphibious landing, units from adjacent sectors were to move into the area to lend support. Specific counterattack plans were formulated in an effort to meet all possible landing attempts. By prearranged plan, the sector under attack would send information to the island defense headquarters

(*) CINCPAC - CINCPAA Item No. 11, 902, A Battle Plan for the Defense of Peleliu Island, dated 1 September 1944

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which would then order the appropriate action. Following closely the training doctrine which had been set down, the sector commander under attack would hold his positions as long as possible, and with his local reserves harass and infiltrate the beachhead until such time as reserves or troops from adjacent areas could organize for the counterattack. Counterattacks would include landings in our rear areas by seaborne forces in an effort to disrupt and confuse our troops.

The counterattack when launched was not to be a frenzied "Banzai" charge, such as characterized Japanese tactics in previous operations, but a tactical maneuver to wipe out our beachhead in which the use of every man and weapon was coordinated.

When the enemy's counterattacks early in the operation failed to achieve the results which he had hoped for, he retired to the high ground from which he conducted a skillful and stubborn defense. Enemy landings on the northern end of the island which were made between 24 - 25 September apparently were not intended as a sea counterattack, but rather to reinforce and bolster the morale of his troops still holding out on Peleliu. From this point of view he was in part successful, since there is evidence that some 300 Japanese succeeded in reaching the hills on Peleliu to aid in the defense.

From available evidence it appears that the Japanese early in the battle determined to make the final defense in the southernmost hills where they were finally destroyed on 27 November. Important hills to the north, such as Hill 100 and Hill B, fell without large scale counterattack. Beginning with our attacks south of the O-X line, however, the enemy resisted viciously every advance made by our troops and counterattacked frequently.

The Japanese defense in the central combat zone was conducted with intelligence and determination. Our troops were unable to discover any weak point through which they could move to disorganize the enemy in his stronghold. Key terrain features were swept by supporting fires from other important terrain features. As the enemy lost one key hill or valley, he defended the next piece of terrain with cunning and tenacity. His forces remained organized almost to the very end. When all hope was finally gone, Colonel Nakagawa, the commander of enemy forces on Peleliu, committed suicide during the night 24-25 November. Thereafter disintegration of resistance was rapid.

Ordnance

One new item of enemy ordnance was found on Peleliu. It was a high explosive incendiary 7.7mm projectile loaded in drum type magazine used in aircraft type machine guns. The projectile has

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two compartments in the nose which contain the incendiary and explosive powder. Behind these is a blunt nose projectile. The bullet does not explode when it strikes a soft object such as wood or human flesh, but does explode on striking metal. The nose of the projectile is slightly blunted.

Reconnaissance Missions

Photographic missions were flown over the central combat zone at low altitude and obliques and verticals taken. The photos were generally fair, but accurate and detailed information could not be obtained from them because of weather conditions, jungle growth, camouflage, and the concealed locations of caves.

Frequent visual reconnaissance missions were flown using artillery liaison planes, but again terrain and camouflage combined with the enemy's refusal to engage in open combat activity during daylight hours prevented the securing of accurate information of enemy dispositions and installations.

C - SUPPLY

Supply Activities Prior to the Arrival of the Division on Peleliu

Upon arrival in Peleliu, RCT 321 was initially supplied from dumps operated by the 1st Marine Division. Certain critical items not available on Peleliu, such as 60mm mortar illuminating shells and automotive and armament parts, were supplied from 81st Infantry Division stocks on Angaur. Upon establishment of the 16th Field Depot (Marine) on Peleliu, RCT 321 drew all its supplies through the 1st Marine Division from the 16th Field Depot.

Approximately 3 U/F's of all types ammunition and 2 days rations were kept in the regimental dump. Each battalion kept a minimum of 1 U/F at gun positions.

A salvage team consisting of 1 NCO and 6 EM was organized to collect all usable salvage enemy and U. S. supplies and equipment. This was sorted by the RCT 321 S-4 and usable items were returned to troops. All unusable items were turned into the 16th Field Depot.

An ordnance contact team of the 781st Ordnance (LM) Company

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performed minor repairs on armament, in accordance with the standard procedure in the Division.

Several issues of coffee, milk, sugar, and fruit juices were made to front line troops as a supplement to C and K rations.

The complex nature of the terrain on Peleliu made it most difficult to supply forward combat units. At first, supplies had to be hand carried up steep, rugged hillsides. Where terrain was particularly difficult human chains were formed to pass supplies forward. As soon as the tactical situation permitted, improvised aerial tramways were constructed for the supply of forward elements. A system of pulleys and cables was used to support a movable gondola and the whole activated by a $\frac{1}{4}$ -T truck or M29C. The method was most efficient and did more than anything else to keep troops on forward positions properly supplied. Its use was extensive even up to the last days of combat, due to the impossibility of constructing access roads to advanced positions.

Supply Activities After the Arrival
of the 81st Division on Peleliu

The movement of the major portions of Division service troops from Angaur to Peleliu was completed on 23 October. The Division supply services were set up to receive and issue all Army Class II and IV supplies. All other supplies were drawn directly from the 16th Field Depot with which the Division established close liaison. Certain Division and 16th Field Depot supply personnel worked together on jointly operated installations.

Due to the delayed resupply shipments, inadequate salvage and repair facilities, rough coral terrain, and inclement weather, the supply of many items became critical. Resupply block shipments were inadequate to fill battle shortages.

The Division QM Salvage Section supplemented the 16th Field Depot QM Salvage Section. Four salvage collecting teams were constantly in operation. A salvage dump was established and a classification and a repair detail maintained there. After being processed, QM items were turned over to the Class II Dump or to the Island Salvage Dump for reissue to proper supply points. Large amounts of ammunition were evacuated from forward areas. An improvised laundry was made for washing clothes; repair was limited to what could be done by hand.

Shoe repair for all units on Peleliu was handled through one shoe and textile repair trailer of the 16th Field Depot. To speed

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up the work, six experienced shoeworkers in the Division were assigned to this unit on special duty. In general, shoe repair facilities were inadequate.

Ordnance Supply

All motor vehicles landed on Peleliu were essential. Transportation requirements were never fully met by the means available.

On a land mass as large as Peleliu, all of the Division's and attached troops' special purpose vehicles and a minimum of 80% of authorized general purpose vehicles should be taken. Restricted shipping space for the Division reduced the quantity for the Division below the desirable limit. (*)

Medical Supply

Owing to the limited shipping space available and the short notice of movement orders, only a small amount of medical supplies accompanied RCT 321 on its departure from Angaur. It was necessary initially to draw on the supplies of the 1st Marine Division. The supply of medical items was improved as soon as the Division reserve stocks on Angaur could be transported to Peleliu. The supply of sterile linens was critical until a large sterilizer belonging to the 17th Field Hospital could be moved from Angaur to Peleliu.

D - INFANTRY TACTICS

The extremely rugged and easily defended terrain in the central combat zone of Peleliu made it necessary to improvise combat tactics to fit the situation, in order to bring an early end to enemy resistance and keep our casualties as low as possible under the circumstances. Enemy resistance was generally built around a series of caves, pillboxes, and strongpoints which in themselves were most difficult to approach and yet guarded all avenues of approach to them.

The development which enabled our troops to close in on the enemy and hold the ground gained was the sandbag fortification.

(*) Reference: Report of Operations on Angaur Island, Hq 81 Inf Div, for numbers and types of vehicles taken.

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Without it our troops inevitably suffered high casualties from enemy rifle and machine gun fire and more often than not found their positions untenable. The construction of mutually supporting sand-bag fortifications on newly occupied ground enabled our troops to withstand counterattack and sniper fire. As the area became more completely organized with similar fortifications the enemy was gradually driven to his inner defenses. The process was repeated until the enemy force was reduced to a small group and could withdraw no farther when the remnants were finally destroyed.

Wherever possible strong combat patrols composed of infantry, tanks, LVT flamethrowers, and armored bulldozers would be employed to sweep through an area and attack and seal all caves within reach. The Japanese had no effective defense against such an attack and generally remained in hiding in their caves. In this way large numbers of them were destroyed, as was evidenced by the number of bodies taken from caves after resistance ceased. Napalm bombs were used from time to time with good results. When the area of the combat zone was so restricted as to make the normal use of napalm bombs with contact fuse dangerous to our troops, fuses were removed so that bombs burst their casing on impact and covered an area with napalm fuel. After planes had cleared the area and before the napalm could evaporate, it was ignited by means of 4.2" mortar shells in such specific areas as desired. In this manner our troops were safe even though some bombs fell within our own lines. In areas where our troops were exceptionally close to the enemy, a similar effect was obtained by directing a stream of diesel oil on a specific area by means of an improvised oil pipe line connected to a fuel truck some 300 yards away. With the aid of a booster pump and nozzle at the end of the pipe line the effect of a garden hose was obtained. WP hand grenades were used to ignite the fuel which settled in crags and crevices in the area covered.

Attrition tactics were also employed to reduce the enemy's numbers. Grinlinton Pond between the Five Brothers Ridge and Walt Ridge was the only water supply point available to the enemy. Scores of Japanese were killed as they attempted to replenish their insufficient supply of water. A considerable number of the enemy was also killed as they foraged about for food. Many were killed on the reefs seeking escape to other islands.

E - ENGINEER

Engineer troops were active on Peleliu in supporting the infantry in combat operations, preparing bivouac areas for units of the Division and Island troops.

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Engineer troops offered valuable assistance to the infantry in the reduction of Japanese cave fortifications and in the construction of combat roads. In some cases armored bulldozers operated by engineers had to operate in front of forward elements to prepare routes of approach for tanks and LVT flamethrowers which found it impossible to negotiate the broken terrain found in many parts of the central combat zone. The construction of the ramp from Wildcat Bowl to the top of the east China Wall did much to hasten the final collapse of the enemy. The development by the engineers of the 300 foot pressurized fuel line served to facilitate the reduction of strongpoints against which ordinary weapons had no effect.

After arrival in Peleliu, the 306th Engr (C) Bn took over the operation of three water supply points and later developed others to serve troops on Ngesebus, Garakayo, and Ngeregong Islands. All water was obtained from shallow wells 8-12 ft deep. Testing of the potability of water was accomplished by the Island Command. Average consumption of water from engineer water supply points was 2.9 gallons per individual per day. Additional water was obtained locally for washing from rain water and chlorinated water pumped from wells within their areas. No restriction was placed on the amount of water drawn by units from their own supply points.

Engineer construction of temporary facilities was handicapped to some extent by a lack of construction materials. It was necessary to salvage practically all materials and rip dunnage to suitable size. Consequently, from four to six times the effort was required than would have been the case had suitable material been available.

Considerable construction of new roads and repair to existing roads and trails was accomplished by the organic and attached engineers, particularly in the area to the north of the central combat zone. In the area southeast of the airfield, attached engineers prepared a sizeable storage area for use by Island supply agencies.

Elements of the attached engineers did considerable work in the unloading of shipping, which was accomplished under the direction of the Island Command.

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F - MEDICAL

Medical operations were made particularly difficult by the extremely rough terrain encountered in the central combat zone. In many instances front line troops and even battalion aid stations were located on precipitous peaks which necessitated the lowering of casualties by Stokes Litters, ropes, and pulleys from sheer cliffs rising to heights of 100 feet.

The Division Clearing Co and 41st Portable Surgical Hospital set up a 300 bed hospital and performed many functions normally associated with station and evacuation hospitals.

Statistics for operations on Peleliu during the period 23 September - 27 November are shown below:

	Battle		Non-Battle			
	Wounded	Injured	Disease	Injured	Fatigue	Total
Received from Units	907	101	1285	237	179	2709
Returned to Duty	460	60	903	157	120	1700
Died of Wounds	84	5	0	0	0	89
Killed in Action	193	0	0	0	0	193
Evacuated	358	27	147	49	50	631
Remaining in Hospitals (*)	56	9	235	31	9	340

Flies

During the first four to six weeks of the Peleliu Operation the fly menace constituted one of the outstanding health problems. All normal measures of fly control were employed as the tactical situation permitted. The use of DDT spray in sufficient quantity to give residual doses to kitchens, messes, and latrines was highly effective. Sodium arsenite was used with success to control breeding in particularly bad areas. Beginning on approximately D plus 15, a plane employing a 10% solution of DDT began to spray the entire island at regular intervals. This method made the largest single contribution toward the complete control of the fly problem.

(*) Remaining in 17th Field Hospital, 41st Portable Surgical Hospital, and 306th Medical Bn as of 27 November 1944.

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Mosquitoes

Although information of enemy prisoners indicated that Dengue fever could be expected in epidemic form on Peleliu, no single case of confirmed Dengue was recorded. It is felt that the plane spray of DDT eliminated the Aedes Mosquito. Culex Larvae and Adult Culex were found, but not in numbers to cause great annoyance. Malaria was absent in the area; no anopheles mosquitoes were found. Normal control measures were effective.

Gnats

The Culicoides Peleliuensis, which is evidently peculiar to the Palau Islands, was the cause of extreme discomfort to all personnel. This gnat measures 2 to 3 millimeters in length and is a vicious biter. Its bites cause small red papules to appear, which in many instances become infected and rapidly reach the ulcer stage. The larvae and pupae forms of the insect were discovered in the mud of the mangrove swamp on the island. The gnats were most bothersome during early morning and late afternoon and evening hours. They would appear in great numbers for a four or five day period and then disappear for a similar period. It is believed that the peak emergence during the month coincided with the lowest tides. It is presumed that as large areas of swamp land and mud flats were exposed by the receding tides the gnats left their breeding places; as the tides flowed back over these swamp lands, their emergence was controlled. The elimination of the Culicoides Peleliuensis will probably involve extensive drainage or elimination of swamps, since experiments have shown that the insect in larvae form penetrates an oil film on water to effect breathing.

Amebic Dysentery

In mid-November, a routine examination of stools of diarrhea patients admitted to the Division Clearing Station Hospital revealed the presence of Endameba Hystolytica in both the motile and cystic forms. Precautionary measures were instituted immediately against possible sources of the infection. Water filters were operated at one-half the recommended rate to insure more thorough filtration. Disinfectant hand rinses were placed in all latrines and messes. Food handlers received early examination and when found positive were removed from the kitchens. Measures against flies were redoubled. Careful microscopic examination of the back-wash of filters and the sediment at the bottom of wells showed no amebic

cyst in the water supply. On at least one occasion, the organism causing the disease was found in the feces of a fly. These laboratory tests were performed by POA parasitologists and Division Medical personnel.

The infection rate in certain front-line units reached a maximum of 30-35 per cent. Where the tactical situation permitted the practice of better sanitation, units consistently had a much lower rate of infection. Treatment consisted principally of carbasone, emetine, or diodoquin. Initial checks showed these remedies to be 95% effective in eliminating positive stools. There was a marked absence of actual symptoms of amebic dysentery among those found to be harboring amebic infections. The incidence of appearance of bloody stools was rare.

Acute Infectious Hepatitis (Jaundice)


An outbreak of acute infectious hepatitis occurred early in November. Initially, hospital admissions were light; but they reached a peak of 10-15 admissions daily one month later. The total number of cases hospitalized was approximately 185. The percentage of jaundice cases was higher among troops who had been longest on front-line positions where standard sanitary procedures were not feasible. No deaths from Hepatic abscesses occurred as a result of the infections. Cases responded well to treatment and were returned to duty within a four to six week period.

Ulcers


A form of tropical ulcer was noted in many individuals. These infections responded well to treatment with sulfonamides. It was noted that normal treatment with ointments tended to prolong the presence of the ulcerated sores. It was determined that tropical conditions required less treatment with strong ointments than is required in temperate zone.



PICTORIAL




CENTRAL COMBAT ZONE



OLD BALDY




DEATH VALLEY




WILDCAT BOWL



CHINA WALL




TERRAIN IN 323RD INF RIDGE



TERRAIN IN NORTHERN END OF WILDCAT BOWL




75mm PACK HOWITZER



SANDBAG EMPLACEMENT



LVT FLAMETHROWER IN ACTION



IMPROVISED AERIAL TRAMWAY



INTERIOR OF JAPANESE CAVE




306TH ENGINEER CAUSEWAY



RADAR HILL



TERRAIN IN NORTHERN PELELIU



AMERICAN CEMETERY



JAPANESE CEMETERY



ORDERS

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13/192-lfs

Operation Plan

No. 12-44

HQ III AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
(TG 36.1)

In The Field

10 October, 1944.

MAP: Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, PALAU Islands, Sheets, 35, 36 and 37, Scale 1:20,000.

1. (a) See current C-2 Periodic Reports.
- (b) TF 32 continues naval support, Mag-11 provides necessary air support.
2. This Corps will continue the attack on PELELIU and ANGAUR, in order to capture or destroy the remaining enemy forces and complete the seizure of these islands.

For boundaries, see ANNEX "A" (Operation Overlay).

3. (a) 1st Marine Division, Reinf., with all forces available, attack with the utmost vigor and capture or destroy all enemy forces in its zone of action. Be prepared to assist, with artillery fire, the 321 RCT in the defense of PELELIU, NGABAD, NGESEBUS and KONGAURU.
- (b) 321st RCT pass to Corps control. Capture or destroy remaining enemy remnants on PELELIU within its assigned area. Defend PELELIU, NGESEBUS, KONGAURU, NGABAD, GARAKAYO, and the unnamed islands in Target Areas 167, 153, and 144.
- (c) Garrison Forces, PELELIU, revert to Corps control. Continue unloading and base development on PELELIU and defend that island within assigned area.
- (d) 81st Inf Div, Reinf., (less 321st RCT, and 323d RCT) continue elimination of enemy forces remaining on ANGAUR. Defend that island and continue unloading and base development thereon.
- (x) (1) Units having activities or installations located outside respective assigned areas may continue to occupy present positions by mutual agreement.
- (2) Air and naval support will be coordinated by Corps.
- (3) This plan effective 0800 ITEM, 12 October, 1944.

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12/192-lfs

10 October, 1944

Subject: Operation Plan No. 12-44

- 4. (a) Admin O 1-44 continues to apply.
- (b) Equal priority on all roads unless otherwise prescribed.
- 5. (a) Index No. 2-7 MARSOL.
- (b) CP's:

III PHIBCORPS	- TA 129 FOX
1st MARDIV	- No change
321st INF	- No change
Garrison Force	- No change
81st Inf Div	- No change

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL GEIGER:

M. H. SILVERTHORN
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

W. A. WACHLER
Colonel, USMC.,
C-3

Opn O No. 12-44

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13/192-lfs

Operation Plan

No. 14-44

HQ III AMPHIBIOUS CORPS,
(TG 36.1)

In the Field

18 October, 1944

MAP: Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, PALAU Islands, Sheets 37 and 39 of 40.

1. (a) See Current C-2 Periodic Reports.
(b) CTG 57.14 provides naval support.
CTG 59.6 provides air support.
2. This Corps, on about 20 October 1944, will turn over the ground defense of the Southern PALAUS to the 81st Infantry Division, Reinforced.
3. (a) 81st Inf Div, with 5th Marines, Reinf., attached; report to CTG 57.14 and assume responsibility for ground defense of the Southern PALAUS. Upon debarkation 323d RCT, direct 5th Marines Reinf., less 8th 155mm Bn, to return to RUSSELLS Islands. Upon arrival 48th CA Bn, return 8th 155mm Bn to GUADALCANAL. (For composition of the 5th Marines, Reinf., see ANNEX "A").
(b) 1st Mar Div, Reinf., (Less 1st Marines): Attach 5th Marines, Reinf., to 81st Div. Embark remainder of Division on vessels assigned by CTG 57.14 and return to RUSSELLS Islands.
(c) 321st RCT, with 1st Bn, 323d Inf attached; revert to 81st Inf Div.
(x) This plan effective upon order.
4. Supply - normal.
5. CP's III PHIBCORPS - No Change.
81st Inf Div - ANGAUR - PELELIU (To be reported).
1st Mar Div - No change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL GEIGER:

M. H. SILVERTHORN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff

Opn O No. 14-44

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1990-5-80
458/332

First Marine Division (Rein)
In the Field

Field Order
No. 3-44

September 22, 1944. 1400

MAPS: Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, Sheet 37 of 40 Sheets,
1:20,000, PELELIU. PALAU ISLANDS, 1:62,500.

TASK ORGANIZATION

1. (a) Combat Team - 1
(b) Combat Team - 5
(c) Combat Team - 7
(d) Combat Team - 321
(e) Arty Group
(f) Other Task Organizations as in Annex A, Operation Order No. 1-44 and as amended by Field Order No. 1-44.
2. (a) See current Intelligence summary.
(b) See Operation Overlay (Annex A).
3. First Marine Division (Rein), will continue the attack with the main effort on the West (left flank) in order to complete the seizure of PELELIU.

Time of Attack: 0700, September 24, 1944.

Line of Departure: Front lines occupied at time of attack.

For Boundaries and objectives see Annex A (Operation Overlay).

4. (a) CT - 1
Upon relief by CT 321 occupy and defend areas as shown on Annex A (Operation Overlay).
- (b) CT - 5
Upon relief by CT - 1 become Division Reserve and occupy and defend area shown on Annex A (Operation Overlay).
- (c) CT - 7
Attack to the Northeast in Zone of Action, seizing O-4. Be prepared for further advance on Division Order. Establish defenses in Zone of Action.
- (d) CT - 321
Relieve CT - 1 in positions now held by that unit. Attack to the Northeast in Zone of Action seizing O-4 and be prepared for further advance on Division Order. Establish defenses in Zone of Action. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

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- (e) Arty Group
Furnish direct and general fire support missions during advance.
- (f) Other Task Organizations carry out assigned missions.
- (x) (1) All reliefs will be completed by 1800, September 23 1944.
(2) Responsibility between units will be from left to right.

5. Supply normal.

6. (a) Communications according to III PhibCorps SOI.

(b) CPs:

1st MarDiv	As shown on overlay.
CT - 1	As shown on overlay.
CT - 5	As shown on overlay.
CT - 7	As shown on overlay.
CT 321	To be reported.

Other Task Organization as at present.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL RUPERTUS:

J. T. SELDEN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

ANNEX:

A - Operation Overlay. (Not inclosed)

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LtCol., USMC,
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First Marine Division (Reinf)
In the Field

October 8, 1944. 1400

Field Order
No. 7-44

MAPS: Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, Sheets 35 and 26 of 40
Sheets, 1:20,000, PELELIU.
PALAU ISLANDS, 1:62,500.

1. (a) CO, 321st Inf

You are hereby directed to send one (1) reinforced company to the island of GARAKAYO. The company (reinforced) will land, annihilate or capture the enemy forces, destroying any defenses thereon. Upon completion of this mission the company (reinforced) will return to PELELIU and make a full report of the action.

(b) The CO, 3d Armd Amph Tractor Bn by copy of this order is directed to furnish your company (reinforced) with ten (10) Armd Amph Tractors upon request by you.

(c) This mission will be accomplished by 1800, October 10, 1944.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL RUPERTUS:

J. T. SELDEN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

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First Marine Division (Reinf)
In The Field

October 10, 1944

1300

Field Order

No. 8-44

MAPS: Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, Sheets 35 and 36 of 40
Sheets, 1:20,000, PELELIU.
PALAU ISLANDS, 1:62,500.

1. Having seized and occupied the island of GARAKAYO, you are hereby directed to establish an outpost on that island. The outpost will consist of the following:

One (1) Rifle Company
One (1) Platoon Heavy MG's
Det Medical Company
Forward observers for 81mm mortars and artillery.

By copy of this order the CO, 3d Armd Amph Tractor Bn will assign six (6) LVT(A)s which will be attached to the outpost. The CO, Amph Trans Group will assign six (6) LVTs (Cargo) for purposes of supply.

2. The reinforced company will establish such defenses as are necessary to prevent the use of that island by the enemy. It will further prevent the movement of enemy forces from the North in order to reinforce PELELIU and NGESEBUS and, in addition, prevent enemy forces from escaping from PELELIU and NGESEBUS to the North.
3. Relief of personnel manning the outpost will be done as deemed necessary by you.
4. Responsibility for supply will rest with 321st Infantry.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL RUPERTUS:

J. T. SELDEN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff,

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/s/ L. J. Fields
/t/ L. J. FIELDS
LtCol., USMC,
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First Marine Division (Rein)
In The Field

October 13, 1944. 1500

Field Order

No. 9-44

MAPS: Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, Sheets 35, 36 and 37 of 40 sheets, 1:20,000, PELELIU.
Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, Sheets 1 and 2 of 3 Sheets, 1:10,000, PELELIU.
PALAU ISLANDS, 1:62,500.

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) CT - 5 Colonel H. D. Harris, USMC
5th Marines
2d Bn 7th Marines
Det 3d Armd Amph Trac Bn
726th Amph Trac Bn (less Det)(USA)
- (b) CT - 7 Colonel H. H. Hanneken, USMC
7th Marines (less 2d and 3d Bns)
Det Amph Trac Bn
- (c) CT - 321 Colonel R. F. Dark, U.S.A.
CT - 321 as at present.
Det 11th Marines
Det 1st Pion Bn
Det 1st Amph Trac Bn
Det 6th Amph Trac Bn
Det 3d Armd Amph Trac Bn
Det Navy Flame Throwers
- (d) Division Reserve Major E. H. Hurst, USMC
3d Bn 7th Marines
- (e) Arty Group Colonel W. H. Harrison, USMC
11th Marines (Less Dets)
3d Bn Corps Arty
8th Bn Corps Arty
- (f) Other Units 1st MarDiv (Rein).
1. (a) See current intelligence summary.
- (b) TF 32 continues naval support, MAG 11 provides air support.

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2. First Marine Division (Rein), will continue to attack in order to capture or destroy all enemy forces within its zone of action. In addition, furnish artillery fire in support of III PbibCorps forces on PELELIU, NGABAD, NGESEBUS, KONGAURU and GARAKAYO.

3. (a) CT - 5
Continue the attack until relieved by CT - 321; then occupy and defend the area now held by that Combat Team. Revert to Corps control at 1600, October 17, 1944, see Annex A (Operation Overlay).

- (b) CT - 7
Occupy area as shown in Annex A (Operation Overlay).

- (c) CT - 321
Commencing at 0800, October 15, 1944, begin relief of CT - 5 by battalions. On October 16, 1944, when two battalions of infantry of CT - 321 have been committed, control of all troops in the present zone of action of CT - 5 passes to CT - 321. Continue the attack. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

- (d) Division Reserve
Occupy assigned area (See Annex A, Operation Overlay) and await Division Order. Keep abreast of situation CT-321 in order to be ready for committal in any part of zone of action of that Combat Team.

- (e) Arty Group
Furnish supporting fires for CT - 321. Be prepared to furnish supporting fires for our forces on PELELIU, NGABAD, NGESEBUS, KONGAURU and GARAKAYO.

- (f) Other Units 1st MarDiv (Rein).
Continue to carry out assigned missions.

- (x) (1) Relief of CT - 5 by CT - 321 will be so effected that it will not interrupt the advance against the enemy.
(2) Units with troops attached to CT - 321 for purpose of holding certain sectors will rotate their personnel as arranged with CT - 321.
(3) Holding troops will be released as the advance permits.
(4) Search and seal or destroy all caves.

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- (5) Stretcher bearers will be assigned as required.
4. Supply normal.
5. (a) Index No. 2-7 MARSOI. Units will exchange wire systems.
- (b) CPs: See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL RUPERTUS:

J. T. SELDEN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

ANNEX:

A - Operation Overlay. (Not inclosed)

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/s/ L. J. Fields
/t/ L. J. FIELDS
LtCol., USMC,
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81 INF DIV
ANGAUR LANDING FORCE
2300I, 21 September 1944

FO NO. 17

MAP: ANGAUR ISLAND, Scale 1:10,000 - PELELIU, Scale 1:10,000.

1. a. See Intelligence Summary: To be issued.
- b. The FLEET and FLEET AIR ARM will support the operation.
2. a. RCT 321 (Reinf): In accordance with verbal instructions of CG 3rd PhibCorps, RCT 321 will embark on Beach RED 22 September 1944; move under naval control to PELELIU to support the 1st Marine Division to complete seizure of PELELIU. CO RCT 321 will report to CG 3rd PhibCorps aboard MT MCKINLEY for instructions. RCT 321 is constituted as follows under the command of Colonel Robert F. Dark:

321 Inf
Co A 306 Engr Bn Plus Det H&S Co
Co A (Plus Co D (Less 2 Plats) and Hq Det 306 Med Bn
Det 781 Ord (LM) Co
154 Engr (C) Bn (less 1 Co) Plus Det H&S Co
Det 592 JAS Co
Det 481 Amph Truck Co (20 DUKWS)
Co B 726 Amph Tractor Bn plus Det H&S Co
Co A plus Prov Mortar Plat 710 Tank Bn
Det Prov Gr Reg Co
Det Translator Intpr Team Hq Co CPA

- x. a. Loading on ships will be as follows on Beach RED:
 - (1) LVT 0700, 22 Sept.
 - (2) RCT 1000, 22 Sept.
 - (3) Co A Plus Prov Mortar Plat 710 Tank Bn, 23 Sept.
 - b. Brigadier General Marcus B. Bell is designated as liaison officer for the purpose of assisting and coordinating the move of RCT 321 from ANGAUR to PELELIU.
3. See Administrative Order No. 7.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PAUL J. MUELLER:

J. C. SHORT
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

/s/ Wm. R. Woodward,
/t/ Wm. R. WOODWARD,
Lt. Col., GSC.
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81 INF DIV (Reinf)
 ANGAUR ISLAND, PALAU GROUP
 1200, 18 October 1944

FO NO. 21

MAPS: ANGAUR ISLAND, Scale, 1:10,000.
 PELELIU ISLAND GROUP, Scale, 1:20,000.

1. a. The Japanese force on ANGAUR is reduced to a handful of survivors. On PELELIU the enemy is in a pocket near the center of the island in considerable strength and is conducting an organized defense.
- b. RCT 321 with 1st Bn, 323 Inf attached, operating as a part of the First Mar Div initiated an attack on the Japanese force on PELELIU on 16 October, having relieved the Fifth Mar Regt (Reinf), which assumed the defense of the island.
2. The 81 INF DIV (Reinf) will eliminate the remainder of the enemy from ANGAUR and PELELIU ISLANDS and will defend the islands from amphibious attack. The mission for PELELIU ISLAND becomes effective 19 October when announced RCT 321 will revert to control of the Division and combat elements of the First Marine Division will be attached to the Division.
3. a. (1) The ANGAUR DEFENSE FORCE, 81 INF DIV, Brigadier General Rex W. Beasley Commanding, will take over the mission of the Division on ANGAUR ISLAND at 0900, 19 October, and will operate the force in conformity with instructions of DHQ.

TROOPS

Hq Angaur Defense Force
 322 Inf
 Det Hq Div Arty
 317 FA Bn
 52 Engr (C) Bn (less Det)
 483 AAA (AW) Bn, pending transfer to ULITHI
 Det 81 QM Co
 Det 592 JAS Co
 Det 1st Plat Prov Gr Reg Co
 1 Plat 481 Amph Truck Co

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- (2) CG ANGAUR DEFENSE FORCE will utilize for defense purposes other elements of the Division on ANGAUR until they are moved to PELELIU. He will assist in effecting this movement. He will be responsible for the administration of all elements of the Division and attached troops while on ANGAUR. He will coordinate the operations and administration of his force with the Island Command, Army Garrison Forces, APO #264.
- (3) Current tactical missions and procedures for defense will remain in effect until otherwise ordered, except the 483 AAA (AW) Bn will take over CHARLIE OP No. 1 and include it in the BAKER sector, and 81 Cav Rcn Troop will relieve 306 Engr Bn in DOG sector effective 1700, 18 October 1944.
- b. Missions of troops on PELELIU reverting to control or attached to the Division remain unchanged until otherwise ordered.
- c. Advance DHQ, constituted by FO No. 20, is dissolved as of 0900, 19 October
- d. Troops will be moved to PELELIU in accordance with the following general priority beginning 18 October:

DHQ and Det Sp Trs
17 Field Hosp
306 Med Bn (less Det)
Co D 88 Cml Wpms Bn
81 Div Arty (less 317 FA Bn)(906 FA Bn will be moved from ULITHI when transportation can be made available.)
Sp Trs (less Det)
1138 Engr (C) Gp (less 154 Engr (C) Bn at PELELIU plus Det 52 Engr (C) Bn) (155 Engr (C) Bn will be transported from ULITHI).
41 Portable Surg Hosp
710 Tank Bn
592 JAS Co (less Det)

4. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS: See Adm O No. 16.

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5. a. (1) Index to SOI 2-7 (III PhibCorps) with 81st Div Supplement.
- (2) Radio: Angaur Defense Force, 81st Inf Div, will operate the Shore Defense Net (27.8 Mc) and a station in Div Comd Net (4360 Kc).
- (3) Wire: Angaur Defense Force, 81st Inf Div, will take over maintenance and operation of present Division wire net and switchboard.
- b. CPs:
- (1) Div CP - Vicinity Purple Beach. Opens PELELIU 0900 Item, 19 October; closes ANGAUR same time.
- (2) Div Arty CP - No Change.
- (3) 321 Inf - Present location, PELELIU.
- (4) 322 Inf - No Change.
- (5) 323 Inf - To be announced.

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/s/ Woodward

/t/ WOODWARD
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81 INF DIV (Reinf)
PELELIU ISLAND, PALAU GROUP
0800, 20 October 1944

FO NO. 22

MAP: PELELIU ISLAND GROUP, Scale 1:20,000.
ANGAUR ISLAND, Scale 1:10,000.

1. a. The Japanese force on ANGAUR is reduced to a few survivors. Major Goto, Japanese commander on ANGAUR, was found dead this date. On PELELIU the enemy in considerable strength is conducting a determined defense.
- b. The III Amphibious Corps turns over ground defense of the Southern PALAUS to the 81 INF DIV(Reinf) as of this hour. The First Mar Div is embarking, leaving the Fifth Marines (Reinf) on PELELIU attached to 81 Inf Div.
- c. CTG 57.14 (Comdr Sub-Area Western Carolines) provides naval support.
- d. CTG 59.6 (CG Air Defense Western Carolines) provides air support.
2. a. The 81 INF DIV (Reinf) reports to CTG 57.14. It will eliminate the remainder of the enemy from ANGAUR and PELELIU ISLANDS and will defend the Islands from amphibious attack. It will be responsible for ground defense of the Southern PALAUS.
3. a. ANGAUR DEFENSE FORCE, 81 INF DIV, Brig Gen Rex W. Beasley, Commanding, no change of composition or mission.
- b. 321 Inf with following attachments:
 - 1st Bn 323 Inf
 - Co D 88 Cml Wpns Bn (less Det)
 - Co A (plus Co D (less 2 Plats)) and Hq Det 306 Med Bn
 - Co A (plus Prov Mortar Plat) 710 Tank Bn
 - Det Prov Gr Reg Co
 - Det Translator Intpr Team Hq Co CPA
 - Det Navy Flame Throwers

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- (1) Will maintain constant pressure on the enemy by offensive action both day and night to annihilate the Jap force from PELELIU ISLAND within a prescribed zone of action (see overlay). The regiment will contain the enemy force until destroyed within a restricted perimeter (see overlay). Easily traveled exits from perimeter will be blocked with several bands of barbed wire which will be covered by automatic weapons fire. It will be especially alert to destroy a "ban-zai" counterattack.
 - (2) It will be prepared to move two battalions to defensive sectors on Division order to repel hostile amphibious landings.
 - (3) It will be responsible for beach defense within its zone.
 - (4) Its air support will be arranged through DHQ.
- c. Fifth Marines, Reinforced, Brig Gen O.P. Smith, USMC, Commanding.

TROOPS

Det Hq Bn 1st Mar Div	Co B 1st Med Bn
5th Marines	Co C 1st Med Bn
2nd Bn 7th Marines	Det 1st Serv Bn
Det H&S 11th Marines	Co A 1st Mtr Tractor Bn
4th Bn 11th Marines	1st Amph Tractor Bn (less Co C)
3d Bn 155mm (HOW) Marines	Det 6th Amph Tractor Bn
8th Bn 155mm (G) Marines	Det 8th Amph Tractor Bn
Co B 1st Pion Bn	3d ArmAmph Tractor Bn
Co B 1st Engr Bn	5th Sep Wire Plat
Det H&S 1st Med Bn	6th Sep Wire Plat

- (1) Will occupy and defend Northern Defense Sector (see overlay).
- (2) Detailed plan of defense including warning system will be submitted to DHQ prior to noon, 21 October 1944.

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- d. 81 Div Arty (less elements on ANGAUR)

TROOPS

Hq 81 Div Arty (less Det)
906 FA Bn
4th Bn 11th Marines (for operations only)
3d FA Bn (155mm How) Marines (for operations only)
8th FA Bn (155mm Gun) Marines (for operations only)

Will support the 321 Inf and will provide artillery support for the defense of PELELIU and adjoining islands.

- e. RCT 323 (Less units ashore in PELELIU, less 155 Engr (C) Bn in ULITHI): will debark, proceed to bivouac and await orders. It will reconnoiter combat zones. RCT attachments cease. Det Prov Gr Reg Co and Division Translator ~~Interp~~ Team Hq Co CPA are attached to 322 Inf.
- f. 306 Engr Bn: Will support the Division in PELELIU.
- g. Elements 592 JAS Co on PELELIU will assemble in designated bivouac. It will be under command of CO Special Troops. It will furnish service as required by Div Sig O.
- h. 726 Amph Tractor Bn (less Dets) on PELELIU: Will establish observation posts and defensive positions along the coast of the Southern Defense Sector. Arrangements for signal communication will be made through Div Sig O. Weapons will be dug-in, fields of fire cleared, and developed to maximum practicable extent, to facilitate fire against water-borne targets. Communications will be established with JOC in Hq Bldg.
- x. (1) All units will be responsible for local defensive measures to protect themselves against snipers and possible "banzai" attack.
4. Administrative Details: No change.
5. a. Index to SOI 2-7 (III PhibCorps) with 81st Division Supplement.

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b. CPs:

- (1) Adv Div CP - TA 129 B - Hq Bldg.
- (2) Div CP - Vicinity of PURPLE Beach - TA 132 G.
- (3) 5th Marines - TA 156 I.
- (4) 321 Inf - TA 147 U.
- (5) 323 Inf - TA 131 H.

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/s/ Woodward
/t/ WOODWARD
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81 INF DIV (Reinf)
PELELIU ISLAND, PALAU GROUP
1700, 24 October 1944

FO NO. 23

MAPS: PELELIU ISLAND GROUP, Scale 1:20,000.
ANGAUR ISLAND, Scale 1:10,000.

1. a. Japanese forces, estimated at 25,000, remain on islands in the PALAU GROUP north of our northern outpost line. The bulk of the forces are in BABELTHAUP. Major threat of enemy amphibious operation is an advance through inland waters by stealth on a dark night.
 - b. Offensive action against the Japanese forces on ANGAUR ceased 22 October when the last of the enemy on the island was either killed or captured. On PELELIU the enemy remains in considerable strength in an area in the central part of the island and is conducting an organized defense.
 - c. CTG 57.14 continues to provide air support.
 - d. CTG 59.6 continues to provide naval support.
 2. a. 81 INF DIV(Reinf) will eliminate the remainder of the enemy from PELELIU and will conduct ground defense of the islands of the southern PALAU ISLANDS.
 3. a. Angaur Defense Force, 81 Inf Div, will conduct the ground defense of ANGAUR.
 - b. 321 Inf (less 3rd Bn) with following attachments:
 - 81 Cav Rcn Troop
 - Det Translator-Intpr Team, Hq Co, CPA
- (1) Will relieve:
 - (a) 2nd Bn, 7th Marines, with 81 Cav Rcn Troop, by 0900, 26 October.
 - (b) 5th Marines by 1200, 26 October.
 - (2) Will occupy and defend the north defense sector from amphibious attack (see overlay).

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(3) Be prepared on Division order to move one Bn either to assist in the defense of the southern defense sector or to assist the 323 Inf in eliminating the enemy from PELELIU.

(4) CO 321 Inf will retain command of combat zone until 0800, 26 October.

b. 323 Inf with the following attachments:

3rd Bn 321 Inf
Co D 88 Cml Wpns Bn
Co C 306 Med Bn
Det Prov QM Gr Reg Co
Det Translator Intpr Team "A" Hq Co CPA
Det Navy Flame Throwers

(1) Will relieve 1st and 2nd Bns 321 Inf with one Bn of 323 Inf prior to dark 25 October.

(2) Will maintain constant pressure on the enemy by offensive action both day and night to annihilate the Japanese force from PELELIU ISLAND within a prescribed zone of action (see overlay). The regiment will contain the enemy force within a constantly decreasing perimeter until destroyed (see overlay for initial perimeter). Exits of escape from perimeter will be blocked with barbed wire and covered by automatic weapons fire. The regiment will be especially alert to destroy a "banzai" counterattack.

(3) Will be prepared to move two battalions to defensive sectors on Division order to repel hostile amphibious landings.

(4) Will be responsible for beach defense within its zone.

(5) Air support will be arranged through DHQ.

(6) CO 323 Inf will assume command of the combat zone at 0800, 26 October.

d. 81 Div Arty (Reinf) (Lieut. Col. John E. Barlow, Comdg):

<u>TROOPS</u>	
Hq 81 Div Arty (less Det)	8th FA Bn (155 Gun)
316 FA Bn	Marines (for operations only.)
906 FA Bn	
318 FA Bn	

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- (1) Will support the 323 Inf and will provide artillery support for the defense of PELELIU and adjoining islands.
 - (2) 316 FA Bn upon arrival PELELIU direct support of 321 Inf. Prepare alternate positions for defensive fires in Sector.
 - (3) 906 FA Bn relieves 4th Bn 11th Marines by 1200, 25 October. Direct support 323 Inf. Prepare alternate positions for defensive fires in N sector.
 - (4) 318 FA Bn upon arrival PELELIU in general support.
 - (5) 8 FA Bn (155mm Gun) Marines: General support. Priority to long range fire on approach channels from N inside barrier reef. (Position areas shown on overlay).
- e. Fifth Marines (Reinf), Brig Gen O. P. Smith, Commanding, is relieved from duty with the 81 Inf Div according to the following schedule for the purpose of embarkation:
- | | | |
|------------------------|------|------------|
| Fifth Marines | 1200 | 26 October |
| 2d Bn, 7th Marines | 0900 | 26 October |
| 4th Bn, 11th Marines | 1200 | 25 October |
| Hq 5th Marines (Reinf) | 1200 | 26 October |
| All other units | 0800 | 25 October |
- f. 306 Engr Bn: Will support the Division in the following priority:
- (1) Combat Engineer Missions, 323 Inf.
 - (2) Rear area installations and services.
 - (3) Island defense installations.
- g. 1138 Engr (C) Gp(less 52 Engr (C) Bn in ANGAUR and 155 Engr (C) Bn at ULITHI): Will support the Division in PELELIU.
- h. Elements 592 JAS Co on PELELIU: Attached to Special Troops. Will furnish services as required by Div Sig O.
- i. 726 Amph Tractor Bn (Co D 776 Amph Tank Bn attached): Will continue on present mission of defense in South (see FO No. 22), and support the 321 Inf in defense of the North Defense Sector with 1 Amph Tractor Company (less 1 Platoon) plus 1 Platoon Co D 776 Amph Tank Bn.

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- j. 710 Tank Bn: Will be held in Bn area combat loaded prepared to support the 323 Inf with one medium company (less 1 platoon) (plus 1 Platoon Co D) and defend the Island against amphibious attack.
 - k. 306 Med Bn (less Co C) 41st Portable Surg Hosp Attached: will provide hospitalization for Division (Reinf) on PELELIU.
 - l. 481 Amph Truck Co: Will support the Division.
 - m. 17 Field Hosp: Will support the Island Command, PELELIU.
 - x. (1) All units will be responsible for local defensive measures to protect themselves against snipers and possible "banzai" attack.
(2) Relief between units will be made in such a manner that the enemy will not realize the change has taken place.
(3) Firing of small arms in rear areas at any target other than the enemy will be dealt with severely.
(4) During Air Alert (Condition RED) or "banzai" counter-attack at night, blackout conditions will be effected on warning.
(5) If and when the "banzai" attack commences, the 323 Inf will notify DHQ by the fastest means available. Upon notification of the "banzai" all units will occupy defenses.
- 4. a. For bivouac areas and dumps, see overlay.
b. See Administrative Order No. 18.
 - 5. a. Index 2-7 to MAR SOI with 81st Div Supplement.
b. CPs:
 - 81st Inf Div (132 G)
 - 81st Inf Div Adv Msg Cen (129 B)
 - 321st Inf (156 K)
 - 323rd Inf (129 D)
 - 81st Div Arty (143 V)

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b. CPs: (Cont'd)

316th FA Bn (131 C)
318th FA Bn (142 Y)
906th FA Bn (155 E)
8th FA Bn Mar (122 O)
Co D 88 Cml Wpns Bn (156 Y)
710th Tank Bn (146 X)
1138th Engr (C) Gp (142 T)
306th Engr Bn (146 O)
306th Med Bn (156 P)
592 JAS Co (137 T)
726th Amph Tractor Bn (157 V)
481st Amph Truck Co (125 F)

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81 INF DIV (Reinf)
PELELIU ISLAND, PALAU GROUP
1130, 10 November 1944

FO No. 24

MAP: PELELIU ISLAND, Scale 1:20,000.

1. a. Japanese troops estimated by troops of LCI Flotilla 13 to number approximately 100 seized NGEREGONG ISLAND (TA 44-53) 9 Nov 1944 and drove troops of LCI Flotilla 13 from the island.
 - b. TG 59.6 bombed and strafed the island night 9-10 Nov and 10 Nov. CTG 59.6 will be requested to provide air support for seizure of NGEREGONG ISLAND.
 - c. CTG 57.14 will be requested to provide naval support for seizure of NGEREGONG.
2. In conformity with oral instructions from CTG 57.14 elements of the 81 INF DIV (Reinf) will seize, occupy and hold GOROKOTTAN ISLAND and NGEREGONG ISLAND (In the PALAU GROUP) until relieved by this Hq.
3. a. 81 Cav Ren Troop (less 2d Plat) with Det 4 Amph Tanks Co D 776 Amph Tank Bn and 5 Amph Tractors 726 Amph Tractor Bn attached, under the command of Capt W. D. Johnson, will seize, and occupy GOROKOTTAN ISLAND 11 Nov 1944. It will operate an observation post in the Division Net (NAN OP) until further orders. It will be temporarily detached from the 321 Inf for the seizure of the island and on order DHQ will revert to control of CO 321 Inf.
 - b. 321 Inf will remain on present mission. CO 321 Inf will prepare and submit plans for seizure of NGEREGONG ISLAND to this Hq for approval by noon 12 Nov 1944. Elements of the 321 Inf, in close coordination with naval support and air support, will seize (Date and time to be announced by DHQ), occupy and hold NGEREGONG ISLAND until relieved by this Hq. Air and naval support will be arranged through DHQ.

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- c. 81 Div Arty (Reinf): 1 Btry 318 FA Bn in direct support of 81 Cav Rcn Troop for seizure of GOROKOTTAN and 1 Btry 8th FA in direct support of 321 Inf for seizure of NGEREGONG ISLAND.
 - d. 726 Amph Tractor Bn (Co D 776 Amph Tank Bn attached): Will continue on present mission and support the capture of GOROKOTTAN ISLAND with 4 Amph Tanks and 5 Amph Tractors; be prepared to support the assault of NGEREGONG ISLAND.
 - e. All other troops: No change.
 - x. EEI: By observation and reconnaissance determine the location, armament and number of Japanese on NGEREGONG ISLAND.
4. Administrative Details: No change.
5. a. No change.
- b. Location of CPs of assault units will be reported. CPs all others - No change.

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/t/ WOODWARD
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DISTRIBUTION:
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By officer messenger:
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CTG 59.6
CO 321
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CO 726 Amph Tractor Bn
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81 INF DIV (Reinf)
CG GROUND DEFENSE, SOUTHERN PALAUS
PELELIU ISLAND, PALAU GROUP
0800, 14 November 1944

FO NO. 25

MAP: Special Map, PELELIU ISLANDS, Scale 1:20,000.

1. a. Japanese forces are reported to have moved onto NGEREGONG ISLAND in TA 193 on 9 November. Strength is estimated not to exceed one platoon.
 - b. TG 59.6 has bombed and strafed the island intermittently since 10 Nov. CTG 59.6 will be requested to have air support available on call from H to H plus 1 hour on D Day.
 - c. CTG 57.14 will be requested to provide at least two LCI gunboats to support the landing by fire on call and to be prepared to assist in evacuation of the wounded.
2. A detachment of the Division will seize and occupy NGEREGONG ISLAND by amphibious operation (Authority: Naval Speed-letter 10 Nov. 44, Com West Carolines Sub Area to CG 81st Inf Div).

Time of landing: D Day - 15 November; H HOUR - 0800I

Point of Departure: GOROKOTTAN ISLAND

Troops: Commander, Captain W. D. Johnson, Cav.

81st Cav Rcn Tr (less Det)

Det 726 Amph Tractor Bn (10 Amph Tractors)

Det Co D 776th Amph Tank Bn (4 Amph Tanks)

Det 481 Amph Truck Co (2 DUKWS)

Det 306 Med Bn

3. a. (1) 81 Cav Rcn Tr, Reinf, will assemble on GOROKOTTAN ISLAND on D minus one. It will move by amphibious vehicles (less Det 1 O,50 EM) so that leading elements will reach the West Beach of NGEREGONG ISLAND at H Hour. It will seize the northwest peninsula of the island, rapidly prepare hasty defenses, following which it will advance and occupy remainder of the island.

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- (2) 81 Cav Rcn Tr is detached from operational control of 321 Inf this date. Following occupation of NGEREGONG, this island and GOROKOTTAN will be occupied and held by 81 Cav Rcn Tr operating directly under DHQ.
- (3) NGEREGONG ISLAND will be garrisoned initially by the occupying force. Strength of the permanent garrison will be determined after occupation.
- (4) Subsequent to the capture of NGEREGONG ISLAND, and not later than 1700I 16 November, Dets 81 Cav Rcn Tr will relieve elements of 592 JAS Co now operating the Ground Defense OP System and will man OPs under Division control designated as follows:

Administration Bldg, TA 129 B - Charlie OP
Radar Hill, TA 156 Y - - - - - Easy OP
GARAKAYO ISLAND, TA 176 N - - How OP
NGEREGONG ISLAND, TA 193 - - - Nan OP

Special instructions will be issued by DHQ
for the operation of the above lettered OPs.

- b. 81 Div Arty will place 1 Btry 316 FA Bn in positions on GOROKOTTAN ISLAND not later than 1600I D minus 1 and will support the landing. It will fire a concentration until H minus 30 minutes with 1 Btry 8th Bn 155MM (G) (Marines), and additional concentrations between H minus 30 minutes and H hour; all other fires thereafter on call.
- c. Division Reserve: One rifle company 321 Inf and necessary Amph Tractors 726 Amph Tractor Bn assembled in vicinity TA 159 W by H hour D day prepared to move without delay on order DHQ.
- d. 592 JAS Co will be detached from 321 Inf and relieved from all OP duty not later than 1700I, 16 Nov, and assemble in unit bivouac preparatory to change of station.
- e. All other units: No change. Record is made of attachment of Co D 88 Cml Wpns Bn (less 1 Plat) to Div Arty and 1 Plat Co D 88 Cml Wpns Bn to 321 Inf by oral order DHQ 6 Nov.

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x. EEI: Determine location, strength, and disposition of all enemy on NGEHEGONG ISLAND.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPLY:

a. Supply:

(1) Rations:

- (a) Assault troops to carry 2 "K" rations.
- (b) 10 days "10 in 1" will be held in reserve on PELELIU to be sent to garrison unit when island is declared secure.

(2) Water:

- (a) 2 Gal per man per day for 2 days to be carried by troops.
- (b) 5 Gal per man per day for 10 days will be held in reserve on PELELIU to be sent to garrison unit when island is declared secure.

(3) Petroleum products as desired by CO 81st Cav Rcn Tr.

(4) Fortification and demolition materials as desired by CO 81st Cav Rcn Tr.

(5) Ammunition:

- (a) Basic load as prescribed by CO 81st Cav Rcn Tr to be carried by assault troops.
- (b) 2 U/F all types to be held in reserve on PELELIU to be sent to garrison unit when island is declared secure.

b. Evacuation:

(1) Initially by DUKW to LCI thence to Div Hosp at 156 P on PELELIU.

(2) 2 DUKWS assigned to 81st Cav Rcn Tr for evacuation of wounded for assault phase only; 1 to revert to Div when island is declared secure.

5. a. Index 2-7 to MAR SOI with 81st Inf Div Supplement.

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b. CPs: Division Commander aboard Command LCI. 81st Cav Rcn Tr CP as reported after landing. Division Reserve CP at TA 159 W, PELELIU.

c. Radio:

- (1) (a) 81st Cav Rcn Tr will enter Div Command Net (4360 kc) HOW minus 60 and will remain up on this net until the island has been secured.
 - (b) When NGEREGONG ISLAND has been secured, 81st Cav Rcn Tr will switch to Defense Net Frequency (4255 kc) on voice and use GOLIATH NAN as call.
 - (c) After NAN OP has been established, GOLIATH NAN will make reports to GOLIATH according to present system.
- (2) Command Liaison Net: 27.5 mc SCR 510; four stations, one at each CP as listed in Par 5. b. Div CP TA 132 G opens HOW minus 60.

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CG 81st Division Artillery 4
CO 321st Infantry 4
CO 322d Infantry 4
CO 323d Infantry 4
CO Sp Trs, 81st Infantry Division 6
CO 306th Engr (C) Bn 1
CO 306th Med Bn 1
CO 1138th Engr (C) Gp 4
CO 483d AAA (AW) Bn 1
CO 710th Tank Bn 1
CO 726th Amph Tractor Bn 1
CO 17th Field Hosp 1
CO 592d JAS Co 1
CO 41st Port Surg Hosp 1
CO 481st Amph Truck Co 1
CO Co D, 88th Cml Wpns Bn 1
CO Co D, 776th Amph Tank Bn 1

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